JENGHIZ KHAN

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WITH SEVEN MAPS IN COLOUR

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PREFACE

THIS book is an attempt to clarify one of the great periods of history, rather than to describe a man, because in spite of the fact that the man Temuchin, who won the title of Jenghiz Khan, was responsible for a human cataclysm with tremendous consequences to the future course of history, it must be admitted that the man himself remains a nebulous figure in the shadows.

We have no portrait of him drawn by a contemporary artist, we know nothing of his stature or his bearing. Although his order loosed the whirlwind, it is not known whether he muttered the instruction to some subordinate, or whether he stood erect as a soldier should and thundered his command to the waiting troops. The same is true of all the other great figures of this period who cut their names so deeply on the face of Asia. Chepe Noyon and Subutai Bahadur have left behind them nothing by which we can portray them, there are only their dreadful deeds for record that they existed at all.

All the great personalities of the Mongol galaxy have the same nebulousness. Of individuality, except in their application of the art of war, there is hardly a trace.

Therefore anyone who attempts to write of this period finds himself at a great disadvantage, because he is limited to describing the events and not the men who caused them. It is for instance a fact that Jenghiz Khan himself was fifty years of age when he commenced his first great campaign, and for the next sixteen years,

until the day of his death, was a commander-in-chief almost constantly in the field. Yet remarkable as this point is, there is hardly a reference to his age in the authorities I have consulted, and for an Asiatic fifty is old age. It is true that Chang Chun's narrative has come down to us, and that he actually spoke to the old Khan on many occasions, but as a true Chinese, Chang Chun is more concerned with his own philosophy than with a description of the greatest figure in Asia.

It is also true that there exist the Mongol legends and romances and the compilation by Sanang Setzen, but it seems likely that these may bear the same relation to actual history as the Iliad does to the history of Troy.

With these limitations then, the historian is left with the events and with geography. Strange to relate it is precisely in this last factor that I have found the scholars who have dealt with this period going astray. The reason for this must lie, I think, in the fact that the Mongol's contact with civilization was by means of wars of extermination. The sources from which the great orientalists have compiled their histories must have been written many years after the events occurred, and unless the chronicler had an appreciation of military problems and requirements he could easily have made errors both of time and place. For instance, Barthold, the great Russian historian, claims that he was able to use material which was not available to d'Ohsson, but d'Ohsson wrote with a better understanding of the military problems, even though he lacked adequate maps. The work of J. R. K. Douglas is almost unintelligible on this account. It took me many months to unravel the tangled thread that runs through the erudite labours of Douglas.

Under these circumstances, I have felt obliged to

devote an Appendix to the explanation of the chronological problems involved. The following pages were first published in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* in successive numbers during 1932 and 1933, but further research has required much rewriting and revision.

My gratitude must be expressed to Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, Col. E. L. M. Burns, and Major J. E. Lyon and to several members of their staffs, for their assistance in surmounting many problems. To Col. K. Stuart I owe a deep debt of gratitude for his advice and criticism. I have also to thank Dr. Meldrum Stuart for working out the date of the eclipse of the sun recorded by Chang Chun, because it provides a fixed chronological point in the history of the Mongol cataclysm.

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CHAPTER I

"Behold, a people shall come from the north, and a great nation. They shall hold the bow and the lance; they are cruel and will not show mercy; their voice shall roar like the sea, and they shall ride upon horses every one put in array, like a man to the battle. (Jeremiah l. 41, 42.)

IF we let our minds wander back through the centuries, past Imperial Rome to the ancient civilizations of the Eastern Mediterranean, even past them to the great days of Babylon, and gaze on the historical scene as it presents itself to our mind's eye, we gradually get the impression that in spite of the sunny skies overhead, there is a menace overhanging the scene that will one day overwhelm and destroy it utterly. To the civilized ancients, the land to the far north was all but unknown; but it was always a danger. To them it was a land of grass, inhabited by peoples of strange customs, swift in war by reason of the horses they rode, terrible in battle on account of the showers of arrows they discharged. But for the rest, this north country, this background, was dark and mysterious, a land of night and ice. Even as we let our minds wander over the changing scene, we can on occasion, see sudden influxes of wild and uncouth peoples, riding the whirlwind of destruction, ruining some civilized state, and then disappearing back into the dark from which they came. Sometimes they stayed and settled, as the Magyars did in Hungary, took to agriculture and became civilized themselves; then the lands from which they had originated would suddenly erupt again, and another wave of wild and savage horsemen would sweep down in an orgy of destruction, and the story would be repeated.

It was in this manner that the Kassite and the Hyksos descended on Babylonia and Egypt respectively in about 1800 B.C.

"They came in a strange manner," says Manetho of the Hyksos, for they came on horses, which had not been seen in Egypt before. They conquered Egypt as the Mongols were to conquer Khwarazm thirty centuries afterwards, without fighting a battle, and when their tide had run its course, it was to the north they retreated, to disappear so completely that their origin has not yet been solved.[1] The Cimmerians and other Scyths—armed with long swords instead of the nomad's weapon, which was the bow—paved the way for the conquering Mede horse-archers who ruined ancient Assyria. Better known are the Huns, who came all the way from the Great Wall of China to overrun Imperial Rome. Other peoples of this dark background of history, the same background which overshadowed Dravidian India, Ancient Assyria and Babylonia as well as Rome were the Magyars, Avars and Parthians, and the Aryan speaking peoples who overran ancient Persia and all Europe, also came from the north.

Very little is known about them, except by analogy with other nomads of the grass-lands, for most of their exploits occurred at periods when the light of civilization was dim. But there is one people, the Mongol, whose eruption took place in the full glare of history; and though there are gaps in the chronicles, yet there is sufficient material available, when pieced together, to make one of the most amazing stories of war and conquest

[1] It is interesting to note that both the Mongols and the Hyksos attached a religious significance to the shoulder blades of animals. (*Illustrated London News*, May 14th, 1932.)

In some parts of Tibet the same is true to-day. We will not stress this unduly, but the Egyptologist can take serious note of it.

in all history. So far did they march, and so fast did they ride, that the scholars who have attempted the history of the Mongols have never yet been able to refer to all the available historical sources in the original tongues. Parts of it are written in Mongol; but Chinese, Persian, Armenian, Latin, Russian, and Hungarian accounts exist, and the historian who would attempt a complete history written entirely from original sources, would have to be marvellously well-equipped linguistically for his task.

Originally the smallest of the tribes which kept their flocks and herds on the great Mongolian plateau, by hard fighting and sheer mastery of the art of war they won for themselves dominion over an empire stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic.

They began by devastating China, and before their course was run "in Asia or Eastern Europe scarcely a dog might bark without Mongol leave." Vologda, six hundred miles north of Moscow was to pay tribute to a Mongol khan, parts of Silesia were swept with fire and blood when the Mongol armies rode into Hungary. When Allenby's men entered Gaza in 1917 they occupied a town which a Mongol detachment had reached seven hundred years before, and Dunsterforce in 1919 crossed trails along which Chepe Noyon and Subutai and Hulagu had ridden. Tremendous as their eruption was, there is little enough written in English regarding the details, and in general histories the name of Jenghiz Khan is accorded but passing mention. Their path was paved with the ruin and desolation of civilizations, and the bones of millions whitened the tracks they rode. Jenghiz Khan himself is debited in one estimate with no less than eighteen million deaths in China alone—an estimate undoubtedly exaggerated—and he was to the day of his

death an illiterate nomad, clad in the tattered garments of a nomadic shepherd, the fuel of whose hearth-fire was camel dung. Conqueror of half Asia, he neither appreciated nor understood what civilization had to offer.

To read of his amazing campaigns, and those of his great subordinates, demands a re-adjustment of military values.

If Hannibal's fame as a great Captain rests on his ten years' campaign that began on the Ebro and ended at Zama, and especially on his victory at Cannae (the model on which a great German strategist planned the invasion of France in 1914), there are many Mongol commanders who marched further, crossed higher ranges, and fought battles as complete and as decisive as Cannae.

The march of Alexander from the Hellespont to the Indus will have to be compared with the campaigns of Chepe Noyon or Subutai Bahadur, who rode from China to the Crimea and beyond, fighting more battles and storming more cities than the Macedonian. Subutai, after Jenghiz Khan was dead, rode from China where he had been conducting a siege of the Chinese city of Kaifeng-fu in which occurs the first definite mention of gunpowder used in warfare, to lay waste Russia, Poland and Hungary, returning at last to die of old age in a tent by the Tola River and have his body thrown as food for the dogs as every good Mongol should.

The snows of Russia which ruined Napoleon were turned to good account by the Mongol cavalry. The very conditions which made campaigning impossible for that Great Captain, were utilized by the Mongol generals to make their task easier. Their campaigns in Russia were undertaken in winter, commencing with the first frosts and ending with the thaw, and after

three such campaigns Russia lay helpless beneath their feet.

But it is not entirely a story of great commanders. If the generals arrest the attention, the soldier who fought under their banners must not be forgotten. The Mongol strategy and tactics may indicate a consummate mastery of the art of war, but the instrument whereby the art was perfected was unique in its military capabilities.

To understand the Mongol conquests, it is first necessary to study the men who bore the fatigue and the exertion, and the animals which carried them.

When history first opened on the Mongolian plateau, it was inhabited chiefly by Turkish tribes. One small tribe, inhabiting the area watered by the Ingoda, the Onon, and the Kerulen, sources of the Amur River, was racially different from the Turkish tribes west and south-west of it, and from the Manchu Tatar peoples to the east. This tribe was known as Mongol.

From the viewpoint of language, it belongs to the great Turanian group, which includes Finnish, Lapp, Esthonian, Magyar, Turkish, Manchu, and Mongol. As language may be a key to race, it is possible that the peoples speaking this Turanian group of languages may have originated from a common centre, and then dispersed; with the Lapp and the Finn moving westward, followed by the Magyar; the Manchu and Mongol going north-easterly; and the Turks spreading generally southwards. A few thousand years of separation, or of wars of extermination, in which intermarriage with captives was a constant occurrence, may profoundly modify both speech and appearance. At any rate, racially the Mongol appears to be more closely related to the Manchu than

to the Turk, while in speech he is kin to the Turk rather than the Manchu.[1]

Mongolia itself is a vast plateau, commencing with an elevation of 700 to 1,000 feet at its western extremity in Sungaria and rising to about 3,300 feet at the Great Wall of China. Along the northern edge of the Gobi desert lie great grassy prairies, that merge into the Siberian forests south of Lake Baikal and the headwaters of the Yenesei. The plains were inhabited by a population of nomadic tribesmen who herded their flocks to pasture and whose wealth consisted chiefly of sheep and horses. In describing the Mongol, it must be remembered that he has changed his habits hardly at all in a thousand years. What was true of him in A.D. 1200 was true of him in 1900. The main alteration which occurred about A.D. 1200 was the loss of tribal independence.

Prior to that date the peoples of Mongolia were organized on a tribal basis, because true boundaries did not exist between tribal territories, except to the north, where the forest prevented the horse-riding population from living their normal life. The Gobi desert to the south was not a real barrier, because although it is an impassable obstacle to civilized troops, the Mongol and other tribes had little difficulty in crossing it. It is in no sense a Sahara, for after the rains there is sufficient sustenance of short grass, saxaul, and tamarisk, to enable horses or sheep to survive, if with difficulty. Wells exist, and armies frequently crossed it. In the forests to the north were other peoples of similar stock. Living in the mountain system of the Yenesei headwaters was a reindeer herding people, known as the Uriankhai. They lived in tepees made of birch-bark, similar in shape to those of the American Indian, and in the forests around them were

[1] *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed. Articles, Ural-Altaic, Turks, Mongols.

such animals as moose, wapiti, beaver and lynx. I mention them merely because it was this people that gave the Mongols one of their most famous generals, Subutai, who rose from the ranks to be acknowledged their greatest soldier when Jenghiz Khan died.

All the nomads of the plains and steppes of Asia were culturally very similar.

Their habitation, called a yurt, was a tent made of felt, with a domed roof and vertical sides.[1] In the extremes of climate in Mongolia, the tent must be both wind-proof and cold-proof, and it must also be portable. Depending on their flocks and herds, their whole scheme of life was based on mobility. As the flocks ate the pastures they had to be driven to new ones. If the water failed the whole tribe had to move. The tribal boundaries were as indefinite politically as they were uncertain geographically, which means that inter-tribal war was incessant.

The climate is what might be expected. There is no barrier to the icy winds that blow down from Siberia to fill the void created by the rise of the heated air of the Gobi. Sudden storms, low in temperature and of tremendous violence are the rule. In winter the cold is Siberian, in summer the heat is fierce, and in spring and autumn violent fluctuations of temperature occur without warning.

In such an environment, with its special characteristics of desert and vast prairie, its extremes of climate and its nomadic horse-riding population imbued with a desire for loot and brigandage, it is obvious that the individuals of the plateau would have characteristics differing from those of peoples inhabiting more fortunate lands.

[1] For a description of the nomad's tent, see Burnaby *Ride to Khiva*, Chapter XXII, Andrews, R. C., *Across Mongolian Plains* and *On the trail of Ancient Man*, p. 116.

The incessant movement, the necessity for keeping a constant watch for hostile raiders, and the life in the great open plains where a drop in temperature of fifty degrees in twenty-four hours was not uncommon, made the tribesman hardy and self-reliant and gave him courage.

He is a man who can exist where a civilized peasant would die of starvation and exposure, and the combination of mobility and hardihood beyond the ordinary has made the nomad a scourge of civilization whenever circumstances have united the dispersed population.

The Mongol is a man of middle height, with the gait characteristic of the horseman. His great leather boots and his sheepskin coat make him appear stockier than he really is, but observers all agree on his frank good-nature, his impetuous courage and his powers of endurance. His bearing indicates a self-reliant personality.

Candid and hospitable he is also credulous, and his good-humour is as liable to change as his own tempestuous climate. Life on the plains has developed his eye-sight to a remarkable degree, and he possesses a sense of direction and locality almost incredible to those whose talents of this kind have been blunted by civilization. If he knows of a well in the steppe fifty miles away, he can ride to it without hesitation, even though the plain be as trackless as the ocean itself. It may be this faculty which permitted him to cross hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles of land on his campaigns without a map, for there is nothing to indicate that the Mongol generals operated with anything more precise than the information brought in by scouts or spies.

From the time he can walk, he also learns to ride, and as he grows he never walks if he can ride. Even if the

distance to be covered is only a few hundred yards, he mounts the pony he keeps tethered to his yurt.[1] Normally he travels at the gallop. On journeys he is quite prepared to sleep in the saddle while his horse grazes, and usually for long distances he takes with him more than one pony, changing mounts when the one he is riding tires. These habits are not exceptional, they are normal to all individuals.

His powers of endurance are remarkable. "'No people on earth,' said Marco Polo, 'can surpass them in fortitude under difficulties, nor show greater patience under wants of every kind.'"[2] Carpini remarked, and his astonishment can be read between the lines, "they are very hardy. Even when they have fasted a day or two without any manner of subsistence whatsoever, they sing and are merry as though they had eaten their bellies full." Polo has described the Mongol soldiers.[3]

They carried little with them except their fighting equipment. For emergency rations they carried a preparation of milk curd. This was prepared by boiling mare's milk and taking off the skim as it formed. This skim was put into a vessel and dried in the sun to a consistency of hard cheese that resembled chalk. About ten pounds of this preparation was carried in a leather bag, made of antelope hide or sheepskin. For a meal, if other food was not available, about half a pound of the sun-dried curd was placed in another bag with a little water, and the jolting of the day's ride produced a thin porridge which sufficed for the evening meal. When even this was exhausted, the Mongol on occasion drank the warm blood of his horse which he obtained by opening a vein in the animal, a trick also known to the Scythians.

[1] Douglas Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, Vol. II, p. 322.
[2] Marco Polo, I. LIV. [3] Ibid. I. 49.

Their training to war was part of their life. Their main weapon was the bow, the arm of the nomad the world over. Constant practice with it was normal routine. A common feat was for three dummy figures the size of a man to be placed in a row about twenty paces apart. The archer galloped past at full speed, and as he passed he aimed an arrow at each figure. A Tatar saying reminds us of the early Aryans who were taught "to ride, to shoot, and to tell the truth." "The first and most important knowledge a Tatar must acquire is to shoot an arrow." He knew how to ride before he could walk, so that part of his education was taken for granted.[1]

According to Polo, every soldier carried a bow and two quivers, each of which contained thirty arrows. One quiver contained heavy arrows with broad heads and thick shafts, intended for close range against armoured troops, while the other held arrows with a light head and slender shaft for long-distance work. His armour was of leather, made by drying "green" hides before a fire until they became hard and stiff. His breast-plate and his helmet were often coated with plates of metal. In addition to his bow, he carried a heavy curved sabre or a mace for shock action. One thing that made his battles so much more decisive than those of most of the nomadic horsemen who preceded him was the fact that he had stirrups. Stirrups were unknown in the European world before the end of the sixth century, and Chinese references to stirrups are little earlier. Shock action by cavalry without stirrups could not possibly have been as violent as when stirrups were in existence. He also carried a lance, which could be slung over his back by a leather thong.

[1] Huc and Gabet. *Travels in Tartary, Thibet & China*, 1844-46, Chap. IV.

In addition to the active life and constant practice with his weapons which made him a proficient soldier when mobilized, his normal social organization was essentially military,[1] being based on a group of families commanded by an elder, usually elected. In each group every Mongol was liable for military service, and unquestioning obedience to the orders of a superior was required in peace as well as in war. It was the duty of each group to provide a certain number of warriors with a chief in command at a moment's notice. The "group" belonged to a clan, which was part of a tribe, and the powers of a tribal chief were very great. He had complete power of life or death over his subordinates —disobedience to a chief's order being invariably punished with death. In such a land, with other tribes as mobile as himself around him, speed of mobilization was essential. An example can be taken from recent history.

In 1842, during the Anglo-Chinese war, the Chinese called on some Mongol clans for soldiers. The order reached the tribe at sunrise.

By noon the shepherds had been called in and the tribe was ready.

It moved the same day.[2] "We are shepherds, it is true, but we never forget that we are soldiers also."[3]

In addition to the training for war that he received as part of his everyday life, the Mongol acquired a complete indifference to climate at his mother's knee. To fit him to withstand the violent changes of temperature, his mother will turn the toddling brat out of the yurt quite naked into the cold of winter or the heat of summer.[4] It is therefore hardly remarkable

[1] Buxton. *China*, pp. 184-191.
[2] Huc and Gabet. Chap. II. [3] Ibid. Chap. II.
[4] Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, Vol. II, p. 133.

that the survivors of the Mongol family-care and home-comforts could fight a campaign in a Russian winter; and his women were worthy of the men. Polo records their strength, and they rode with the menfolk if occasion demanded. At times, even, they took their places in the ranks. At the taking of Nishapur, it was the widow of a slain Mongol commander who led the stormers, and the wife of Jagatai, a prince of the blood, headed the assault at the storming of Bamian to distinguish herself by her ferocity, even in that ferocious blood-shed.

Essentially a shepherd in peace and a cavalryman in war, the picture will be incomplete without a description of the horse that carried him. If the rider is hardy and is prepared to suffer patiently, the Mongol demands the same qualities in his mount. It is a small animal, about thirteen hands, but what it lacks in speed and weight when compared with the horses of civilized cavalry, it makes up in stamina. It lives entirely on grass, because there is nothing else available. In winter it grows a coat of hair five or six inches long, for it knows no shelter from the icy Siberian winds as it paws in the snow for the dead grass which is its winter fare. In spring it rapidly puts on flesh when the green shoots appear, and if in condition it is capable of doing great distances on a minimum of food and water, like its rider. The Mongol to-day expects of his horse that it will be able to drag a cart all day in summer, averaging thirty to forty miles a day across the plains. For this, he will water it once a day—if water is available, often once in two days. When he dismounts from a long ride, he hobbles it and turns it loose to graze, but he expects it to work just as hard each day until he reaches his destination. Often, however, he sleeps in the saddle while the horse grazes. A Mongol on a single pony

will ride to-day from Urga to Kalgan, over six hundred miles by the shortest route, in nine days, the wells being about seventy miles apart.[1] If he is in a hurry he takes more than one horse. The distances which Marco Polo records that the Mongol couriers covered, two hundred and fifty miles between sunrise and dark, with a change of ponies at post stages every fifteen to twenty-five miles are therefore quite credible. In winter the horse is turned loose and the snow supplies its need for water.

When John de Plano Carpini crossed the plains of Russia on his way to visit the Great Khan, then at Karakorum, the Mongols advised him to exchange his western horses for some Mongol ponies, giving as the reason the fact that there was no fodder to be had and the western horse was unable to paw away the snow for the dead grass, and it would therefore starve to death. The plains pony, on the other hand, did not need either grain or cured hay, and could find sufficient for its needs.

Ayscough, describing a journey between Urga and Uliassuti by cart in winter stated that it was about seven hundred miles, and it was covered in eleven and a half days, " which was rather long. We should have been quicker had not the snow delayed us."[2] Elsewhere he mentions casually that his interpreter, " having covered (on horseback) one hundred and forty miles in twenty-four hours was quite game to go on."[3]

When Curzon rode from Meshed to Teheran, five hundred and sixty miles, in nine days, he mentioned that " this is slow rather than speedy travelling," and he records that the post goes through in five to six days, which implies ninety to one hundred and ten miles a day.

[1] Perry Ayscough, *With the Russians in Mongolia*, p. 136.
[2] Ibid. p. 205.
[3] Ibid. p. 174.

This remarkable staying power in both man and beast is common to all the steppe nomads. Burnaby noted the same attributes in the Kirghiz further west. He mentioned that when a Kirghiz horse is doing hard work in winter, it must be watered "every fourth day."[1] If this horsemastership appears extraordinary to the civilized cavalryman, another traveller David Frazer, who made the same journey as Curzon in sixteen days and took so long because his pony was dead lame over half the route, has summed up the difference between the civilized horse and the ponies of the steppes. "I have now been from end to end of Asia, and ridden horses in practically every country in it. The more one sees of Asiatic horsemastership, and the more one realizes what the Asiatic can get out of under-sized, three-cornered, and weedy animals the more convinced one becomes that we, who think we know all that there is to know about horsemastership, have still something to learn. It is undeniable that English breeding has evolved thoroughbreds for racing, half-breds for hunting and other purposes, and heavy horses for draft, that for shape, make and power are without rival in the world. But it is equally undeniable that in Asia there are horses equal to tasks that would puzzle our fine animals; but whose appearance would excite contempt in the cat's-meat man . . . With due deference to cavalrymen, I would ask if the methods which are suitable for sporting purposes, and which to a great extent are used in military training, are the methods most likely to turn out a horse fit to take the field in a campaign. It is dogma in English stables that feed should be little and often; but throughout Asia, so far as I am aware, it is a bellyful, and that seldom. Little and often may be right for a

[1] *Ride to Khiva*, Chap. XXVI.

horse that is to gallop a mile at top speed, but may not the other be right for animals that are required to do forty miles a day for an indefinite period?"[1]

To heighten the comparison, it can be noted that when Prince Edward of England in 1264 (when Kublai Khan was building his capital) marched from Nottingham to Rochester, a mere one hundred and fifty miles, in five days, he ruined many of his horses.[2] A Mongol commander would have covered the same distance in three days and fought a battle at the end of the journey.

Whatever we may think of the men, and of the brains that directed them in the field of battle, it is certain that without the endurance and stamina of the Mongol ponies, that carried their riders for sixty to eighty miles a day when it was demanded of them, and perhaps provided the rider with some of their blood at the end of the day's ride, the campaigns of Jenghiz Khan and his successors would not have been as extensive or as decisive as they were.

Certainly civilization has never produced the equal in staying power of either the man or his horse.

. . . . . .

It must be obvious that with such material available, the advent of a leader who could control it and use it to his purpose, would have serious consequences in the civilized world of the thirteenth century. Europe, then only semi-civilized, was in comparative chaos, "a body without a head, a state without laws or magistrates. Every state had a separate prince, and every prince had a separate interest." Asia was not quite so bad, but bad enough. So far as can be ascertained, Jenghiz Khan made little or no change in the military organization

[1] Fraser, D., *Marches of Hindustan*, p. 447.
[2] Oman, *Art of War in the Middle Ages.*

of the peoples who lay ready to his hand. His armies were simply the result of a scheme of things which had existed from long before his day. His main work was the unification of the tribes into a nation, and this gave the impulse to the cataclysm.

His smallest unit was the troop of ten men, commanded by the local troop commander. Ten of these units composed the squadron, and the troop commanders chose the squadron commander from their number. Ten squadrons formed the regiment under a tribal chief, or else the squadron commanders chose the regimental commander from among their own number. Ten regiments formed the "tuman," and the tumans were commanded by a general who was either a prince of the blood, i.e., a relative of Jenghiz Khan, or else was appointed by the Khan himself. Chepe and Subutai, most famous of Mongol generals, both rose from the ranks. When princes commanded armies of more than one tuman, we often find an experienced general acting as military adviser to the prince. Thus Subutai was frequently with Juji, Jenghiz Khan's eldest son, and on the latter's death, Subutai served under Batu, son of Juji, in the Russian campaigns.

In the Mongol tribal organization the discipline of peace was little different from that of war. Obedience to a senior was but a part of the iron discipline that was instilled into the tribesman from the day of his birth. D'Ohsson states[1] that if a superior considered that a subordinate had committed a fault, in order to punish him he had only to send him word of his sentence by any of his followers and the subordinate, even though he were at the other extremity of the domain, and a commander at the head of his troops, had to submit with

[1] d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols*, Vol. I, Chap. X.

respect to orders carried by a humble messenger, to stretch himself on the ground if the sentence was flogging or to lower his head if the sentence was death. Where other troops required pay for their service, the Mongol, instead of receiving pay, gave an annual payment to his chief, a tax of horses and cattle. When he went on active service he was not exempt from taxes, and his wife normally stayed behind to tend the flocks and pay the assessment.

In order to prevent desertion, it was forbidden a troop commander to receive in his command a man who had belonged to another troop.

No one, not even a prince of the blood, dare accept in his service a man who had deserted his previous chief.

In addition Jenghiz Khan required his captains to report to him each year to receive their orders and obtain his views. He made the rule that all officers should regularly inspect their men. All arms were to be examined, and he made a list of articles, including such items as files for sharpening swords and arrowheads, an awl and thread for repairing saddles, and needles for clothing, which every man was to have with him on a campaign.

Every expedition was preceded by a *Kurultai,* or General Council, at which were present the chief officers of the domain and of the army. The plans of campaign were discussed; and the staff, the numbers to be employed, the time and place of mobilization and concentration, were all decided and arrangements for supply and administration were made.

Having once given his orders, Jenghiz Khan left his subordinates with full responsibility and seldom interfered. A remarkable point about the Mongol campaigns was the presence of more than one

commander, without, apparently, any commander-in-chief.

Nothing is more striking to the student of military history than what appears to be a divided command, and the ease with which the system worked. Thus Juji, Jagatai and Ogdai the three eldest sons of Jenghiz Khan were in command of more than one operation. Nothing indicates that Juji, the eldest, was commander-in-chief. Chepe's name is linked with Subutai's for nearly three years. Only on one occasion did the divided command break down. At the siege of Urgenj, Juji and Jagatai disagreed, and the operations languished. Jenghiz Khan removed both and placed Ogdai in command.

The whole operation in the field was based on the mobility of the Mongol armies. They nearly always invaded a country with widely dispersed forces, with their superior mobility giving each army that security in the presence of the enemy which only concentration affords to the slow-moving armies of civilization. An offensive was normally carried out by widely separated armies, with each army apparently left to its own devices, and it is known that intercommunication between them was sometimes lacking. In the approach march, a screen of scouts rode ahead a day's march or more, say one hundred to one hundred and fifty miles in a wide semi-circle, and were supported by advanced detachments. This scouting screen prevented surprise and also brought in the necessary information. When we recall that the greatest European soldier, Napoleon Bonaparte, made use of a well-advanced and strongly supported cavalry screen, and that modern armies in 1914 limited themselves to mere patrols ten or eleven miles ahead of their main bodies, we have probably one important reason for such

" collision " battles as Mons, Virton, Ethe, and other Battles of the Frontier in 1914. With an effective scouting screen thrown far in advance the commander of an army not only prevents intelligence regarding his own forces reaching the enemy; but he also gathers information regarding the enemy's strength, dispositions, and location. Recent strategy, as evidenced in the early days of 1914, cared for none of these things, and in fact, more than one commander quite readily admitted that he knew very little about the opposing forces, and his ignorance was accepted as a matter of course.

Communication was normally by courier, but on the field of battle flags were used to make signals.

An almost modern feature was the concern of officers for their men. A troop was required to bring off its wounded, and serious loss brought about by a stubborn foe was considered to require revenge.

" We have lost many good men " is a refrain which was considered justification for refusing quarter to a defeated foe, or to punish a subordinate. It was with this phrase that Batu reproached Subutai for being too slow at the Sajo in A.D. 1242, during the Hungarian campaign, in his attack on the enemy's rear, and the grey old warrior who had won more battles than the young prince had seen years, found it necessary to explain.

They never entered an enemy's territory without first obtaining intelligence. Jenghiz Khan made use of disaffected elements in the other's domain, he used religious disputants, and he sent in spies.

Surprise and stratagem are the hall-marks of the commanders of his school. The word " Tatar " in the English language implies one who, being harassed and pursued, turns and rends his pursuers. It is the keynote of Mongol warfare, just as mobility was its basis. The

moment when the hostile commander saw a vision of victory within his grasp was the moment when his ruin was upon him. Thus Jelaludin near Isfahan in 1228 in his encounter with the Mongol army sent by Ogdai, threw in his last reserves to complete the rout of the Mongols before him, and as he rose in his stirrups in exultation to urge on the pursuit, he saw a fresh, strong tuman riding in on his rear, and he rode from his last fight almost alone. The Mongols considered a victory won by a straight soldier's battle almost discreditable. As Polo puts it, "It is just when the enemy sees them run, and imagines that he has gained the battle, that he has in reality lost it ; for the Tatars wheel round in a moment when they judge the right time has come." With these wild Asiatics, deception of the foe was ordinary practice, just as retreat from a battlefield to lure the enemy to his destruction was a common manœuvre, not a symptom of defeat. "The first principle of War is deception," is how the great Chinese general of Hulagu, the conqueror of Mesopotamia, summed up his successful methods. The employment of a ruse that deceived the enemy and caused him to walk straight to destruction, was the general's duty, and it is precisely in this regard that the Mongol victories are so noteworthy, in these days when the soldier's battle is the rule.

The soldier's battle was the exception in the days of Mongol ascendancy, and when cornered and forced to fight, as Juji was in 1218, or Kutaku at Parwan in 1221, the bigger men and heavier horses of their opponents overpowered the lighter Mongols.

When they intended to besiege a town, they first attempted to reduce the garrison by a ruse. Usually a small body would ride up as if to reconnoitre, and the garrison commander, if he was an able soldier would

send out his best men on their fastest horses to destroy it.

The Mongol detachment would retreat at speed, until it had drawn the pursuit past a place where strong bodies of Mongols were previously concealed. Then it would turn, and the pursuing horsemen would be attacked on all sides and annihilated. Once they began a siege, they seldom abandoned it, even if the reduction of the city took months. After their conquest of China, siege artillery, such as catapults and ballistae, accompanied every army. Served by Chinese or Persian engineers, it was made portable and mobile—real horse artillery that could be effective in siege warfare.

If Alexander can be said to have invented the pursuit, the Mongols brought it to perfection. They would pursue an army defeated in the field for days until it was completely destroyed, and if the enemy commander escaped by reason of the excellence of his mount he would be followed for months.

Neither chivalry nor humanity stayed them, and the absence of passion makes their warfare appear the more terrible. If their fearful massacres appear unique, let us remember that ancient warfare gave no rights to the vanquished. Alexander at Thebes, the Romans at Carthage, Jerusalem, Byzantium, Corinth, to name a few of the better known instances, and even the chivalry of England at Limoges, gave no rights whatever to the vanquished.

The Old Testament is full of examples of massacre following a success in war.

But the Mongols were swayed by no religion to enable the historian to make excuses for their dreadful excesses, and no patriotic motive spurred them on. All the fine rhetoric, for gods, or homes or country, so common with

Greek or Roman or more recent commanders, is absent—the order is given, the troops obey, and that is all. They would retreat for days before a superior but less mobile force until the lack of discipline and the disorder of the pursuit had disorganized their foes. Then the disciplined Mongols would change to fresh horses and fight.

Their use of a single arm simplified their problems. The weapons employed by their cavalry made possible a combination of fire and shock which won them victory when their generals had decided on the plan.

First would come the discharge of arrows as the galloping horsemen rode past the front of their foe, and when the hostile ranks were disordered the squadrons would draw swords and charge home. They always pressed on his flanks, working round them and distracting his attention. If the foe was well disciplined they would hold him with showers of arrows in front until a fresh body could ride home on his rear.

Sometimes, to this end, they would spread out in a long line, overlapping his flanks, and would even let him press on their centre, depending on their mobility to prevent disaster. Then the line would close in and while it kept the enemy employed on his front a strong attack would be pushed home on his rear—Cannae over again. And it was not often that the same proportion of men that escaped from Cannae escaped from a Mongol victory. The map on the next page shows the extent of their campaigns.

The effect of the Mongol impact on Europe is only just being given its due by history.[1] In fact the Mongol even gave a word to the English language, and they were never nearer England than Silesia. The word "ordo" or

[1] *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. IV.



JAPAN 1281 KOREA 1235 JAVA 1293 CENTRAL CHINA 1235 INDO CHINA 1279
TIBET 1257 BURMA 1284 CRIMEA 1222 SILESIA 1241 ROUMANIA 1242

" ordu " is a Mongol word meaning a camp or perhaps general headquarters. From it is derived the English word "horde" but with a changed significance. Anything less like a horde than the Mongol armies which overran Russia had not been seen in Europe since the Roman legions. This same word has also reached India. The *lingua franca* of northern India is known as " Urdu." When Timur (and a few others) had crossed the Indus, after marching across Persia, a camp lingo was invented, in which many Persian words were employed. The word " Urdu " is simply the Mongol word " ordo," meaning camp. And the citadel of Samarkand is called the " Urda " to this day.

MONGOLIA
IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

0 100 200 300 Miles

TANNU OLA MTS.
Ubsa Nor
Lake Baikal
Ingoda R.
Onon River
Dalai Nor
KHINGAN MTS.
LIAO-TUNG
LIAO-TUNG
Balkash L.
Ili River
Issik Kul
ALA TAU
BARLIK MTS.
CHUGUCHAK
Kara Irtish R.
Kobuk R.
ALTAI MTS.
NAIMANS
MERKITS
Selenga R.
Orkhon R.
KENTAI MTS.
MONGOLS
Tola
Kerulen River
TARTARS
Buyar Nor
URGA
ULIASSUTAI
KARAKORUM
KERAITS
BALA SAGUN
KULJA (ALMALYK)
SUNGARIAN GATE
SUNGARIA
PE LU (NORTH ROAD)
BISCHBALIK
TIAN SHAN
NAN LU (SOUTH ROAD)
KUMUL
UIGHURS
AKSU
KASHGAR
Tarim River
Lop Nor
YUMEN
GOBI
KERAITS
ONGUTS
Tzagan Nor
TOLUNNOEHR
MUKDEN
KALGAN
YENKING
TATUNGFU
Yellow River
ORDOS
ALA SHAN
NINGSIA
TANGUT
KANCHOWFU
NAN SHAN
KUN LUN MOUNTAINS
TIBET
SHENSI
SHANSI
CHILI
SHANTUNG
Present Course
Yellow River
KAIFENGFU
HONAN
TSIN LING MTS.
Koko Nor
Hon Ho
Hwai Ho

not put their trust in a mere boy. Some of the clans became openly hostile, and on one occasion, Temuchin was a captive awaiting death, but he managed to escape. His mother, one of those remarkable women who appear so frequently in Mongol history moved down the Onon with her family to the forested districts, where the little family was comparatively safe from raiding pastorals.

When Yessugai was alive, he had become blood-brother, that is to say, he had made a compact of eternal friendship and sealed the bond with blood, to Togrul, Khan of the Keraits, who were at that period the most powerful of the tribes of Central Asia. Temuchin, therefore, when still in his teens, took advantage of this blood-brotherhood and visiting Togrul, he asked his help to regain the position he had lost. The Kerait chief lent his aid, and Temuchin, in a succession of tribal wars, eventually won back the heritage which had been his by right of birth. By 1194, when he was thirty-two years old, his authority had so increased that his power in Eastern Mongolia was second only to that of Togrul, and the two chieftains are found in alliance acting against the Tatars of the Buyar Nor region.

These Tatars were the scourge of the Chinese in the vicinity of the Great Wall, and when victory resulted from the operations conducted by Togrul, he was given the Chinese title of Wang Khan or Great Commander. The Keraits at that period, like many of the other tribes of Mongolia, were Nestorian Christians, and the fame of Togrul spread through Christian tribes to Europe, where vague rumours after passing a thousand tongues, turned Wang to John, so that there grew up a legend of a wonderful Christian king who ruled a vast domain and was called Prester (or Presbiter) John.

It was in these early years that Temuchin learnt the

art of war. He must have conducted many campaigns against the pastoral peoples of the plains, and gradually he gained experience. Speed of execution and the surprising of his enemies were the keynotes of the methods he adopted; and if he behaved savagely towards his foes he maintained the principle that he had responsibilities for his subjects and his allies. As soon as he made it his policy to defend those who owed him allegiance from the attacks of hostile tribes his feet were set in the path of empire, for in that immense grassy ocean between the western mountains and the Great Wall there was no barrier on which he could rest his conquests. If he maintained that policy, geography would thrust upon him its eternal choice of empire or extinction, *sic semper imperia.*

Gradually his power extended, until at last the old Khan of the Keraits, growing fearful of a possible rival, and consumed with jealousy, attacked and defeated him. Temuchin had climbed high, but after his defeat by Togrul he sank very low. It was the great crisis of his career. The eastern plains of the plateau had been divided between two masters, from now on there could be only one. Allies and subject tribesmen deserted him in his hour of defeat, and even his Mongol clansmen wavered in their allegiance. His brother Kassar went over to the enemy, and the Keraits, thinking that his sun had set for ever, dispersed. Temuchin who had fled down the Kerulen with the remnant remaining loyal to him and had encamped under the shadow of the Khingan Mountains, seized the opportunity. He led his little force back by forced marches, and such was his speed that he reached Togrul's encampment in the vicinity of modern Urga before the news of his approach had reached the Kerait khan. Temuchin struck at once,

and the Keraits, completely surprised fled in utter rout in all directions.

Togrul and his son fled westwards, and a Naiman outpost killed the old khan as he attempted to climb a river bank that was the boundary between the Kerait and Naiman territory, while Togrul's son was killed later in the Uighur country.

By that decisive action Temuchin made himself master of the grasslands from Buyar Nor to the Selenga, and in one bound he had increased his power beyond that held by the Khan of the Keraits.

Such a figure on the plains caused a complete upset in whatever balance of power previously existed, and the western tribes, Naimans and Merkits, together with those Kerait clans who had not made their submission to Temuchin, at once formed an alliance against him for their own security. Temuchin, his own position threatened by such a formidable confederacy, marched westwards to settle the problem, and in the autumn of 1204 the two armies met.

From sunrise till dark the wheeling squadrons fought it out, and as the sun was setting Temuchin led in the reserves which he had been holding under his own hand, whereupon the Naimans broke. Their khan was killed on the field, while his son Gutchluk with the remnants of the Naimans and Merkits, fled south. We shall refer to Gutchluk again.

Temuchin could now afford to rest on his victory. He treated with leniency those of his enemies who submitted, and enrolled them under his standard.

Such, briefly, is the account of the rise of Temuchin, son of Yessugai. Being largely a matter of tribal war, with its concomitants of deceit, treachery, intrigue and murder, there is little in the details of the story which

is of interest to the historian, and therefore, the more legendary and romantic aspects have been omitted.

His next step was to ride south along the Altai Mountains, grass-covered and easy of ascent. Everywhere the tribesmen welcomed him, glad to offer submission to the great khan and place themselves under his protection, for he was now master of the plains from Ubsa Nor to the Khingan Mountains. When he heard that the Merkits were concentrating their scattered forces south of the Altai, he crossed the range and routed them in a battle fought on the banks of the Black or Kara Irtish, hunting the fugitives through the marshes and lagoons through which the river flows. The Merkits, already far from their homeland south of Lake Baikal, fled over the passes into the Lake Balkash region; but years later Temuchin was to seek them out and scatter them beyond recovery.

The victory on the Kara Irtish brought him into touch with civilization. Across the desert of Sungaria were the main caravan trails from China, the Pe Lu or North Road, and the Nan Lu or South Road, so called because they ran north and south respectively of the Tian Shan or Celestial Mountains, named because of their scenic beauty. The Uighurs occupied this area, which contained walled cities and depots of the caravan trade. The Uighurs were a settled Turkish people, the only Turks, be it noted, who settled down to till the soil and develop a civilization of their own. Everywhere else the Turk has taken root, he has conquered settled agriculturists and absorbed the civilization of the conquered.

The eastern Uighurs were subject to the king of Tangut, while the western Uighurs, stretching in scattered communities from Lop Nor to the Ili River were subject to the kingdom of Kara Khitay.

With civilization before him, and with its barriers of desert-steppe and grassy mountain ranges no obstacle to his mounted warriors, it is not to be wondered at that in 1205 we find Temuchin leading a raiding expedition against the caravans slowly crossing the dusty steppe between the Ala Shan and Lop Nor, where he obtained much booty.

In the year 1206 he summoned a Kurultai, or Great Council of Chiefs, and took the title of Jenghiz (Greatest or Mightiest) Khan.[1] He was now forty-four, and had commanded troops of horsemen from his youth. Master of the nomadic horsemen of Mongolia, for the future he was to wage war under entirely different circumstances.

For some years he was to wrestle with the problem of fortification; but the slow-moving armies of civilization were to offer no difficulties in the open. In the thirteenth century, as in the second decade of the twentieth, the defence had almost entirely mastered the offensive. In Europe, warfare was merely a matter of siege-craft,[2] and campaigns were limited to marches from one fortified city to another. But in Asia, Jenghiz

[1] This spelling of the name of the great conqueror is that adopted by J. R. K. Douglas and the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. The following are some of the variations available:

Gentchiscan -	Gaubil	Tchen-Kis }	
Genghiz - -	de Guignes.	Tsin-Kis }	Huc.
Zingis - -	Gibbon	Tchingis }	
Gengis - -	Voltaire.	Chinghiz -	Yule, Bretschneider.
Tchinguiz -	d'Ohsson.	Djenghiz -	Vambery.
Chingiz - -	Ross.	Tchink kiz -	Grouset.
Chengiz -	Sykes.	Jingis - -	Howorth.
Jenghiz - -	Douglas.		

A point to be noticed is that it is a title and not a name. At the Kurultai held to consider the title for the unifier of Mongolia, the title "gurkhan" was first suggested, but as Temuchin was even then the overlord of several gurkhans (i.e., great khan), it was considered unsatisfactory. At last a shaman exclaimed "Jenghiz Khan," meaning the greatest, bravest, or mightiest khan, and it was unanimously adopted. In the text I have used a title as a proper name, but I have deferred to custom in so doing. Obviously he should be referred to as *the* jenghiz khan, and the word Jenghiz should apparently never be used alone.

[2] "The defensive had obtained an almost complete mastery over the offensive so that famine was the only certain weapon of siegecraft." Oman, *Art of War in the Middle Ages*, Book VI, Chap. I.

Khan was to show that by means of surprising mobility he could make such headway that eventually he acquired the aid of civilized engineers with knowledge of siege-engines, and then he surmounted with ease the problems which the defences of civilization placed in his path.

II

When the thirteenth century opened, the south-eastern neighbour of the nomads of the plateau was the kingdom of Tangut, or Hsia as the Chinese called it, comprising the long strip of territory now known as Kansuh. It stretched from Lop Nor to the Ordos desert, and included within its domain part of Shensi, and possibly the Koko Nor country. It lay astride the most important caravan route from China to the west, and had its capital at Ningsia on the Yellow River. This caravan route ran through Kan-chow-fu to Kumul in the Uighur territory, and is part of the old silk road[1] to Samarkand, Persia and beyond. It was along this same route that the silk had come to Imperial Rome and Constantinople. Earlier still, the jade of Yarkand had made use of the western end of this road to cross the passes and arrive in Babylon or Nineveh two thousand years before Caesar. Marco Polo was to tread it thirteen centuries after Gaul had become a Roman province, and even to-day the caravan cart-wheels turn in the same old ruts which have felt the passage of thirty centuries.

Tangut occupied a position astride this road and must have made the most of its opportunities to tax the trade

[1] The actual route along which the silk travelled, appears to have been from Kan-chow to the vicinity of Lop Nor, and then by the route at the base of the Kun Lun Mountains to Khotan and Kashgar. There was also the route from Lop Nor along the north of the desert, following the Tarim River, via Aksu to Kashgar. A third route was from Lop Nor to Bishbalik, thence to Almalyk (See Aurel Stein, *On Central Asian Tracks.*) Yet another route was from Etsin Gol to Hami (Owen Lattimore, *The Desert Road to Turkestan*).

which made its way along it, for Tangut is known as the " robber-kingdom " in the Chinese annals.

North-east of Tangut lay the Kin empire, comprising the provinces of Honan, Shansi, Shensi, Chili, Shantung and Manchuria.

South of the Kin dominion lay the kingdom of the Sung, commencing at the southern boundary of Honan and stretching to the tropical forests. Between the Gobi desert and the Great Wall is the strip of prairie marked on modern maps as Inner Mongolia, known to the Chinese as the Land of Tall Grass, suggestive of rich pasture. This grassy strip was occupied by a nomadic people akin to the Mongols, named Onguts. The word " ongu " in Mongol means wall, and the Onguts were employed by the Kin as Guardians of the Wall and were paid a subsidy by the Kin ruler for this service.

The barrier between civilization and the mobile pastorals was the Great Wall of China. It is usually considered to have been built in the third century B.C. and to have been added to and strengthened in subsequent periods. Certain portions of it had existed long before the third century, and it is probable that this period merely saw the building of sectors which linked together separated fortifications. As a barrier to organized armies it was undoubtedly inadequate, for it would never have been defended along its whole length ; but as an obstacle to raiding parties of tribal horsemen it undoubtedly served its main purpose. Like the Roman walls in Europe, it was never intended as an impassable barrier, but a raiding cavalry force which crossed the wall would always have to remember that should it be harassed and pursued by government troops it might find its retreat to a passage in the wall cut off, and be faced with the problem of getting its horses over the

obstacle. Although it is marked on the maps as stretching from the Gulf of Chili to Kan-chow-fu in Kansuh, it is only in the northern sectors near Pekin that it is a well-built structure. It dwindles away to broken mounds of rubble and mud in its western sectors ; and the farther it was away from Pekin and government inspectors the less it looked like a wall, until at last it consisted merely of light earth-work with an occasional tower.[1] Even in Shansi and Chili, where the need of it was almost as great as in the Manchurian sector, it frequently consisted of brick and stone structure only in the passes and in the valleys where the trade routes run, disappearing altogether on the steeper slopes and ridges. Speaking generally, it runs along the crest of the escarpment formed by the sudden descent of the plateau to the plain of China. The border cities, always in contact with the tribes beyond the Wall, were strongly fortified in consequence, with well-built ramparts and many towers.

Some of them were to hold out through three campaigns of Jenghiz Khan, which is testimony to their strength. The country called Tangut had derived its name from conquering tribes originating in the Koko Nor country of eastern Tibet, who had made themselves masters of the territory north of the Tsin Ling range. If they had escaped Chinese rule in the earlier periods of their ascendancy they are found subject to the Sung kingdom in the eleventh century.

Then, during a period of expansion a hundred years later, they established their independence and conquered the Uighur lands to the west, and part of Shensi to the east. Ningsia was the capital, situated on the Yellow River, in an area where the periodical flooding of the

[1] Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, Vol. II, p. 427, *Encyclopædia Brit.*, art. China.

river enabled irrigation on a large scale to be practised by means of canals and ditches. The strength of the ramparts of Ningsia was augmented by a large area of swamp, filled with reeds and water-lilies, which surrounded the walls.[1] In the twelfth century Tangut became a vassal state of the Kin.

Tangut's first clash with Jenghiz Khan was in 1205 when he raided the caravan routes. Then in 1207, the year after he had been acknowledged the Mightiest Khan, he again set his forces in motion and harried a greater area, but apparently capturing no town of importance. In 1208 he remained quiescent in Mongolia but in 1209 he made a wide sweep through his domains. First, he led his army across the Altai Mountains and descended the slopes to the Kara Irtish, where Gutchluk, the Naiman chief, had collected the remains of the tribes dispersed by Jenghiz Khan four years before. In the subsequent battle, the Naimans and Merkits were utterly routed, Gutchluk himself fleeing to Bishbalik, the modern Urumchi. Finding there no refuge from his relentless foe, he rode on to Almalyk, near the modern Kulja, where he surrendered to the local representatives of the Khan of the Kara Khitay empire. His end had not yet come, but as he had made an enemy of Jenghiz Khan, his present escape merely meant that the final act was delayed. In the nine years still left to him he was to play a tortuous game of cruelty and treachery, so that it is almost with a sigh of relief that we will later read of his death at the hands of Chepe Noyon.

But the battle on the Kara Irtish bore immediate fruit. The Uighurs, part of whom were subject to Kara Khitay, were in rebellion against their rulers. The western Uighurs killed the Kara Khitay governor and

[1] Huc & Gabet, *Travels in China, Tartary and Tibet*, chap. XII.

sent an embassy to Jenghiz Khan asking his assistance. Next Arslan, Khan of Almalyk on the Ili River, sent secretly to Jenghiz Khan and offered to deliver the city to him. Opportunities for empire were growing all around him, and he took full advantage of them later when the time was ripe and his hands were free. For the present he had no quarrel with Kara Khitay, and as he was done with Gutchluk for the time being, he directed his army against Tangut once more. The son of the king led an army against the Mongols, and was completely defeated.

Then riding down from the Etsin-gol oasis, Jenghiz Khan surprised and captured the little fort of Yumen.[1] From there he over-ran the district of Egrigaia, north of the city of Ningsia.

His next move was to march on Ningsia itself. It was probably his first real attempt at siege-craft, and he failed completely.

The combination of wall and swamp was more than he could master with cavalry, so he attempted to guide the waters of the Yellow River against the city in order to undermine the walls.

He built a dyke and cut ditches, but for once China's Sorrow, as the river is termed, proved China's joy. The river rose in spate, swept over his dykes and flooded his camp, giving him no choice but to raise the siege and leave. He therefore came to terms with the king of Tangut, and cemented the treaty by receiving the king's daughter in marriage before he retired.

It has been previously mentioned that Tangut was

[1] Yu-men was a frontier fort for caravans. It is now in ruins and abandoned. In spite of the romantic atmosphere which clothes it,—its name means " Jade Gate "—it was probably a work of very little military strength. (See Aurel Stein *On Central Asian Tracks.*) It is the E. mun of Douglas, the I-mun of d'Ohsson, and the Ou-men of de Mailla.

subject to the Kin empire. The king of Tangut had asked help of the Kin in this campaign, and as he had not received it he broke his allegiance and accepted Jenghiz Khan as his suzerain. Later, when Jenghiz Khan was raiding through the Kin dominions, the king of Tangut assisted him by taking part in the invasion.

III

It was during Jenghiz Khan's homeward march from Tangut that he first clashed with the Kin. He was apparently riding home by way of the Ongut territory, for Douglas records that the Kin attacked an encampment of Mongols near Wu-shao-pao,[1] which d'Ohsson states is the fort in the Wall guarding the road to Ta-tung-fu.[2]

Next year, 1211, he determined to wage war on the Kin.

The nomads of Mongolia had for long paid tribute to the Kin, and when Togrul, khan of the Keraits, had waged war on the Tatars of the Buyar Nor region, it had been at the request of his overlord, the Emperor. After that campaign, the prince of Kin who had been sent to receive the tribute from the khans, had not impressed the wild nomad chiefs very favourably. It was this prince who now occupied the throne, and it is recorded that when Jenghiz Khan had heard of the accession of this monarch, he made very slighting remarks about his overlord. Incidentally, he flatly refused to pay tribute to such a ruler.

In March, 1211, he left his encampment on the banks of the Kerulen and moved nearer the Wall. The Onguts, instead of opposing him as they were paid to do, gave him every assistance and what information they possessed. Once before, in the days when the western confederacy

[1] Douglas, op. cit., p. 58.

[2] D'Ohsson, op. cit., I, Chap. LV, p. 129.


THE MONGOL CAMPAIGNS IN NORTH CHINA
1211-1216
0 50 100 200 300 MILES
Physical Features taken from War Office Maps series G.S.G.S. 2957.
LEGEND
Cities marked ● are of importance in the campaigns of 1211, 1212, 1213, and in Samuka's Raids.
Cities marked ○ were taken by Jenghiz, 1214.
Cities marked □ were taken by The Princes, 1214.
Route followed by Jenghiz in 1214
Route followed by Princes in 1214
Route followed by Kassar in 1214
Cities marked ⊙ remained untaken.
INNER MONGOLIA
LIAO SI
LIAO-TUNG
TOLUNNOEHR
MUKDEN
LIAO-YANG
Liao Ho
KU-PEH-KOW
CHIN-CHENG-HSIEN
KALGAN
SWEN-HWA-FU
PAO-AN-CHOW
HWEI-LAI-HSIEN
CHANG-PING-CHOW
KUYUNG PASS
TUNG-CHOW
YENKING
SUI-YUAN
KWEI-WA-TING
KU-KU-KHOTO
NING-YUAN-TING
FENG-CHEN-HSIEN
WU-SHA-PAO
SO-PING
TA-TUNG-FU
SI-LING PASS
CHO-CHOW
YICHOW
WALL
INNER
Pai Ho
TSOW-MAY-I.
AN-SUH
PA-CHOW
HIUNG-HSIEN
HOKIEN-FU
TAKU
GULF OF CHILI
SHOH-CHOW
SHEN-CHE-HSIEN
PAO-TEH-CHOW
NING-WU-FU
WU-TAI-SHAN
PAO-TING-FU
AN-PING
TSANG-CHOW
SHEN-CHOW
ORDOS
Yellow River
NINGSIA
YU-LIN-FU
KO-LAN-CHOW
NING-HSIEN
CHENG-TING-FU
TSIN-CHOW
KI CHOW
KING-CHOW
PIN-TING-CHOW
CHAO-CHOW
TEH-CHOW
Present mouth of Yellow R.
TENG-CHOW
LAI CHOW
WU-TING
PIN-CHOW
LIN-TSING-CHOW
TAI-YUAN-FU
TSIN-CHOW
SHUN-TEH-FU
LIAO-CHOW
WEI-HSIEN
TSING-CHOW
TSIN-AN-FU
CHU-CHENG-HSIEN
FEN-CHOW
SI-CHOW
Fen Ho
TUNG-CHANG-FU
TA-MING-FU
TZE-CHOW
LU-AN-FU
SHANTUNG
SHANSI
TUNG-PING-CHOW
FU-CHOW
YEN-CHOW
I-CHOW
PING-YANG-FU
KAE-CHOW
TSEH-CHOW
WEI-HWEI
SIN-SIANG-HSIEN
Mouths of Yellow R. before 1852
River
PU-CHOW-FU
HWAI-KING-FU
Yellow
KING-CHOW
MENG-HSIEN
KAIFENGFU
CHIEN-CHOW
YU-CHOW
TUNG-KWANG
Wei Ho
SI-AN FU
CHOW-KIA-KOW
TSIN LING MTS.
Han R.
Hwai Ho
HONAN
SHENSI
KANSU

had been formed to oppose his rising power, the Onguts had been invited to join with the Naimans and the Merkits; they had not only refused but had sent the information on to Jenghiz Khan.

With the khan were his four sons, Juji, Jagatai, Ogdai, and Tule. Each man of the highly disciplined cavalry force was protected by a breastplate and helmet of leather, and armed with a bow, lance, and sword or mace, while a large number of spare horses accompanied the army. This first expedition was not large, perhaps four tumans, of ten thousand each.

The commander of the Kin forces received timely warning of the coming storm, and he reported to the emperor that the Mongols were making armour and arrows and drilling their troops. He intimated that as Jenghiz Khan had made peace with Tangut, there could be no doubt but that the land of the Kin was the objective. The emperor would not believe that any cause for war existed, and he imprisoned his frontier general as a harbinger of evil.

But he was soon to be undeceived. Jenghiz Khan struck first at the unfortified frontier cities outside the Wall, the termini of the caravan routes from the west. Sui-yuan and Ning-yuan-ting were captured, and a shepherd informed the Mongols that a pass which leads through the Wall near So-ping was inefficiently guarded.

The Mongols at once attacked and captured the pass. Jenghiz Khan now directed his force on So-ping, capturing the city in July. A Mongol commander, named Chepe, who had risen from the ranks to become a trusted general, in the meantime had passed through the Wall at Wu-shao-pao, west of Ta-tung-fu. The Mongol forces then moved eastwards, up the long valley that runs between the loess hills south of the Outer Wall.

The main Kin army, hastily assembled, was concentrating at "the meeting of the waters" between Ta-tung-fu and Pao-an-chow. A Kin officer named Mingan, deserting his country in her peril, informed Jenghiz Khan of the Kin dispositions, and the latter, appreciating that the Kin advance guard had moved too far from the main army, seized the opportunity to attack and destroy it.

Following up his victory, he engaged and routed the main body, pursuing it to Pao-an-chow. Apparently the pursuit entered the city with the fugitives, for it is recorded that he captured it in October, 1211.

Having now succeeded in clearing the district of Kin troops he loosed detachments to raid through the area between the Inner and Outer Walls.

After some four months of massacre and destruction and a general harrying of the land, the terror of his name was having a serious effect on the civilized troops opposing him. Chepe, now in command of a detachment, while riding along the Inner Wall presumably seeking a means to cross it, approached the Ku-yung Pass, where the road from the capital runs through the Wall to Kalgan. As soon as the Kin troops guarding the fortified pass saw the approaching Mongols, they deserted the fort and fled.

Chepe at once rode through the pass, and harried the fugitives as far as Chang-ping-chow. The walls of the city completely baffled the Mongol horsemen, and Chepe turned his detachment and led his force to the gates of Yenking itself. The great capital of the Kin, standing close to where Pekin, the modern Peiping, stands to-day was one of the greatest cities in Asia.

Its population could have been little less than that of the modern city of Peiping, and its towering walls

must have been as strongly fortified as those of the city that succeeded it.

Chepe's detachment was probably small, possibly not more than three thousand strong, yet its presence in the suburbs created such an alarm within the capital that the Kin Emperor seriously considered leaving for the south. He was prevailed upon to remain, and preparations for defence were hastily taken. All men capable of bearing arms were pressed into service and no one was allowed to leave the city. These steps stiffened the Kin morale, and Chepe's force was checked on several occasions. That the daring Mongol commander was not destroyed with his whole force is evidence of the complete moral ascendancy the Mongols had established, and the hopeless state of the Kin.

Immediately after the fall of Pao-an-chow, when Chepe was frightening the Kin emperor out of his wits, the three eldest sons of Jenghiz Khan, Juji, Jagatai, and Ogdai were placed in command of detachments and directed southwards. First of all they ravaged the country districts outside the Outer Wall, stormed the cities of Shoh-chow and Shen-che-hsien, and then rode down the long valley of the Fen Ho to Fenchow and possibly beyond into Shensi.[1] While these raids were in progress, Jenghiz Khan and his son Tule raided in the opposite direction towards Tolunnoehr where the Imperial pastures lay.

In the beginning of winter the armies concentrated and encamped north of the Great Wall.

The Mongol khan must have been well satisfied with

[1] D'Ohsson following de Mailla, states that the princes rode through the districts of Youn-nei, Tong-shen-chow, Vu-chow, Sho-chow, Fun-chow, and Kin-chow. With the exception of Sho-chow and Fun-chow, on the Fen-ho, these names are uncertain, but if Kin-chow is the modern King-chow and Vu-chow is Fu-chow in Shensi, then his Youn-nei may be Yu-lin-fu. If such be the case then the Mongol raids covered an enormous extent of territory. De Mailla lists fifteen cities taken, but I cannot find them on the map.

the results of this essay against the Kin dominions. His raiding parties had driven the Chinese to the shelter of their walls and the daring operations of the Mongol leaders, who had contemptuously ridden through the heart of the country, had undoubtedly established such a moral superiority that Jenghiz Khan was satisfied that the conquest of China north of the Yellow River was a feasible operation.

IV

The Mongols resumed hostilities in the early spring of 1212 by ravaging the country north of the Outer Wall, from the Yellow River eastwards. While they were engaged outside the Wall, important developments occurred in Manchuria.

This country was a province in the Kin empire. In about A.D. 900 China had suffered one of its periodical phases of disintegration, when the military governors of the provinces are left to their own resources, causing them to take charge and rule their own territories and incidentally make war on their neighbours. At that period the southern part of Manchuria was occupied by nomadic tribes known as the Khitan, who appear to have been a blend of Mongol, Korean, and Tungus strains. In 907, a Khitan chief made himself master of the tribes bordering on the Gobi, and such success attended his arms that in 916 he proclaimed himself emperor or great Khan. Like Jenghiz Khan three centuries later, he conquered the whole of the plateau of Mongolia from Kashgar to the Wall, and next he invaded China.[1]

It was the son of this Khitan chief who eventually took the throne of China, giving the name of Liao (iron) to his dynasty.

[1] Howorth. Vol. I, Chap. I. Kervin *L'Empire chinois et les Barbares* (Pekin).

Later on, this Khitan dynasty of Liao dominated southern China, then recovering from the period of confusion and ruled by the dynasty known as Sung. The territory subject to the Liao dynasty was widespread, for it appears to have ruled all Central and Eastern Asia from Lake Balkash to Manchuria. It was this dynasty also which gave to ancient China the name which was familiar to Arab, Persian and Turk, and through them to Europe. Cathay is simply Khitay, the land of the Khitan, modified by foreign mispronounciation.

During the next two centuries the hardy Khitan tribesmen degenerated—to use the term commonly applied by historians when attempting to analyse certain human phenomena—for they became civilized and their descendants lost the ability to ride eighty miles a day and fight a battle at the end of it. On them descended the more primitive tribes from the Amur country in northern Manchuria. Led by a chief named Ajuta, these new invaders drove out the Khitan emperor and followed the normal course of conquest in China until stopped by the barrier of the Yellow River, then the boundary between the Liao dynasty and the Sung of the south. It was a Khitan prince of the Liao dynasty who, retreating first to Tangut and finding no refuge, fled west along the caravan route until he came to Almalyk, near the present Kulja, and there founded a kingdom he named Kara Khitay, i.e., Black Cathay, perhaps in memory of his old home. The capital of Kara Khitay was later established at Balasagun, south of Almalyk, not far from the present town of Tokmak.[1] It was the misfortune of this dynasty founded by the fugitive prince

[1] The position of Balasagun has long been doubtful, but by plotting Chang Chun's itinerary on the 1 to 4,000,000 map, it can be located somewhere near the modern Tokmak. (Chang Chun, *The Travels of an Alchemist*, Geo. Routledge & Son, London.)

of Liao that it survived until the rise of Jenghiz Khan, because although the Mongol was to put an end to the rule of the conquerors of the Liao dynasty, he was also responsible for the extinction of Kara Khitay as an independent state.

In 1142 the Province of Honan was ceded by the Sung to the new conquerors from the north, and the son of Ajuta seated himself on the throne of North China and founded the dynasty of the Kin. It was this dynasty which Jenghiz Khan was now attempting to extinguish. Disaffected elements of the Khitan, however, had survived in the old Manchurian homeland, and remembered the days when they were masters of Eastern Asia. When Jenghiz Khan raided the Kin pastures in the autumn of 1211, an official from Manchuria entered into negotiations with him and suggested that Manchuria could assist him in his operations.

Early in 1212, the Kin emperor became alarmed at the developments in Manchuria, and sent a message to Yaylu Liuko, governor of Southern Manchuria, demanding an explanation.

Liuko, a prince of the Khitan house of Liao, promptly raised the standard of revolt and sent an embassy to Jenghiz Khan, who first dispatched an officer to investigate the situation; but when he heard that the Kin were sending an army to quell the revolt, he dispatched a force of three thousand men under Chepe Noyon. With the aid of the Mongols, Liuko defeated the Kin army, capturing all its baggage, which the tactful Khitan prince sent as a present to Jenghiz Khan.

The Kin ruler now fell back on that most successful weapon in Oriental warfare, bribery; but when Liuko refused his offer he sent another army. This force was also disastrously defeated and took refuge behind the

double walls of Mukden where they were safe for the time being. Towards the end of the year Chepe raided through Liao-tung (Liao-tung—the country east of the Liao River) drawing the Kin attention from Liuko who was attempting to establish himself in Liao-si (Liao-si—the country west of the Liao River). It was during this raid that there occurred a good example of the Mongol use of stratagem to make good deficiency in strength.

Chepe ravaged Liao-tung and halted before Mukden in December, 1212.[1] Its strong double walls, of which the outer ring was about five miles in circumference, and the inner about three,[2] were quite beyond the capabilities of his small cavalry force, so the Mongol deliberately abandoned his camp before the city, and slowly rode away. He retreated slowly for some days, and then he ordered his men to change to fresh horses at nightfall. Turning his force about, he rode back at full speed along the way he had come. Reaching the city, and finding the vigilance of the garrison relaxed, with the gates open, he rode straight in. With the capture of the strongest city in Manchuria, Liuko appeared to be firmly in possession, and Jenghiz Khan gave him permission to call himself king.

Chepe Noyon, however, remained in Manchuria, until the next year, when he left the country to ride into Jenghiz Khan's camp outside Yenking.

While these events had been taking place in the north, Jenghiz Khan had resumed his operations to the south. In the spring of 1212 he had passed through the wall and had again commenced his systematic ravages.

[1] The chief authorities for this invasion of China are d'Ohsson, Howorth and Douglas. In places where there is a difference in the chronology in these three authorities, I have relied on the date given by Douglas.

[2] Buxton, *China*, p. 220.

First he captured one or two places of minor importance in the prefecture of Swen-hwa-fu, moving from there to Ta-tung-fu. He determined to lay waste the whole country between the Inner and Outer Walls, because he could not pass through the Inner Wall to attack the capital city of Yenking while strong forces remained behind him. He settled first to the siege of Ta-tung-fu, the strongest city of the intra-mural area, after ordering Muhuli, one of his best subordinate commanders, to clear the Outer Wall.

At a place some thirty miles from Kalgan, Muhuli found a Kin army forty thousand strong well posted in a strong position.

Muhuli reconnoitred the Kin army personally, and then rejoined his force. He had noticed that the Kin were badly provided with armour, and he decided to pit his little force against the much superior Kin army. At the end of the day, when the quivers of his horse-archers had been emptied into the close-packed ranks of the Chinese infantry, the Mongols drew their swords and charged. The pursuit went on as far as the head-waters of the Pei-ho, and Kalgan fell into his hands.

Jenghiz Khan, however, was not having things his own way before Ta-tung-fu. Badly provided with siege-engines, if indeed he had any of these necessities of siege-warfare, his first assaults were all repulsed. But a Kin army which was sent to relieve the city was literally exterminated, for whatever difficulties he might experience with fortifications, he could still welcome a chance of meeting a Kin army in the open. After his victory he returned to the siege, but again his assaults were repulsed and in late summer he was wounded by an arrow in the foot. He was then fifty years old. His wound caused him to withdraw his forces earlier than

he had intended; but he left Chepe in Manchuria to contain as many of the Kin as possible. In September, also, Jagatai, with better fortune than had attended his father's effort at siege-craft, had stormed and gutted Feng-chen-hsien near Ta-tung-fu.

With the Mongol withdrawal, the Kins re-occupied the cities which the Mongols had taken; and when Jenghiz Khan returned in the spring of the following year, he had all his work to do over again.

This was probably the reason why he then destroyed the cities he captured in the inter-mural area, and razed them so "a Mongol horse would not stumble when it went across them."

CHAPTER III

Devastations such as had never been heard of, whether in the lands of unbelief or of Islam, which can only be likened to those which the prophet announced as signs of the Last Day when he said. "The Hour of Judgment shall not come until ye shall have fought with the Turks, men small of eye and ruddy of countenance, whose noses are flat, and their faces like hide-bound shields. Those shall be the days of Horror." (Najmuddin of Rei).

I

JENGHIZ KHAN re-entered China in 1213. He had now in his army Chinese deserters, and among these were engineers who could build siege-engines; and the border fortresses fell one after another. He commenced by re-capturing the cities which the Kin had again occupied after his departure the previous year. Tule laid siege to Pao-an-chow, and stormed it, while a Kin army was met and destroyed near Hwei-lai-hsien, just north of the Inner Wall. The pursuit after the battle went as far as Ku-peh-kow, the famous old fortress of the Wall guarding the pass that leads from Jehol to the Northern Capital. The day had not yet arrived when the Kin forces could face the Mongols in the field, and d'Ohsson states that the ground for four leagues was covered with the bodies of the slain.[1]

In August, Swen-hwa-fu was stormed by Jenghiz Khan himself, and the capture of this great city practically completed the devastation of the intra-mural area. Then to add to the Kin troubles, the king of Tangut, in revenge for the indifference of his overlord the Kin

[1] D'Ohsson, op. cit., I. Chap., LV., p. 135-136.

emperor when he had requested help in 1209, invaded the southern districts of the Kin and laid siege to King-chow.

As the intra-mural area was now thoroughly devastated and therefore impossible for the Kin to re-occupy, Jenghiz Khan at the end of summer determined to carry the war beyond the Inner Wall. The Kuyung Pass (the present Nan-kow Pass) leading directly to the capital, was strongly guarded, for the Kin had learnt their lesson when Chepe Noyon's little band of raiders had ridden through in 1211. Jenghiz Khan therefore left a detachment under a general named Kitboga to watch the northern approaches of the Pass and to guard his rear, while he himself led the main army westwards along the Inner Wall. He was able to master the Si-ling Pass, defeating the Kin troops who attempted to bar his progress. For the first time, the dreadful banners of the main Mongol army were seen in the very heart of the Kin dominions. His presence inside the Inner Wall at once had an enormous effect on the Kin troops. They commenced to desert their standards by thousands as their only hope of life was to take service under his banner.

By the end of the year the Mongols had attached to their armies no less than forty-six brigades, numbering approximately one hundred thousand men in all.[1]

Immediately the complexion of his warfare changed. The addition to his arms of a multitude of siege-engines,[2]

[1] D'Ohsson so gives it. The number of men in each brigade is not calculated, but Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, states that the invasion "was helped by the revolt of a hundred thousand Khitans."

[2] The Chinese siege-engines were manually operated. Instead of using the principle of the counterpoise as with European types, the Chinese used ropes operated by manual labour. Hence the Mongol custom of rounding up the peasantry to assist in their sieges. For a full description of medieval engines, see Yule, *Travels of Marco Polo*, Vol. II, Chap. LXX.

and men who understood how to use them nullified the value of the fortifications surrounding each city. The intra-mural area had held him for three years; but now the rest of China north of the Yellow River fell to him in three months.

His first task on passing the Inner Wall was to clear a breathing space. He stormed the cities of Yi-chow and Cho-chow in the autumn, while a detachment captured the northern fort of Ku-peh-kow, thus opening communications with Manchuria where Chepe Noyon was operating.

By this time the whole country was in despair, and dissension in the capital was dissipating what little strength of will was left to the Kin government. The Mongol raiding parties scoured the country in all directions, and the next revolution occurred in Yenking itself. A general who had been degraded for cowardice murdered the emperor and set the emperor's brother on the throne.

While these events were occurring in the capital Chepe rode into the khan's camp outside Yi-chow. Jenghiz Khan, taking advantage of the presence of so able a subordinate, at once instructed him to clear the Kuyung Pass, and Chepe was equal to the task.

He stormed the passage with its guardian fortresses from the eastern side, and effected a junction with Kitboga. These two detachments, only five thousand strong in all, were formed into a corps d'elite which was afterwards called the Khan's bodyguard.

With all the important passes in his possession, and with an ample supply of siege-engines and men to work them available, Jenghiz Khan now determined to bring the government to its knees.

He concentrated his forces south of the capital, and

sent most of his Chinese infantry to besiege it. In December, 1213, he set his cavalry in motion, and in three columns he swept through the country.

The right wing under his sons Juji, Jagatai, and Ogdai, made a sweep south to the banks of the Yellow River and then turned west. His own army kept a parallel course as far as the Yellow River and then wheeled east. The left wing under Kassar, brother of the great khan marched eastwards to the sea, and then wheeled northwards into Manchuria.

All the Province of Chili east of the mountains was covered in the movement of the three armies. The right wing, swinging west along the north shore of the Yellow River, wheeled northwards again to cover the Province of Shansi. Jenghiz Khan, with whom was Tule his youngest son, and Muhuli, swept along the Yellow River to I-chow and then assumed a general northerly direction.

Muhuli took a detachment and besieged Chu-chenghsien, not far from where the modern fortress of Tsingtau was built by Germany.

The defence was stubborn, and the city delayed him when the main army marched on : in revenge the Mongol butchered all the inhabitants when he eventually stormed the walls.

The fact that the massacre receives special mention may be possibly due to its being the only city so treated ; because such speed attended the whole operation that it is impossible to believe that the resistance offered to the Mongols by most of the cities could have been serious. It was always the policy of the Great Khan to be merciful to those who submitted but savage towards those who resisted. Altogether some ninety cities of major importance were taken by the

three armies, and only nine were able to repulse the Mongols.[1]

[1] According to Douglas, the cities captured by the right wing under the sons of Jenghiz Khan were :—

	Modern Spelling		*Modern Spelling*
In the Province of Chili			
Tsing-yuen-heen in Paou-ting-foo	(Pao-ting-fu)	Ganting	(?)
Suy	(Tsao-may-i ?)	Hing	Tsin-chow)
Gansuh	(An-suh)	Ming	(?)
		Tsze	(Tze-chow)
In the Province of Honan			
Seang	(Sin-siang-hsien)	Mang	(Meng-hsien)
Wei-hwuy	(Wei-hwei)	Leo	(Liao-chow)
Hwai	(Hwai-king-fu)		
In the Province of Shense (i.e., Shansi)			
Tsih	(Tseh-chow)	Pa	(Pu-chow-fu ?)
Loo	(Lu-an-fu)	Fun	(Fen-chow)
Leaou	(?)	Shih	(Si-chow)
Tsin	(Chien-chow ?)	Lan	(Ko-lan-chow)
Ping Yang	(Ping-yang-fu)	Hin	(Shen-che-hsien)
Tai yuen	(Tai-yuan-fu)	Tae	(Pao-teh-chow)
Keih	(?)	Woo	(Ning-wu-fu)
Heen	(?)		

The cities captured by the army under Jenghiz Khan and Tule were :—

In the Province of Chili		**In the Province of Shantung**	
Heung	(Hiung-hsien)	Gan	(?)
Pa	(Pa-chow)	Puh	(Pu-chow-fu)
Mo (35 li north of Jin Kew Heen)	(?)	Po (Lew Ching Heen)	(Lin-tsing-chow)
Gan	(An-ping)	Tse	(Tsing-chow)
Ho-keen	(Ho-kien-fu)	Taegan	(Tai-an-fu)
Tsang	(Tsang-chow)	Tse nan	(Tsin-an-fu)
King	(King-chow)	Pin	(Pin-chow)
Heen	(?)	Tae	(?)
Shing	(Shen-chow)	Yih-too	(Yen-chow ?)
Ke	(Ki-chow)	Wei	(Wei-hsien)
Le	(Lin-tsing-chow)	Tang	(Teng-chow)
Ke	(King-chow)	Lae	(Lai-chow)
Kae	(Kae-chow)	E	(I-chow)
In the Province of Honan			
Hwa	(?)		

The cities which successfully repulsed the Mongols were :—

Tung	(Tung-chow)	Ta ming	(Ta-ming-fu)
Shun	(Shun-teh-fu)	Tung-ping	(Tung-ping-chow)
Chin-ting	(Cheng-ting-fu)	Tin-	(?)
Tsing	(Tsin-chow-chi)	Pei	(?)
Wuh	(Wu-ting-)		

The army under Kassar, called Hochar by Douglas, conquered the districts of Sucho, Pingluan and Lease. Lease is Liao-si, the country of the west bank of the Liao River ; but I am unable to determine the two former places. Once in Manchuria, the Mongol army would be operating in wide plains such as those they knew so well further west, and it is possible that this northern raid may have extended as far north as the territory through which the old Chinese Eastern Railway runs at the present day ; but it appears likely that it was limited to areas of Chinese settlement, which could not have extended much farther north than Mukden.

The operation completed, the three armies concentrated at Taku, near the sea.

There are certain features about this remarkable campaign which are noteworthy. That only nine cities were able to survive must be ascribed to the methods adopted by the Mongols in the use of their siege-engines. They gathered in the surrounding peasantry and forced them to perform all the manual labour such as the haulage of rocks for the engines, and then, when the breaches were made in the walls, they forced their wretched captives to lead the storming parties, thus shielding the Mongol soldiers from the arrows of the defenders. The defenders, also, seeing their own friends and relatives placed as targets for their missiles, would undoubtedly be perplexed and dismayed, and would be prevented from using their weapons to best advantage.

The outstanding feature of the campaign is the distance it covered and the speed with which it was completed.

One of the best-known marches in modern times was when Stonewall Jackson's army marched two hundred and forty-five miles in thirty-five days, or an average of seven miles a day.

But if we presume that the Mongols commenced their march in the first week of December at the earliest, and completed it by the middle of April at the latest, it implies that the army under Jenghiz Khan rode some eight hundred miles, stormed twenty-eight important cities and were repulsed from four others, in approximately one hundred and twenty days. If we allow a delay of two days on the average for the siege and capture of each city, then it means that this army averaged over twelve miles a day for four months in the depths of winter. It is true of course, that the Mongol armies would be split up into many detachments, so that

the delay of one detachment need not necessarily mean the halting of the whole army ; but nevertheless delays due to sieges must be deducted from the movement. The right wing under the three sons of Jenghiz Khan marched some three hundred miles further than the army commanded by their father, and took some thirty cities of major importance : if we make the same deductions for delays, it means that the right wing averaged about seventeen miles a day for over three months.

If to civilized ideas, the behaviour of the Mongols towards the peaceful peasantry was revolting, it must be pointed out that the Mongols were not civilized. In the accomplishment of their aims, nothing but force governed their actions. If they gave no mercy, they expected none themselves. In their own wars on the thinly populated plains of Mongolia, the conquered expected death as the price of defeat, and sometimes even asked for it. The killing of a surrendered foe was as natural to the wild pastorals as it was to the hunting Redskin—it was part of the code of their warfare. Civilization requires density of population to till the fields and manufacture the articles necessary to a settled existence so that slaves may have an economic value but the life of the pastoral nomad is made easier by the absence of dense population. To the pastoral, an abundance of captives merely means more mouths to fill. The pastoral Hebrews when entering Palestine behaved in the same manner as the Mongols—the same mode of living produced the same code.

But to the Mongol belongs the credit that he did not plead that his religion demanded massacre. At least he stands on his own feet to take the judgment of history, and if he has any apologists, they need not

insult the intelligence by pleading that his excesses were due to an order given by God.

When troops operated under such a code of war, the problem presented by the densest population in the world must have caused a modification in their savagery, not from any spirit of compassion; but from sheer physical inability to persist in the continued butchery. It is unlikely that the three armies could have mustered more than thirty to forty thousand men each, and the land they conquered must have had a population of sixty to seventy millions of people. It must also be remembered that the raid took place in the winter, when the harvest would have been gathered in; so that the grim spectre of famine would not have faced the surviving population.

In April, 1214, the armies were concentrated, and the Mongol generals were eager to move on Yenking. But Jenghiz Khan refused.

Disease (smallpox and typhus naturally suggest themselves), probably contracted in the looting of the unsanitary cities, was ravaging the Mongol ranks, and the horses, after a winter campaign of four months, were worn out.

Instead of moving on the capital, Jenghiz Khan sent a message to the Kin emperor offering to make peace on certain terms. He pointed out that, with the exception of a few cities, the whole country north of the Yellow River was in his hands, but he was prepared to abandon his conquests on payment of sufficient tribute. In this amazing offer, I think we can see the nomad chief puzzled and perplexed by the problems which civilization presented him: with the mode of life of the inhabitants not only strange to his nature but also repugnant to his own culture. Had it been a con-

quered pastoral territory, he could have turned his flocks and herds (his only form of wealth) into the pastures of the conquered. Not so in civilized fields and cities, where the plough had spoiled the grazing, and buildings occupied large areas. It had taken him three years to destroy an enormous number of people; but the land was still teeming with human life. He had conquered it as a nomadic shepherd chief; but as Yeliu-chutsai the famous Chinese councillor was to point out to his son, it was useless to him if he intended to remain on horseback. Civilization is fundamentally settlement based on agriculture, and the nomadic pastoral simply cannot live where civilization exists. He has either got to become civilized or die.

To the Kin emperor, the offer of Jenghiz Khan was a gift from Heaven. He gave the Mongol all he asked, and the nomads with their immense waggon-train filled with booty, and numerous captives in their train, rode past the capital and through the Kuyung Pass. On the other side of the pass, the Mongols butchered all their captives out of hand, because they were of no further use, and continued their triumphant march homewards.

The Kin emperor proclaimed a general amnesty, apparently including all those who had deserted his armies to fight under the Mongol banner. This act of wisdom was followed by a step which was to prove his ruin.

Having no faith in the safety of his capital with such a terrible neighbour on his frontiers, he decided to leave Yenking and transfer the Imperial Court to Kai-feng-fu in Honan across the Yellow River, which had proved to be an impassable barrier to the Mongol armies. It was urged by stouter-hearted councillors that he was abandoning the greater and richer part of his empire; but the fear of the Mongol was predominant over all other

considerations in the mind of this civilized descendant of Tatar warriors. In the month of June, 1214, he abandoned the Imperial city, leaving the Crown Prince behind him as regent.

Other difficulties afflicted him almost immediately. Part of the Imperial bodyguard consisted of Khitan (i.e., Manchurian) horsemen, and the emperor, not trusting their loyalty owing to events in Manchuria where a Khitan was now king, gave orders for them to be disarmed. The bodyguard, loyal till then, promptly mutinied and sent messengers to Jenghiz Khan, suzerain of Manchuria since 1213. In the meantime they killed their commander, elected their own officers, and rode back towards Yenking. A body of troops which attempted to bar their passage was routed, and next, Jenghiz Khan who was encamped north of Tolunnoerh sent two tumans hurrying down to their assistance. Shortly afterwards, Liuko, his vassal in Manchuria, sent word that a Kin army was invading his territory.

The war at once flamed up afresh. Muhuli was immediately ordered into Manchuria, and a Mongol general by the name of Samuka, with one tuman, was sent to reinforce the two tumans already in the vicinity of Yenking.

As soon as the Mongol forces entered Kin territory, there again commenced the wholesale desertion to their banners by the Kin troops. Samuka, with his combined force of three Mongol tumans, and a large number of Kin deserters which he placed under the command of Mingan the Kin general who had deserted to Jenghiz Khan in 1211, marched on Yenking, investing the great city in August, 1214.

The Crown Prince managed to escape through the Mongol lines in the autumn, and it is likely that the

city had not been prepared for a new siege after the treaty of peace in April; but nevertheless the siege dragged on through that year and into the next.

In April, 1215, the Emperor, safe in Kai-feng-fu for the time being, sent a large convoy of provisions under the protection of the largest army that could be raised, in an attempt to replenish Yenking's rapidly diminishing supplies. Just north of Pa-chow the Mongols awaited its coming, and in the ensuing battle the army was annihilated and the convoy captured.

In the meantime, Muhuli was campaigning in Manchuria. On the departure of Kassar's raiding army the previous spring the Kin had raised a force—presumably from the walled cities remaining loyal to the Kin—and had retaken part of the territory which Liuko claimed for himself. Fate played into Muhuli's hands, as it usually does when a mobile force commanded by an energetic leader is operating against a hesitating enemy.

As he was marching into the country, in August, 1214, one of his advanced detachments captured the newly appointed governor of Mukden,[1] that city having fallen once more into Kin hands, and with the governor were his letters patent signed by the Emperor. The Mongol officer promptly rode to Mukden, and displaying the emperor's seal, gained admission.

Then this audacious Mongol in some way prevailed on the commandant to remove the guards and sentries. Three days later Muhuli arrived with the main body and rode into the city.

It was not only on the field of battle that the Mongol's

[1] Where Douglas speaks of Mukden, d'Ohsson calls the city Liao-yang. Douglas, however, used the Chinese sources, where d'Ohsson was only able to utilise translations.

mobility was decisive, for by their speed they often outstripped the news of their coming. Like another great conqueror[1] eighteen hundred years before Jenghiz Khan the Mongol was his own fore-runner, and the first news of his approach was the sound of his pony's hoofs. With the capital of Manchuria in his possession, Muhuli rapidly re-conquered the province, but Ta-ning-ching[2] and some other cities held out against him. He was forced to invest the former, and a long stubborn siege resulted. The Kins attempted to relieve it; but the same destruction awaited the relieving force as that which had occurred to the attempted relief of Yenking. Douglas, from the Chinese annals, gives the strength of the Kin army as two hundred thousand men, and states that eighty thousand men were dead on the field when the Kins broke. Such figures are undoubtedly impossible. Just as we have to divide the figures often given for similar encounters in the Old Testament by one hundred to obtain an approximation, if we divide the Chinese figures by ten we will be close to the mark.

Muhuli returned to the siege, and finding the fortifications were too strong for his army, was forced to let famine do his work, but even so, it was 1216 before the city surrendered.

The savage Mongol, from whose code all thought of chivalry for a stubborn foe was entirely absent, determined to raze the walls and massacre the inhabitants; but it was pointed out to him by someone with more civilized ideas, that if he did so, his treatment would

[1] Cyrus the Persian, conqueror of Media, Babylonia, and Lydia, died 528 B.C. See *Herodotus* I. 79.

[2] I have been unable to place this city. Both d'Ohsson and Douglas call it the " northern court " and state that it was in Liao-si, on the banks of the river Loha. If some Sinologue would re-write Douglas' almost unintelligible history of Jenghiz Khan, using the modern system of orthography of Chinese place-names, and adding an adequate map, he would be doing a service to history.

cause the other cities still in Kin hands to fight him with all the energy of despair. Much against his will, Muhuli consented, and treated the conquered generously, and was undeservingly rewarded by the immediate surrender of the other fortresses. Years later he was to discover once again that generosity towards a defeated foe is always better policy than rigorous treatment.

While these events were occurring in Manchuria, Yenking was slowly being starved into surrender. After the capture of the convoy at Pa-chow, it had lost all hope. The besiegers drew their lines more tightly and grimly waited for the end.

The commander of the garrison, despairing of any chance of succour, committed suicide, and the officer who succeeded him managed to cut his way through the besieging ring in a desperate sortie (June, 1215). It was the last convulsive struggle of a dying organism, and patiently the Mongols watched it die. The population was by then reduced to the last extremities of utter starvation, and when part of the garrison under the city's commander had cut its way out, the remainder threw open the gates.

The sack of the greatest city in eastern Asia lasted for thirty days, after which the Mongols, satiated with slaughter, rapine, and loot, withdrew from the smoking ruins. A graphic picture of the horror of the sack has been preserved in the words of an embassy which reached the Mongol camp before Yenking. This embassy had been sent by Mahommed Shah of Khwarazm, then at Samarkand, and it reported the terrible devastation of the land of the Kin on its return. "Bones of the slaughtered formed whole mountains, the soil was greasy with human fat, and the rotting bodies brought on an illness from which some (of the embassy) died. At

the gate of Yenking lay a vast heap of bones and the envoys were told that on the capture of the city, sixty thousand girls threw themselves from the walls to avoid falling into the hands of the Mongols."

Jenghiz Khan himself was at Tolunnoehr when the news was brought him, having taken no part in the siege.

Among the captives sent to him was a Khitan named Yeliu-chutsai, one of the councillors of the emperor, and the bearing of the man impressed the conqueror. Even though his kindred in Manchuria had revolted, the Khitan had remained faithful to the emperor he and his father had served; and the great Mongol who always appreciated faithful service, and who saw the need for civilized and cultured advisers, asked the Khitan to transfer his allegiance to himself, whereupon the councillor agreed, remaining as adviser to the Great Khan, to be a power for good in the camps of the savage warriors of Central Asia.

II

With the fall of Yenking, the resistance of the Kin ceased north of the Yellow River. There still remained Honan.

It is a characteristic of Jenghiz Khan and the generals of his school, that if there was work to be done the task was never abandoned until it was brought to a final and successful conclusion; and as the destruction of the dynasty was the task he had set himself, the Mongol determined to explore all methods to attain his object.

The forces set free by the fall of Yenking were now available. Samuka was therefore ordered to make a raid into Honan, whither the reigning monarch of the Kin had taken refuge. Whether the expedition was

intended to be a reconnaissance in force or merely a destructive raid it is impossible to determine, but it is significant of the contempt with which the Mongols regarded the Kin, that Samuka's force comprised only a single tuman. Presumably all that the Mongols could have known of the difficulties before Samuka would have been information gleaned from their own experience of the Yellow River when they had ridden down to it in the great raid by the two armies in the winter of 1213-14, and from the statements of deserters and captives.

Jenghiz Khan must have realized that the Yellow River was a most formidable obstacle, and if he intended to pursue the Kin monarch, it was essential that he gain more information regarding the approaches and the river crossings.

Samuka apparently crossed the Yellow River somewhere west of Ning-yuan-ting, and rode south through Shensi on the west bank of the great river. The Yellow River flows east through the Ordos desert, then turning abruptly south, flows some four hundred miles between the provinces of Shensi and Shansi, and is again turned east by the Tsin ling Mountains, the highest peaks of which reach to 10,000 feet. At this bend, not far from the famous fortress of Tung-kwang, the Yellow River receives its greatest tributary the Wei Ho. Here, also, the river flows through a narrow valley, and Tung-kwang, situated east of this valley, is the guardian of the route leading to the centre of Honan from the west. This fortress successfully resisted all Samuka's efforts. The time was mid-winter, he had crossed the Wei Ho successfully, and the resistance of Tung-kwang would have forced any but the most stubborn commander to turn back ; but Samuka was endowed with that same

tenacity of purpose which characterises all the greater Mongol commanders. When he found that he could not force the pass, he deliberately led his cavalry force over the ice-covered Tsing-ling range, and in spite of the precipitous and slippery slopes he eventually reached the plains beyond. Riding towards Kai-feng-fu, he rested a short time outside Yu-chow, and then systematically ravaged the province, reaching the capital in the late winter of 1215-16.

The Kin monarch, now in the depths of despair, attempted to make peace ; but the terms offered by the greatly daring Mongol, who was thousands of miles from any reinforcement, and was also operating with only ten thousand men in the midst of millions, were so harsh that even the terrified Kin was forced to refuse them. Samuka, helpless before the walls of Kai-feng-fu, thereupon withdrew his force by the way he had come ; [1] but in November, 1216, he repeated his remarkable feat. This time he had a slightly larger force ; and probably he brought a siege train with him, for he captured Yu-chow, Chow-kia-kow and other cities, before he finally reached the suburbs of Kai-feng-fu.

His methods are explained in a letter written to the emperor by his council, in which it is stated that the Mongols ravaged the countryside as they rode through the province, storming and destroying the cities. It was systematic destruction, and because Kai-feng-fu was too strong for them, they surrounded it with desolation. Their main force covered the exits of the city in which the best troops were stationed as its garrison, while their detachments rode through the surrounding

[1] De Mailla states that Samuka was defeated at Chen Chow (close to Chow-kia-kow) and forced to retire. Samuka, according to this authority, then re-crossed the Yellow River on the ice and made his way back to Mongolia. (De Mailla, *Histoire Generale de la Chine*. Paris, 1779.)

district. The councillors therefore suggested that the emperor should so dispose of his troops that the exit at Tung-kwang should be covered, and that picked officers be given the best men available to carry on a guerilla warfare against the Mongol detachments. They pointed out that the supplies in Kai-feng-fu were not a hundredth part of those which Yenking had contained, and they admitted that their blood ran cold at the thought of the consequences should the Mongols decide to besiege the city. As usual, divided counsels and paralyzing fear swayed the emperor, and so the great dynasty founded by Ajuta entered on its last days. Fortunately for the Kin, Samuka was recalled by Jenghiz Khan, and we hear of him no more, but these two raids of his, even if he did nothing worthy of note afterwards, stamp him as one of the great cavalry leaders of history.


ARAL SEA
KIZIL KUM DESERT
KHORASSAN
BADAKSHAN
HINDU KUSH
KARAKORAM MTS
PAMIRS
LITTLE PAMIR
SARIKOL RANGE
TERIM HIGHLANDS
TIEN SHAN
ALTAI MTS.
KARA ALTAU
BARLIK
SUNGARIA
NORTH
LAKE BALKASH
YENGIGEND
URGENJ
JAND
ESCHNASS
BARKHALIGKEND
KARAKU
OZKENDA
SIGNAK
OTRAR
TARAZ
BALA SAGUN
CHUGUCHAK
KULJA (ALMALYK)
BISCHBALYK
TASHKENT
BENAKET
NUR
BOKHARA
DJIZAK
KHOJEND
ANDIJAN
OSH
SAMARKAND
KARSHI
SHAHR-SABZ
DERBEND
KELIF
TERMEZ
BALKH
TALIKHAN
TORGAT
UCH TURFAN
AKSU
BESHTAM
KASHGAR
YARKAND
TASHKURGAN
Jujis 2nd Corps
Sir Darya or Jaxartes
1st Corps Army
Jenghiz Khan Route of
Summer camp 1220
Chepe 1218
Concentration area 1219
PEI LU (NORTH ROAD)
NAN LU (SOUTH ROAD)
Amu Darya or Oxus
Chu River
Talas River
Jagatai
Issik Kul
Narin River
Ak Su River
Tarim River
Kashgar River
Yarkand River
Kara Irtish River
Emil R.
Kabuk R.
Satram
Ebi Nor
SUNGARIAN GATE
DJAIR PASS
MUZART PASS
TEREK PASS
Zarafshan
Wakhs R.
THE MONGOL INVASION
OF
KHWARAZM
1219-20
0 50 100 200 300 MILES

CHAPTER IV

The destructive hostilities of Attila and the Huns have long since been elucidated by the activities of Zingis and the Moguls; and I shall be content to observe that from the Caspian to the Indus they ruined a tract of many hundred miles which was adorned with the habitations and labours of mankind, and that five centuries have not been sufficient to repair the ravages. (EDWARD GIBBON.)

I

WHEN Jenghiz Khan completed his operations in that part of China lying north of the Yellow River, he left Muhuli as governor, and gave him instructions to consolidate the territory, while he himself set up his *ordo* on the Tola.

In 1217, he dispatched a force under Juji to undertake the defeat of the Merkits who were still encamped in the valleys of the Tannu Ola Mountains, in the north-west of Mongolia.

In the spring of 1218, information that the king of Tangut was giving assistance and shelter to certain chieftains who had failed to submit to the Mongols, was brought to the ears of Jenghiz Khan. An army was therefore directed once again towards the Tangut kingdom, whereupon the king, believing that his capital of Ningsia stood too close to the plains where the Great Khan was now master of all he surveyed, abandoned Ningsia and removed to Lan-chow-fu, then, as in recent times, the most impressive fortress between Tibet and Pekin.[1]

About the same time also, Korea, which had suffered

[1] C. D. Bruce, *In the Footsteps of Marco Polo.*

from Mongol raiding parties, deemed it politic to send an embassy and submit to the terrible Mongol chieftain.

It is likely that Jenghiz Khan at this period was considering a scheme for the conquest of Honan, which was the sole remaining portion of the ancient Kin dominion; but circumstances forced his attention westwards, starting a train of events which were to have tremendous consequences in south-western Asia and subsequently in Europe.

In Chapter II it has been told that when Ajuta came down on China from the Amur country, a prince of the then reigning dynasty of Liao had fled westwards to his farthest dependency, and had there founded a kingdom called Kara Khitay, or Black Cathay with its capital at Balasagun. This event occurred in A.D. 1123. By taking advantage of local troubles among the Turkish peoples of the Ili River district, this prince and his descendants eventually extended their dominion from Kashgar and Kulja (or Almalyk, as it was then named) to the Oxus and beyond; until by 1141 the Gurkhan of Kara Khitay was sufficiently powerful to be able to cross swords with Sultan Sanjar of Khorassan, routing him with enormous losses. After this, the Gurkhan became overlord of Merv and Khorassan, and incidentally held all Transoxiana, i.e., the land between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, in subjection.

It is obvious, however, that the government of this new empire which had so suddenly sprung into existence, could not have maintained a very firm control of the peoples it held subject. A glance at the map will show the immense mountain ranges which lie across it in all directions, and these ranges constitute very difficult barriers to easy communication and administration. Nevertheless, in spite of this obvious weakness,

the Kara Khitay Empire at the end of the twelfth century was by far the greatest and most powerful state in Central Asia. It comprised the western oases of the Tarim basin, the southern portions of Sungaria, the Ili valley and the Talas basin, while, across the Central Asian mountains, Ferghana was included in the possessions of the Gurkhan of Kara Khitay. Samarkand also was a feudatory state paying tribute to the Gurkhan; and when Jenghiz Khan obtained possession of Kara Khitay, he extended his dominions at a single bound to the steppes of the Aral Sea.

In A.D. 1209 occurred the event which was the cause of the extinction of Kara Khitay. Into this loosely held empire had come Gutchluk the Naiman chief, at his last gasp owing to the defeat administered by Jenghiz Khan on the Kara Irtish. The reigning Gurkhan received him with kindness, even admitting the Naiman into his family by giving him his daughter in marriage, whereupon Gutchluk, a Nestorian Christian, like so many of the Turkish peoples at this period, adopted Buddhism, then the official religion of Kara Khitay. Another religious factor existed in this area, for when Kutaiba, the great Arab conqueror of Central Asia, had descended on Kashgar in A.D. 712 he had brought Islam, then in the full flush of empire, in his train.

At this same period, outside influences were at work to bring about the downfall of Kara Khitay.

Away to the west, at the south-western extremity of Transoxiana, was the district of Khwarazm. This district, later known as Khiva, consisted of the delta of the Oxus, where the river enters the Aral Sea.

The silt of the delta, fine as flour, is wonderfully fertile provided water can be got to the soil, and by an

extensive system of irrigation a considerable population is supported.

Originally but a little emirate of the great Seljuk Empire, it had taken advantage of the political chaos which resulted when that able dynasty had fallen, and the rulers of Khwarazm had extended their dominions beyond the Oxus delta. At the beginning of the 13th century, Ala-ud-din Mahommed, Sultan Shah of Khwarazm was ruler of Bokhara and Khorassan as well; but he paid tribute to the Gurkhan of Kara Khitay. Mahommed found the payment of this tribute an awkward drain on his treasury, so he plotted with Othman, Emir of Samarkand, who was also a tributary of Kara Khitay, to rebel and overthrow the rule of their overlord.

Casting around for a possible ally in Kara Khitay itself, he found a willing associate in Gutchluk, son-in-law and guest of the reigning Gurkhan.

Gutchluk set to work in a careful manner. He first obtained the old Gurkhan's permission to enlist in his service the remnants of the Naiman tribesmen, and by this misplaced trust Gutchluk soon obtained a considerable force. When he considered the moment favourable, he sent word to Mahommed and Othman, arranging with them to strike his blow as soon as they commenced their rebellion in Transoxiana. When he received their message, Gutchluk commenced his revolt; but the rising was promptly quelled by the Gurkhan's army. The precious pair in Transoxiana started hostilities by murdering the Gurkhan's representative—Mahommed's normal method of breaking off diplomatic relations and one which was to bring utter ruin on him and his empire at a later date—and then succeeded in defeating the Kara Khitay forces on the Talas river, north of the Jaxartes.

Gutchluk took advantage of the dismay caused by this disaster to make another bid for victory. This time he was successful, taking the old Gurkhan prisoner. A.D. 1212.

Thus did he repay the hospitality and protection he had received from his father-in-law. Two years later the Gurkhan died, worn out with grief and shame, whereupon Gutchluk usurped the throne.

Before long he showed himself to his subjects in his true colours, because like all proselytes, his newly adopted religion filled him with fanatical fervour, causing him to commence a religious persecution, specially directed against the Mussulman population. When his subjects protested, he loosed his wild Naimans to harry the believers of Islam, and to show that he was in earnest, he nailed the chief Imam of Kashgar to the door of his own college. Not content with this, he communicated with those Merkits who had submitted to Jenghiz Khan in 1209, and they, breaking off their allegiance to the Mongol Khan, rode south and joined Gutchluk.

All this time Jenghiz Khan had been chiefly occupied with events inside the Great Wall, but in 1218, when his hands were free, he interfered in this melodrama of treachery, rebellion and religious fanaticism in his own direct and simple way.

He placed two tumans under the command of Chepe Noyon, giving him orders to make for Kashgar and settle with Gutchluk once and for all. At the same time he ordered his son Juji, with a young commander named Subutai as his Chief-of-Staff, to take a similar force and obtain the submission of Almalyk, and then to finish with any Merkits who might escape Chepe.

Chepe's route took him through Bishbalik (whose ruins stand a few miles from modern Urumchi), and

Beshtam ; and once Bishbalik was in his hands the rest was merely a matter of time. Gutchluk had fled to Kashgar when he heard of Chepe's approach ; but the Mussulman population, with the memory of their Imam crucified on his own gate, were so decidedly hostile in their attitude that Gutchluk, realising his days were numbered, left the city and made for the mountains, whereupon the Kashgarians opened their gates and welcomed the Mongols.

Chepe, whose simple soul failed to see the difference between Buddha and Mahommed, promptly proclaimed full religious liberty, which act of ordinary good sense at once won over the inhabitants to the new regime of Jenghiz Khan. Chepe then sent detachments after Gutchluk. They chased him across the mighty ranges which are known as the Roof of the World, trapping him eventually in a defile in Badakshan, whereupon they slew him and Chepe sent his head to Jenghiz Khan. It is recorded that when the Mongol Khan got Chepe Noyon's message of complete and decisive success, instead of going into transports of joy, he merely sent back word to his great subordinate telling him not be too proud of himself.

Though this operation of Chepe's is dismissed in a paragraph in the chronicles, it was in many respects a most remarkable undertaking. The speed with which Chepe drove straight for Kashgar gave Gutchluk no time to organize an adequate resistance, and left him with no choice but flight. West of Kashgar rise the ranges whose highest peaks are twenty-five thousand feet, the passes and naked wind-swept valleys lying at ten to fifteen thousand. Across these mountains the fugitive rode, and if he believed himself safe, he would have been correct had his pursuers been any other troops in the

world. That plainsmen should have dared to follow him over the very Roof of the World, into plateaux of bare rock and barren dreariness is remarkable, but that they caught him—in the defile of Weradin, on the Badakshan side—is astounding. Chepe's detachments must have travelled at ten to fifteen thousand feet altitude for three or four hundred miles; and when explorers to-day make such journeys they are liable to receive medals from geographic societies; but the men led by Chepe Noyon were prepared to attempt anything at all. Later we find them swimming out into the Caspian in pursuit of another fugitive.

While Chepe was riding to Kashgar, Juji was making for Almalyk, which had rebelled against Gutchluk and was being besieged by Gutchluk's forces at this time and it was Juji's approach which caused them to raise the siege. As Jagatai had not then built the road with its forty-eight bridges which led down from Sairam Nor to Almalyk, Juji must have advanced from the Mongolian plateau by either the Sungarian Gate, or the Djair Pass which descends to Chuguchak and the Emil Valley. Juji entered Almalyk without striking a blow, and by so doing he cut off Gutchluk from any hope of success. This action, combined with Chepe's expedition, decided the fate of the Kara Khitay dominion. With the cities of the Tarim basin in the hands of Chepe, and the cities of the Ili and Emil valleys in the hands of Juji, all resistance ceased.

From Almalyk, Juji then led his army towards the plains of the Talas River where the Merkits were encamped. A battle was fought with these unsubdued tribesmen somewhere in the vicinity of Karaku. Three of the four Merkit chiefs were killed in the fight, and the fourth, with the defeated remnant, fled towards the

city of Jand on the Jaxartes. Then occurred the first clash with Mahommed of Khwarazm.

Some five years previous to this event, about the year 1213 Mahommed, taking advantage of the upheavals in Kara Khitay caused by Gutchluk's misrule, picked a quarrel with his erstwhile ally Othman, Emir of Samarkand, and captured the city. He then moved his capital from Urgenj, in the Oxus delta, to Samarkand. This stroke had extended his dominion to Benaket, on the Jaxartes, which city had been allotted to Gutchluk by the agreement made between them prior to the revolt against Kara Khitay. Then, turning south during the next two years Mahommed extended his conquests to Afghanistan and also into central Persia.[1]

In Ghazni, at that time the chief city of Afghanistan, for Kabul did not rise to importance until the sixteenth century, he discovered evidence that the Caliph of Bagdad, taking alarm at the sudden rise of Khwarazm, had been attempting to bring about a coalition against Mahommed, so in 1216 Mahommed raised an army and marched westwards with Bagdad as his objective. The city of the caliphs was saved by an extraordinary fall of snow which blocked the passes through the mountains of Kurdistan enabling the Kurdish tribesmen to attack his army. This forced Mahommed to return to Samarkand. By these expeditions his dominions in 1218 had been extended from the Indus to the Kurdish mountains, and northwards they spread into the steppes beyond the Jaxartes.

His campaign against Bagdad had one important result, for it had so frightened the Caliph that he decided he would have to look elsewhere for assistance before

[1] Skrine & Ross, *Heart of Asia.* Barthold, *History of Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion.*

he could adequately counter Mahommed's aims of conquest.

Rumours of a great conquering chief far to the north had reached his ears, and he hit on the expedient of suggesting to this warrior that he might raid Mahommed's empire with much profit to himself. Already in 1217, before the religious leader of Islam had attempted to loose the whirlwind on his co-religionists of Khwarazm, Jenghiz Khan had sent an embassy to Mahommed, expressing the hope that peace would always exist between them, but requesting also that Mahommed refrain from assisting Gutchluk, against whom he was preparing an expedition. He added that he would always look on Mahommed as his beloved son—a hint of his own superiority which Mahommed was inclined to resent. Mahommed had previously sent an embassy to Jenghiz Khan, about the year 1216, and it was this embassy which had seen the horrible devastation of China.

During this period dissension began to make its appearance in Mahommed's government. The queen-mother, the Sultana Turkan Khatuna, one of those domineering women who could not realize that her son was grown up, and that she was no longer queen, was interfering in the affairs of state, and had succeeded in forming a strong political following in opposition to the Sultan. She was a Kankali Turk, and many of her race had entered the service of Khwarazm, forming a military aristocracy that depended on the queen-mother for their favoured position, and which assisted her to take advantage of her son when occasion arose.

Some time early in 1218, Jenghiz Khan bought the stock of some Khivan merchants, and sent back with their caravan some Mongol traders with instructions to

trade in Khwarazm, most likely as intelligence agents. The caravan consisted of 450 men with 500 camels laden with gold and silver and silk, looted from China, and skins of beaver and sable and other costly things. When this caravan with its merchandise arrived at Otrar, the fortress which guarded the entrance to Transoxiana from the north, the governor, a Turk named Inaljuk, seized the traders and their stocks, sending word to Mahommed that they were spies—which was probably true. Mahommed ordered their immediate execution and the governor obeyed, incidentally helping himself to the rich booty. One man escaped the massacre and sent word to Mongolia.

Jenghiz Khan, on hearing of this, promptly sent another envoy demanding that the governor of Otrar be surrendered to Mongol vengeance, with war as an alternative. Mahommed, blinded by his past successful career, made war certain by executing the ambassador.

Whatever his high opinions of himself may have been, he was shortly to revise his ideas of the troops of his northern neighbour.

He had decided to take from Gutchluk the remainder of the territory in Ferghana which still remained to Kara Khitay; and to that end he raised an army and was about to march eastwards, when the news came of Gutchluk's death at the hands of Chepe. At the same time word was brought him that a strong force of Merkits was in the vicinity of Jand on the Jaxartes. He therefore turned westwards and led his force to Jand. These Merkits composed the body shortly afterwards destroyed by the Mongols under Juji and Subutai; and when Mahommed realized that a Mongol force was also in the vicinity he first returned to Samarkand for reinforcements, and then led his army, now about 60,000 strong,

north into the steppes. Near Karaku he came on a battlefield covered with dead, and among the bodies he found a badly wounded Merkit who informed him that the Mongols had been victorious and had just left the field.

The Sultan immediately followed the tracks of the victors, coming up with them next day. He formed his troops for battle, when Juji, the Mongol commander, sent word to say that as the two peoples were at peace he saw no reason for the hostile attitude.

Apparently Juji had not yet heard of Jenghiz Khan's ultimatum, or else it was so short a time after the execution of the Mongol ambassador, that warning from Jenghiz Khan of probable hostilities had not reached him.

Juji informed the Sultan that he was acting under the orders of Jenghiz Khan, who had expressly told him to treat as friends any men of Khwarazm he might chance to meet, and he offered to surrender his prisoners and his booty, but, he added, if Mahommed really wanted a fight he could have it. Mahommed, whose army was much superior in numbers, refused to listen. "If Jenghiz Khan has given thee orders not to attack me, yet Allah commands me to attack thee, and I hope to deserve His good-will by destroying you pagans." The rule also holds in Central Asia, apparently, that those whom the gods wish to destroy they first drive mad.

The Mongols had no choice—and they nearly won. Their right wing destroyed the Khwarazmian left, and they bit deep into the centre commanded by Mahommed in person, almost breaking it entirely, whereupon Jelaludin, Mahommed's fighting son who commanded the Khwarazmian right, which had defeated the Mongol left, rode in with his force and restored the situation.

Night fell on an undecided field, and the Mongols withdrew slightly and encamped.

They lit numerous camp fires as though they intended to remain and renew the battle in the morning; and once again stratagem succeeded where brute force had failed, for when morning dawned the Sultan discovered that they had left under cover of darkness and were beyond pursuit.

It was a thoughtful monarch who turned his horse for Samarkand: he made the remark that he had never seen such troops.

One important result of Juji's expedition was that the road to the Sultan's dominions had been reconnoitred, and the fighting prowess of the Mongols had so impressed Mahommed that he lost all desire to meet them in the field.

II

When the news of the execution of his envoy by Mahommed reached Jenghiz Khan, he decided on war. He had probably had the idea in his mind for a long time past, but now he had the pretext. In the spring of 1219 he commenced to collect cattle and horses in the valleys of the Kara Irtish and the Kobuk, where immense grassy pastures are spread along the valleys and foothills.

Towards autumn, he concentrated his army, calling to his standard men from all the tribes of Mongolia, and bringing skilled workmen and engineers from China to work the siege-engines, made portable so that they could be transported on animals or by carts. His total force consisted of about 150,000 cavalry with perhaps 15,000 men for the siege-engines.

There were also vast herds of spare horses, more than

one for each man, and immense numbers of cattle and sheep.

News of these preparations reached Mahommed, and he decided on a plan which he hoped would nullify the onslaught of the Mongol cavalry; but which has been the cause of his condemnation for military incapacity and cowardice.

In order to obtain a clear appreciation of the problem which confronted Mahommed, it is necessary first to describe the land known as Transoxiana from a strategical standpoint.

Transoxiana, the country between the Oxus and the Jaxartes, can be roughly described as a letter H lying on its side, with the populated regions limited to the river banks and broad cross bar of the H—the latter formed by the valley of the Zarafshan, in which are Bokhara and Samarkand and, in addition, the oasis of Nakshab in which stand Shahr-sabz and Karshi. Between this central densely populated area and the Aral sea the terrain between the rivers is desert and desert-steppe, called the Kizil Kum, or Red Sands. In spite of the name, most of it is hard, sun-baked clay, on which grows the flora common to such steppes, tamarisk and saxaul, and after the snow melts, grass, a point of importance to the commander of grass-fed Mongol ponies; but the fierce heat of summer rapidly withers the green shoots and it is useless as fodder by June. East of this belt of agriculture and settlement rise the mountains, and the further east they extend the higher become the peaks and the more difficult the passes, until at last the only means of communication between the Oxus and Jaxartes is the valley of the Wakhs which is almost impassable in its upper reaches. Agriculture in Transoxiana depends entirely on irriga-

tion and the water channels require constant attention to prevent them becoming clogged with the silt.[1]

It is obvious that the defence of this area against invasion from the North would be as difficult an undertaking as any commander could ever be called upon to effect. The long line of the Jaxartes was served by only one line of communications practicable for an army, i.e., the high-road from Samarkand to Benaket. The river and the mountains assist the invader rather than the defence, for if a commander with a view to saving the northern cities, all of which lie on the north bank of the river, decides to meet the enemy on the frontier, he will have to risk fighting with a broad river at his back, with a chance of annihilation if defeated. If, on the other hand, he advances beyond the mountains into the steppes with sufficient force to risk an encounter, he would be limited to one line of supply or retreat, i.e., the Arys Pass.

On the other hand, if he decides to use the river as his defensive line, he will lose the cities on the north bank.

One critic of Mahommed's strategy makes a point of the dispersal of his forces ; but takes care not to offer a suggestion as to where he should have concentrated.[2]

Mahommed's experience of nomadic horsemen, and a population of Turkoman nomads was always present in the steppes of the Kizil Kum, led him to believe that the Mongols would be powerless before the walls of the fortified cities—he knew nothing of the Chinese and the siege-engines.

His defensive plan was this. He placed strong

[1] Olufssen, *Emir of Bokhara and his Country*, pp. 150 to 160 (Heinemann, London).

[2] Liddle Hart, *Great Captains Unveiled*, article "Jenghiz Khan and Subutai."

garrisons in the cities north of the Jaxartes—Otrar alone was given a force of fifty thousand—and concentrated the bulk of his army, to the strength of sixty thousand Kankali cavalry and fifty thousand local infantry, in Samarkand, probably hoping that the Mongols when plundering the surrounding districts, would give him opportunity for a counter-stroke. He had four hundred thousand men at his disposal, but a large part of them, probably more than half, would normally be stationed in Persia and the cities of Afghanistan because these areas of his newly won empire would require holding from internal disintegration as well as from external aggression.

His plan failed because of the ability of the Mongols to storm the fortresses. Had Jenghiz Khan not appeared on the scene, the ability of Mahommed to conquer and organize an immense empire would have been seized on by historians as evidence of supernatural genius and superlative statesmanship, and his treachery and indecision would have been considered wisdom. So much for the judgment of history.

Jenghiz Khan completed his preparations on the Kara Irtish in the late fall of 1219, and when the weather grew cold he put his army in motion. The winter was the normal time for his campaigns, as the rivers could be crossed on the ice, and swamps, frozen hard in the Siberian cold, would present no barrier to cavalry. He marched down the Sungarian plain in the shadow of the mountains, and wheeled through the Sungarian Gate. This is a great trough in the rock, from six to ten miles wide and some fifty long, separating the Barlik Range from the Ala Tau. Owing to the funnel shape of the exits, winds of tremendous violence sweep through it, so that headway is impossible if the traveller

is facing the wind.[1] These winds, called *buran*, sometimes exceed seventy miles an hour, and in winter men and animals are frequently frozen to death if caught in the passage. Caravans therefore do not use it, preferring the steep and more difficult mountain passes, but the Sungarian Gate is the main route for armies.[2]

The Huns and other warrior peoples had passed through this same gap in the ranges, and now the worst and most destructive of all the nomadic tidal waves was flowing through in the beginning of the winter of A.D. 1219. From here on, the route of the main army was the caravan trail which became the Russian post-road of yesterday, and which the Turksib rail-road follows to-day. Jagatai's command, however, took the caravan route which runs between the Kobuk east of Chuguchak, and Almalyk. This route joins the Pe Lu at Kur-kara-usu, east of lake Ebi Nor, and runs due west, rising from 700 feet altitude at Ebi Nor to 7,500 feet at Sairam Nor—a distance of seventy miles, and then drops steeply to Almalyk through the Talki River defile.[3] Chang Chun records that Jagatai was forced to build no less than forty-eight bridges before the steep descent was passable for his army and its numerous transport waggons.[4]

North of the gap in the hills through which the Arys River flows, the Mongol army divided into four corps.

The first, with Jagatai and Ogdai in command, rode

[1] D. Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*. Mediæval travellers, such as Rubruquis and John of Plano Carpini also refer to the violent winds which are a feature of the Sungarian Gate.

[2] Owen Lattimore considers that the Djair Pass farther north is the more practicable pass. On the other hand all authorities state that the Mongols used the Sungarian Gate.

[3] For a description of this Pass see Schuyler, *Turkestan*, and Lattimore, *High Tartary*.

[4] Chang Chun, *The Travels of an Alchemist*. Geo. Routledge & Son.

through and laid siege to Otrar, the guardian fortress at the mouth of the Arys River.

Juji took command of another corps, about four tumans strong, rode down the Arys valley, wheeled past Otrar, and turned north-west down the Jaxartes with Jand as his objective.

A third corps, only five thousand strong, followed the same route as the other two to Otrar, but then wheeled south up the river, and laid siege to Benaket. The fourth corps, some fifty thousand strong, under Jenghiz Khan himself, with Tule, his fourth son, acting as chief-of-staff, encamped north of the hills.

It is obvious that before Jenghiz Khan could operate against Samarkand, he would have to clear the Jaxartes of the enemy forces holding it; but the scheme he adopted demands attention. The size of the third corps, only a half-tuman, under subordinate commanders named Alac, Songtu, and Togai, indicates that it had two functions, first to make certain of the river-crossing at Benaket[1] where the road to Samarkand met the river, but its second and equally important function was to present a bait to Mahommed in the hope that it would draw him into the open.

Jenghiz Khan undoubtedly desired to meet his opponent on the battlefield, and if Mahommed had been an able soldier, he would have tried to destroy his enemies in detail, so to help him make up his mind, one weak detachment was offered him. If Mahommed had crossed the river, this detachment could have retreated to Otrar, where Jagatai and Ogdai were encamped before the walls.

Owing to the Mongol practice of completely destroying

[1] Benaket stood near the mouth of the River Angren. (Barthold, op. cit. Skrine and Ross in their work, *Heart of Asia*, spell it "Finaket.").

the inhabitants of a locality, Mahommed could have had little knowledge of the army which was waiting patiently north of the pass. From Mahommed's point of view, an engagement at Otrar should have been most desirable, for with his army of one hundred thousand men advancing from the east, and the other sixty thousand composing the garrison of Otrar, he should have thought that it would have been possible to catch Jagatai and Ogdai between two fires. But, looking at this situation from Jenghiz Khan's standpoint, we can see the detachment before Benaket retreating to Otrar when threatened, Juji hurrying back from down-river to reinforce Ogdai and Jagatai, and then when battle was joined, Jenghiz Khan and Tule could descend like a thunderbolt on the flank of Mahommed, in a typical Mongol manner. If it be objected that such a scheme depends on accurate timing of widely dispersed forces, it must be remembered that the Mongols made use of this manœuvre on many occasions.

The battle did not occur because Mahommed would not venture beyond his walls, and the three corps proceeded to eliminate all centres of resistance along the river, without interference from Mahommed.

While he was encamped north of the pass, Jenghiz Khan by a simple ruse, took steps to disturb Mahommed's confidence. He had heard of the quarrels between the queen-mother and the Sultan, so he dispatched a message addressed to the former stating that he had received her letter and appreciated her offers of assistance, which he would depend on in his campaign.[1] Then he saw to it that his message fell into Mahommed's hands.

[1] This and other messages of similar tenor were written by a man who had been one of Mahommed's officers. His father, uncles and brothers had been executed by Mahommed and this was his revenge. (*P. de la Croix*, p. 150.)

Mahommed immediately added two and two together, and arrived at a total which included a distrust of many of his military chiefs, who were Kankali Turks like the Sultana.[1] It must have helped to paralyse any offensive operations he may have had in mind, for if he could face Jenghiz Khan in the field in fair fight, he could have no hope if some of his officers were contemplating treachery.

Otrar made a desperate resistance. It was strongly garrisoned and it occupied a position of great strength. It was also commanded by a Turk of fine courage, whose natural bravery was fortified by the knowledge that he had no hope of life if he fell into the Mongol's hands. The fortress held out for five months, December to May, and then the Kankali Turks of the garrison, seeing no hope, attempted to cut their way through the besieging ring. The Mongols caught this body before it reached the river and destroyed it. The governor, Inaljuk, thereupon decided that it would be useless to hold the outer walls any longer, so he retreated to the citadel with the remaining twenty thousand men, and held out for another month. In the end the Mongols stormed the walls, and it is recorded that Inaljuk, his arrows spent and his sword broken, held them off with rocks for a while. They took him at last, and Jenghiz Khan ordered molten silver poured into his eyes and ears as a punishment for his cupidity when he looted his caravan.

Juji in the meantime had marched down the river. The first city on his march was Signak,[2] and he sum-

[1] Allenby was the only commander of the Great War who used ruses of this nature. The well-known instance of the loss of the staff officer's note-book before his attack on Gaza and his simple methods to deceive the Turks and conceal his real intentions before the final battle in Palestine are examples very similar to the ruses of Jenghiz Khan.

[2] Signak was 24 miles west of Otrar.

moned it to surrender. The city mob killed his envoy, whereupon Juji battered the walls and then sent storming parties without cessation into the breaches so as to give the besieged no rest. In seven days he was in the city, and as a punishment for the murder of his envoy, he massacred the inhabitants.

Continuing his march, he took and sacked Ozkend, Barkharligkend and Eschnass, being determined to lay waste the north bank of the river so that there would be no resistance in the Mongol rear when the time came to advance across the river.

When he reached Jand, the most important city between Otrar and the Aral Sea, he mastered the walls, drove the inhabitants outside the city, and then looted it. To make a clean sweep of the north bank of the river, he sent a detachment on to Yengigend, forty miles from the Aral Sea. This would be in March, for he left a governor in the city and turned back to join the fourth army under Jenghiz Khan, then moving on Samarkand.

The third corps which had marched up the river, appeared before Benaket. The garrison was composed of Kankali Turks, nomads from the steppes to the north, and when the Mongols promised them their lives if they surrendered, they opened the gates. But no oath bound the Mongol in his dealings with a foe—he even considered broken faith a legitimate ruse of war, so the Kankalis were slaughtered when the Mongols entered the city, and next they took captive only such artisans and labourers as they would need in future siege operations. They then moved on Khojend as its capture would prevent reinforcements from Ferghana reaching the scene of operations. This ancient city, which had been occupied by Alexander the Great fifteen hundred

years before, and named by the Greeks Alexandria Eschate, was commanded by a fighting Turk named Timur Melik. He moved his small garrison of one thousand men to an island in the river, and refused to surrender. The Mongols were baffled until Jenghiz Khan sent them strong reinforcements and fifteen thousand captive "tajiks,"[1] or peasants, to labour under the Mongol command. The Mongols put them to work to build a causeway from the bank to the island and were completely indifferent to the casualties their captives suffered from the arrows of the besieged. Timur Melik, seeing that the end could not be far off with unlimited labour at the Mongol's command, moved his small force into barges and abandoned the island. As he drifted down the river, the Mongols stretched a chain across at the point where the ferry of the Samarkand-Benaket road crossed the stream; but this was successfully broken and the flotilla drifted down with the Mongols keeping pace with it on the banks. But at Jand a bridge of boats had been built, and catapults on the banks played on the barges, forcing Timur Melik to land in an attempt to escape. Almost alone he cut his way through the Mongol cavalry and reached Urgenj; but in spite of his adventures, the intrepid Turk was not satisfied. He later collected a small force, rode across the desert, and attacked and killed the Mongol governor of Yengigend.

Jenghiz Khan had kept his own force inactive while Juji was clearing the Jaxartes. If the message he had sent to the queen-mother had been intended to create consternation in Mahommed's mind, it had served its purpose; but if Jenghiz Khan had merely intended his

[1] The word "tajik" in Persian corresponds to the word "ryot" in India and "fellah" in Egypt.

enemy's action to be half-hearted, it had done its work too well. Mahommed, torn with doubt, and believing that treachery was rampant, persisted in his policy of passive defence, while one after another his frontier fortresses fell to the invaders.

When his enemy persisted in his inaction, Jenghiz Khan, seeing that Mahommed would not come to the mountains, determined to go to Mahommed.

At the head of forty to fifty thousand cavalry and two companies of siege-engines, he marched through the pass and up the river to Benaket. There he crossed and directed his force to Djizak or Zernuc,[1] about half-way to Samarkand.

The road between Benaket and Zernuc crosses an arid region known as the "famished steppe," eighty miles in extent, a parched and barren waste. Zernuc itself was therefore an important outpost of the agricultural belt, because it was the last town of the fertile plains of Samarkand, before the desert was reached. From Zernuc the road to Samarkand leads through a

[1] Djizak is the town, according to Howorth, which d'Ohsson and others call Zernuc or Zernouc. It is also referred to as Sertac, Zertuc, and Djizak-Sertak. Timur fought a battle here two centuries later. But Bretschneider, *Mediæval Researches*, Vol. I, p. 170, quoting Haithon, distinguishes between Zernuc and Djizak. It is possible that the two towns were close together. Barthold, however, is very doubtful as to its location.

Schuyler has described the pass in which Djizak stands, and whatever fort guarded this pass in the days of the Mongol invasion would have to be reduced before the march could be directed on Bokhara. On this account, it is highly probable that Zernuc was the important fort which guarded this entry into the Zarafshan plain, and if it was not on the site of the modern Djizak, must have been very close to it.

Attacking the problem from another angle, we know that Yakut states that Zernuc was "beyond" Kojend, but he was writing in Ferghana at the time. We know also that Jenghiz Khan crossed the Jaxartes at Benaket on his march to Zernuc, while Haithon, crossing at Otrar, mentions Zernuc as the next town on his journey to Samarkand. This seems to indicate that Zernuc was the logical meeting point for all the roads from the Jaxartes to Samarkand. Schuyler has described the area between the Jaxartes and Djizak as "waterless desert," so it is most unlikely that Zernuc could have been situated anywhere else than in the pass where Djizak stands to-day.

All my authorities definitely mention Zernuc and not Djizak; but I have inclined to Howorth's view that Dijzak and Zernuc are the same.

narrow valley between low hills. This valley was afterwards known as the Gate of Tamerlane, and Djizak was its guardian fortress in the days of Timur.

Zernuc submitted with hardly more than a show of resistance ; but then, instead of marching on Samarkand, the centre of the enemy's resistance, the Mongol swung out into the desert round the range of hills called the Khrebet Nurata, with Nur as his objective. A Turkoman guided his army to Nur, and the route he took was for long afterwards called the Great Khan's Way. Nur, taken by surprise at the sudden appearance of a great army at its gates, when it believed itself safe from attack through the desert, submitted quietly, and Jenghiz Khan spared the town. From Nur he marched straight to Bokhara, reaching the great city in March, 1220. The garrison, 20,000 strong, defended it for some days, but either disloyalty or Mahommed's inaction had caused such a lowering of morale, that the position was regarded as hopeless ; and the cavalry of the garrison deserted and fled. This force reached the Oxus, but there the Mongols came up and annihilated them. The inhabitants, left without defenders, opened the gates and the Mongols rode in.

From the steps of the great mosque of Bokhara, Jenghiz Khan ordered his troops to find fodder for their horses, i.e., permission to loot ; and for days they indulged in an orgy of rape, plunder and destruction, the wealthier inhabitants being forced to surrender their riches.

The stroke bespeaks the master. Foiled by Mahommed's inaction from a decisive victory in the field, he read aright his enemy's mind and evolved another plan when the first one failed.

The capture of Zernuc must have appeared to Mahommed as a prelude to the Mongol's appearance

before Samarkand ; but before he could gain information to the contrary, Jenghiz Khan had swung through the desert, his flank covered by the hills, and taken Nur. Then came the final catastrophe of the failure of the garrison of Bokhara to hold the Mongol, and the fall of the city.

Mahommed had put his trust in the strength of his walls, and Jenghiz Khan, having tested out his enemy's desires and seen his plan, had correctly gauged his opponent's mind and had delivered one of the master-strokes of war. At one blow, as daring in execution as it was simple in conception, he had isolated Samarkand from all hope of eventual victory. Instead of hurling his splendid troops against its impregnable walls, he used his superior mobility to attack the weaker points of his enemy's defensive system ; and when they were gone, Samarkand had ceased to be of importance.

Having eliminated Bokhara as a centre of resistance, Jenghiz Khan now turned back from the gutted city and directed his forces up the valley of the Zarafshan to Samarkand.

Mahommed did not wait for his arrival. When the news reached him of the fall of Bokhara, he left Samarkand and fled for his southern dominions. Jenghiz Khan on his march left detachments to deal with the many small forts that were to be found along the densely populated valley ; and before he reached his objective, he organized the immense number of his captives into sections of ten, giving each section a flag, and doing the same for his engineers. By keeping these bodies of men at a distance from the ramparts, it appeared to the observers on the walls that his army was over twice as strong as it really was. Samarkand was not only the capital of Transoxiana, but was also one of the greatest

entrepots of commerce in the world, being a half-way house for the trade between East and West. It was surrounded by a wall nine miles in circumference with many towers and twelve gates of iron. As well as the 110,000 men that composed its garrison, it had twenty war elephants. But all this strength availed it nothing. The Kankali Turks deserted the city and joined the Mongols, claiming that they were kin—which they were. With the exception of 10,000 who entered the citadel, determined to hold out to the last, the garrison parleyed with the Mongol for some days, but in the end agreed to lay down their arms if their lives would be spared.

Then the gates were opened and the Mongols entered (April, 1220).[1]

First the soldiers who had been promised their lives were butchered. The civil population was ordered to bring forth their wealth as ransom, and next the Mongols gathered the Kankali deserters into one body, surrounded them with Mongol troops, and slew them all in cold blood. The city was sacked, and labourers and artizans were made slaves to the number of sixty thousand.

At Samarkand strong reinforcements from the northern Mongol armies reached Jenghiz Khan during the first days before he entered the city—another example of the Mongol ability to concentrate their armies on the battle-field. From these armies, Jenghiz Khan detached two tumans under Chepe and Subutai to follow after Mahommed; and then commenced so remarkable an expedition that its details must be left over to another chapter.

The citadel held out for a month before the Mongols finally stormed it, and as summer was now approaching, Jenghiz Khan left the burning heat of Samarkand and

[1] See Appendix I.

led his army to the green oasis of Nakshab, in which are Karshi and Shahr Sabz, where he camped till the following September. This is the Nautaka where Alexander had also rested his wearied troops, for conquerors from the north and from the south must tread the same road and camp in the same place in Transoxiana —an example of the influence of geography on history.

THE GREAT RAID
BY
CHEPÉ & SUBUTAI

Mahommed's Route ·····
Mongol's Route – – –
} 1220-1223

NOTE. Operations of 1221 not indicated

0 50 100 200 300 Miles

GREATER BULGAR
River Volga
To Mongolia 1,600 miles
Dniepr R.
Kalka R.
Don R.
SEA OF AZOV
CRIMEA
SONDAC
KIPCHAKS
ASTRAKHAN
BLACK SEA
MOZDOK
TERKI
CAUCASUS MOUNTAINS
DAGHESTAN
MANGISHLAK
CASPIAN SEA
Old bed of Oxus
ARAL SEA
Jaxartes River
OTRAR
TASHKENT
TIFLIS
DERBENT
GEORGIA
MOUNTAINS OF ARMENIA
GANJA
SHEMAKHA
ARRAN
Kura R.
Araxes River
MOGHAN STEPPE
Encampment
Lake Van
KARA KUM DESERT
URGENJ
TRANS-OXIANA
NUR
DJIZAK
BOKHARA
SAMARKAND
OASIS OF NAKSHAB
SHAHR-SABZ
KARSHI
KARA TAGH MTS
Oxus River
Lake Urmia
TABRIZ
AZERBAIJAN
MARAGHA
MOSUL
Great Zab
ERBIL
Little Zab
KIRKUK
ZENJAN
GILAN
MAZANDERAN
ABSUKUN IS.
ASTERABAD
KHORASSAN
ISFARAIN
KUCHAN
MERV
KELIF
TERMEZ
BALKH
KAZVIN
ELBURZ RANGE
AMUL
SEREDEHAN
SHAHRUD
NISHAPUR
TUS
Kashaf R.
DAMGHAN
EL ASK
REI
FERUZKUH
SAMNAN
ZAGROS
DINAVAR
HAMADAN
SAVA
KUM
KARIND
KERMANSHAH
NEHAVEND
HOLWAN
BAGHDAD
LURISTAN MTS
Tigris River
GREAT SALT DESERT
TURBAT-I-HAIDARI
HERAT
AFGHANISTAN
PERSIAN GULF

CHAPTER V

"They trampled on the nations which opposed their passage, penetrated through the gates of Derbend, traversed the Volga and the desert, and accomplished the circuit of the Caspian Sea, by an expedition which had never been attempted, and has never been repeated." (EDWARD GIBBON.)

WHEN the Mongols in the winter of A.D. 1219-1220 were ravaging the country north of the Jaxartes, Ala-ud-din Mahommed, Sultan Shah of Khwarazm, took up his headquarters in his new capital of Samarkand. He fully expected that the nomadic horsemen from the steppes of Central Asia would be powerless before the walls of the frontier fortresses, and that they would depart as soon as they had collected sufficient booty from the outlying districts to satisfy their simple wants. But it was soon brought home to him that the Mongol armies were something entirely new in Asia. Not only were they ravaging the fields but they were also provided with siege-engines; and one after another news of the fall of the fortified cities was brought to his astonished ears. Then, as the snow melted, came information of an army under Jenghiz Khan himself, marching directly on Samarkand. Zernuc was taken, following which the Mongol army disappeared into the desert. Next came the news of the capture of Nur, and then information that Bokhara was besieged.

The Sultan had some hundred thousand men within the walls of Samarkand, while in Bokhara the garrison numbered perhaps over thirty thousand.

But the swiftness of the Mongol advance, and the

uncertainty which their movements imposed on Mahommed's bewildered mind, increased his vacillation.

Perhaps he hoped that the Mongol force would find Bokhara too strong to be taken, and it would be faced with the difficulty of obtaining supplies from the terror-struck country-side.

It was a situation where a civilized army might have dispersed owing to difficulty of supply if it met with resolute opposition from the garrison of Bokhara when besieging the ancient city ; and instances are not unknown where commanders have seen their forces wither away in deserts no worse than this that surrounded old Bokhara. Military situations have existed where, by merely waiting for starvation to do its work, victory has been cheaply won. Whether or not such ideas were running through the mind of one who had gained for himself an immense empire by political astuteness as well as by fighting, cannot now be said with certainty ; but it was as though the earth itself had been cut away from beneath the feet of the monarch when the news came that Bokhara, the mighty fortress, had fallen without a show of resistance.

We can at present only judge Mahommed by his actions, we cannot say on what rock his plans foundered or what his plans were, for the Mongols destroyed the libraries and the records as well as the scribes. In fact, the Jews of Bokhara to-day cannot produce records which ante-date 1220, though they had resided in the city for a thousand years prior to the Mongol conquest. Mahommed could not but believe that treachery most foul existed in his empire ; and in justice it must be said that the ease with which Jenghiz Khan captured Bokhara appeared to justify Mahommed's fears. If Bokhara could thus be delivered into the hands of the

destroyer, what of Samarkand? Could it be possible that the garrison here, also, was ready to betray him? He did not wait to see. With his sons by his side he left the city quietly and rode to Karshi in the Nakshab oasis, telling the inhabitants of the districts through which he rode that they must attend to their own safety, as he could no longer save them. His most experienced commanders advised him that Transoxiana could not be held now that Bokhara was gone; and so he directed his flight towards the Oxus, intending to do what he could to hold Khorassan and Persia. Jelaludin pleaded with him to gather what troops were available and hold the line of the Oxus, while other counsels suggested that he retire to Ghazni and raise an army from among the mountaineers of Afghanistan. "At least," said Jelaludin, "let us do something, for even if we are defeated, our people will not be able to say that in time of peace we receive their taxes, but when danger threatens we abandon them to the fury of their foes." The Sultan, like many another irresolute character when faced with the vehement energy of youth, treated the speech as coming from an inexperienced boy and continued his flight. Reaching Balkh, the Sultan sent back a force to the river crossings to watch the enemy movements, and then he heard of the fall of Samarkand. He decided that he must hasten into western Persia if he would organize an army, so he left Balkh for Khorassan with a strong escort of Turkish horse. Even his escort was afflicted with treachery, and information of a plot to kill him came to the ears of the distressed monarch. He resorted to the plan of sleeping in a different tent each night; and one morning he found the tent in which he was supposed to have slept shot full of arrows.

He rode at speed for Nishapur, reaching there on

April 18th,[1] and commenced making preparations for raising an army, believing that the Mongols would not cross the Oxus. Then to his horror came the news that a strong Mongol force had already crossed the Oxus and was actually in Khorassan. It must have been evident that he was the objective of this new danger and in his terror he announced that he was going on a hunting expedition—the pitiful excuse of a thoroughly frightened man—and left on May 12th for western Persia.

What had happened was that Jenghiz Khan, realizing fully that Mahommed must not be left in peace to organize resistance in Persia, had dispatched two tumans to seek him out and kill him.

He had obtained information of Mahommed's flight when he reached Samarkand. Detaching 20,000 men from the army, he gave command of the pursuit to his two ablest commanders, Chepe Noyon, who had captured and executed Gutchluk, and Subutai, Juji's chief-of-staff. Jenghiz Khan ordered them to make certain of Mohammed, provided they could do so without unnecessary risk. If, however, they found him at the head of large forces, they were to refuse battle but to keep him under observation while they sent back word to headquarters, and reinforcements would be sent. If, on the other hand, Mahommed attempted to save himself by flight, they were to pursue him until they captured him.

Then commenced a pursuit, which for sheer relentlessness has never been surpassed; and for courageous and self-reliant leadership in the heart of a hostile country stands out as a military masterpiece. They picked up the trail shortly after leaving Samarkand. Riding south they crossed the Oxus at Kelif. With branches

[1] Howorth, Vol. 1, p. 80.

packed into the skins of cattle they made rafts on which they placed their weapons[1]; and holding these with one hand they seized their ponies' manes with the other and forcing the animals into the water were dragged across the river. It is recorded that the whole army crossed in a day. The first city they came to south of the Oxus was Balkh, which sent a deputation to the Mongols offering to submit. As the Mongol objective was Mahommed, they contented themselves with leaving a Mongol governor in the city, and passed on toward Khorassan. The town of Turbat-i-Haidari[2] closed its gates and manned its walls; and the Mongols, not to be deflected from their objective by the jeers from the ramparts, passed it by. Later, however, the commander thought better of it, and turning, they rode back, stormed the town and massacred the inhabitants, leaving the buildings in flames.

As they rode westwards the towns along the route were treated according to their attitude and their strength.

The town which submitted was given a Mongol officer as commandant, with a small guard, but the town which was too strongly garrisoned to make its capture profitable was ignored. If, on the other hand its weakness was obvious, and it nevertheless refused to submit it was sacked and burnt.

Near Nishapur in the beginning of June they caught some unfortunate wretches outside the walls, and by applying torture extracted the information that Mahommed had left the city.

Just outside Nishapur the Mongol advance troops

[1] These skins were probably the leather bags which the Mongols carried slung from their saddles. The branches would keep the interior distended, thus providing a larger amount of air for flotation purposes.

[2] This is the town called "Save" by d'Ohsson.

came upon the governor's body guard, a thousand strong, and destroyed it. Riding up to within earshot of the walls, Chepe summoned the garrison to surrender and received the reply that the city was loyal to the Sultan, and while he lived it would be held. Chepe threatened to storm the walls; but in the end he contented himself by accepting supplies for his men, offered on the condition that he depart. Before he left he gave warning that all Mongol detachments who might pass the city were to be furnished with supplies, or else he would destroy the city with its inhabitants, and, he added, the ramparts were not to be strengthened nor the garrison increased. "Do not," said he, "oppose water with fire." Having delivered himself of this threat he led his force down the road which runs between the mountains and the desert.

Subutai in the meantime was carrying fire and torment up the long valley through which the Kashaf and the Atrek flow.[1] In accordance with instructions from Jenghiz Khan, he left small detachments along the route behind him, to watch the approaches from the desert and also to report any movements of troops which might occur. Subutai ravaged the districts of Tus, Kuchan and Isfarain, the latter one of the most fertile areas in Persia, and then rode through Damghan and Samnan, passed Rei and made a sweep south towards Kum. Chepe crossed the Elburz Mountains, most probably by the road from Shahrud, going through the range by a gigantic cleft in the limestone walls known as the "Swordcut" pass, under the peak of Shah Kuh. He would leave the colourless dusty road to the south and descend into the tropical verdure of the Caspian shore

[1] For a description of this part of Khorassan see Curzon *Persia*, Vol. I.

along which lies the province of Mazanderan. It is a new and delightful Persia, wooded, richly clad in green, and spangled with running streams.

Riding westward along the coast he again crossed the Elburz Range by another gorge with tremendous cliffs, leading through Feruzkuh under Mt. Demavend, amid superb scenery, and rode to Rei whence Subutai had returned and the two joined forces before the great walls which had known conquerors before the days of Alexander the Great. Rei was situated three miles to the south of modern Teheran, and was one of the greatest cities of Asia for "excepting Bagdad there is no more flourishing city in the East than Rei."

It was the centre of all the trade routes which ran between Mesopotamia and the heart of Asia and also between Armenia and India.

So swiftly had the Mongols advanced that the city was not organized for defence, in fact it was in a turmoil on account of a dispute between the two Mohamedan sects of Shiah and Sunni. One of the sects, under the influence of fanatical religious hatred, which blinds men to greater issues, opened the gates and invited the Mongols to destroy their theological opponents. The Mongols complied willingly enough; but the massacre being completed, in which some 70,000 people perished, they turned their weapons on their unnatural allies, their simple minds, quite unaffected by theological niceties, considering that men who could be traitors to their brothers under the influence of religion should never be trusted. More than once in the next half century fire and massacre did its work with this ancient city which had survived Mede, Persian, Greek, Parthian and Arab, so that never again did it hold its head among the largest cities of Asia, and at last Teheran rose close

to its ruins to occupy one of the great points of strategic and economic importance in the mediæval East.

Mohammed in the meantime had reached Kazvin, where Rohudin, one of his sons, had got together an army of 30,000 men. The Prince of Luristan also reported to his sovereign there, and the military chiefs of western Persia held a council of war to discuss the best means of stemming the Mongol invasion. It was recommended that Mahommed should retire into the Zagros highlands where a force of at least a hundred thousand men could easily be assembled, and the passes could be effectively held until Mahommed was ready to undertake the offensive.

Already the speed with which the Mongols rode and the suddenness with which they delivered their terrific blows were striking terror through all Persia; therefore the council insisted that a victory was necessary to win the confidence of the troops.

Into this discussion burst a messenger from Rei less than one hundred miles away bearing news of the sack and massacre. At once the assembly broke up in consternation, and the princes and chiefs, together with their troops dispersed for their homes, so great was the fear the Mongols inspired. Mahommed, with a small retinue, galloped along the road for Baghdad past Hamadan, but near the town of Karind[1] he was almost caught by a Mongol scouting party.

His horse was wounded by an arrow but he was not recognized and he reached the gates of Karind safely.

He stayed one day—too long a time for anyone to rest when the Mongol was on his trail—and then, obtaining a fresh horse, again rode hard for Bagdad and safety.

[1] This town is called Caroun by d'Ohsson, but Howorth, pp. 81 and 714, Vol. I, states that Karind is meant.

No sooner had he left when a body of Mongols, having heard that the town held their prey, rode up and without more ado attacked at once. When they learnt, however, that Mahommed had already made his escape, they broke off the attack and took up the chase once more ; and this time they nearly caught him, actually capturing some of his escort. From them the Mongols learnt that Bagdad was Mahommed's destination, and at once urging on their horses, they pressed after their quarry.

But Mahommed, probably remembering the enmity of the Caliph of Bagdad, doubled on his trail like a hunted rabbit, and turning east by circuitous roads, eventually reached Serdehan. Although the situation demanded instant action, he rested there seven days, and then left for the Province of Gilan, and next, turning east again, fled into Mazanderan, arriving in the country alone and stripped of all his glory. But detachments of his pursuers were already in the province before he came, having even then taken Asterabad, and Amul the capital of the province. Mahommed made himself known to some of the provincial emirs and was advised to take refuge on one of the islands near the coast of the Caspian sea.

Again he hesitated, as an irresolute character always will, and wasted some days in the mosque of a village on the coast. And then into the village rode a Mongol patrol. A man whose cousin and uncle had been put to death and whose wealth had been confiscated by the proud prince in the hey-day of his glory, had recognized in the haggard fugitive the author of his ruin, and had taken his revenge by informing the Mongols. Mahommed had just time to enter a boat and gain the open sea when the Mongols rode down to the shore. They sent some arrows after the harassed fugitive, and one or two of

the more eager Mongols actually rode into the sea after him.

Eventually he reached Absukun Island[1] along the coast near Asterabad, and there his troubles came to an end. The rigours of the flight and his harrowing experiences had undermined his health and in December, 1220, he died. Jelaludin and his brothers buried their father in his shirt for a shroud and that duty done they sailed northwards up the Caspian to the Mangishlak Peninsula and rode to Urgenj, probably along an old river bed of the Oxus.

Although Mahommed had escaped, yet the Mongol effort in its fearlessness and speed must remain a model of its kind.

No opportunity was given to the foe to organize an effective opposition, and therefore the main army under Jenghiz Khan operating far to the east need have no fear from the west. With much of Rei a smoking heap of ruins, and stunned by the havoc it had undergone, the logical point of concentration in Persia was eliminated. Later Mongol armies were to finish the work which Chepe and Subutai had begun in Rei, until eventually the site was utterly deserted.

Another event in this amazing chapter of the Mongol cataclysm, was the capture of Mahommed's mother, Turkan Katuna.

Her residence had been Urgenj, the original home of the dynasty, but when Mahommed had fled from Balkh, he sent word to Turkan Katuna advising her to retire into Mazanderan. Jenghiz Khan had also written her, and offered her Khorassan if she would desert Mahommed's cause. When she heard that Mahommed's

[1] Owing to the sinking of the water level of the Caspian, this island is now part of the mainland.

rule was over, she saw that her own importance was gone for ever, so she crossed the desert into Khorassan and then took refuge in the fort of Ilal, now El Ask, in the Elburz. Before she left Urgenj, however, she murdered the many princes who resided there as hostages from the lands which Mahommed had conquered. The princes of districts in Central Persia, together with those of Balkh, Termez, Bamian, Wakhs, Signak, Gur and many others she killed by having them drowned in the Oxus. Then this gentle lady fled to El Ask, and we can feel no pity for her downfall when we read that the Mongols took it and her after a siege of three months. She and the women of Mahommed's harem were sent to Jenghiz Khan, then before Talikhan in Badakshan.

He slew the children of the harem and distributed the ladies among his officers.

While Mahommed was twisting and turning in his desperate efforts to escape the relentless pursuit, Chepe and Subutai had correctly divined Mahommed's intentions and had directed their main forces towards the passes that lead from Persia to Irak and Mesopotamia.

After Rei, which fell probably in July or August, 1220, Chepe rode to Kum, and captured it, massacring the inhabitants in the awful Mongol manner. Kum is one of the most sacred shrines of Persia and the burial place of many of her kings. From there he rode to Hamadan,[1] the ancient Ecbatana, set in a plain thick with orchards, vineyards, and gardens, 6,000 feet above sea level ; but as it submitted quietly he placed a Mongol governor in charge of the city, and then joined Subutai who was scouring the country. They rode to Zenjan together, stormed it, and completely destroyed it.

Turning south, they found Kazvin in their path and

[1] Hamadan—Hagmatana—Ecbatana, *anglice*—Treasure House.

treated it in a similar manner ; but the desperate defence it offered, probably because remnants of the army Mahommed had attempted to organize were still in the city, caused the Mongols heavy casualties and was made the excuse for massacring the forty thousand inhabitants. Mahommed still being at large, they rode south again, past Hamadan into the Zagros highlands, storming Dinavar, Sava, Holwan and Nehavend, leaving a trail of blood and ashes behind them. This placed them astride the main route to Bagdad ; and the reason for their move north was probably the arrival of the news that Mahommed had been found and had fled over the sea beyond their reach. They directed their next march northwards, and rode together into Azerbaijan. The governor of Tabriz bought them off, and as winter was now approaching they rode into the Moghan steppe and set up their tents for the winter.

" These Tatars," said the Persian chronicler Ibn-el-Athir,[1] " have performed deeds, the like of which hath never before been seen. In less than a year they have ridden from China to Armenia."

Considered as an independent operation, it was a remarkable undertaking ; but it is only when it is considered as part of the main strategic scheme of Jenghiz Khan that it can be given its proper importance. Jenghiz Khan realized clearly that in an autocratic state, especially when it was but newly founded, the person of its monarch was the king-pin of its resistance. By giving orders that he was to be pursued without respite, he gave no time for Mahommed to organize resistance. Jenghiz Khan had done the same with the Kin emperor when he had escaped to Kai-feng-fu. Then he had sent Samuka with a single tuman to engage the monarch's

[1] Quoted by d'Ohsson, Vol. I, p. 328.

attention and in the same manner he had sent Chepe after Gutchluk. Compared with any of these Mongol man-hunts, the pursuit of Darius by Alexander is far less striking. It is to the credit of the great Mongol that he had subordinates of the calibre of these tuman commanders, and whereas other great captains stand almost alone, the galaxy of pre-eminent soldiers, outstanding even when we take the whole of military history into account, who led the armies of Jenghiz Khan, is not the least of indications of his pre-eminence as a soldier.

Chepe and Subutai had not only completed their task to the limits of their capabilities when they had driven Mahommed into the Caspian; but they had struck a terror into the hearts of the Persians which effectively prevented them gathering an army to threaten the future operations of Jenghiz Khan in the east. The Mongol operations in Persia would leave the main army free to act in Khorassan and Afghanistan without any cause of apprehension from the west. The southern parts of Persia were prevented by the Great Salt Desert from participating in the conflict. Tule was free to act against Merv and Nishapur, and Urgenj was isolated by the bold action of Chepe and Subutai.

In their travels during the year 1220 they had seen the ice of the Ili and Jaxartes, ridden across deserts such as the Kizil Kum and the Great Salt Desert of Persia, they had felt the heat of Central Persia and the blinding cold of the Siberian Steppes. The mountains of Central Asia had given place to the Kara Tagh and the Paropamisus in quick succession, and the hills of the Atrek had been followed by the mighty range of Elburz. Their horses' hoofs had brought back echoes from the rocks of the Ala Tau and the Barlik between which runs the defile of the Sungarian Gate, and six

months later the frightened mountaineers of the Zagros had seen their flocks driven off by these shepherds who were not less savage than the Kurds of the mountains.

One winter had seen them crossing the Ili ice and the next found them in the shadow of the towering peaks of the Caucasus, and none of them had seen a map.

Marco Polo is rightly given a high place among the great travellers of all time; Subutai the Uriankhai reindeer-herder rode further and faster and with never less than the responsibilities and the cares of thousands of men on his shoulders. Marco Polo travelled on roads made safe by these same terrible warriors—he says as much—but he left an account of what he saw and did. These men left no written record of their wonderful journeyings, so Marco Polo's name has its place in every library index whereas Subutai or Chepe Noyon are names unknown, yet they are the men who opened the road that Marco trod. We can admire the wanderings of Carpini or Jenkinson or later men like Sven Hedin, Bruce, Goes, Prjevalsky, Huc and the rest—but the greater Mongol travellers are terrifying in their ignorance and their faith in their leaders and their weapons. Wherever they desired to go they went, and if men hindered them, those men were slain.

While the Mongols were encamped in the plains of Moghan they ensured that they would be left in peace by sending raiding parties into the valleys of Georgia to inspire that country with the terror that the south already knew too well.

These returned with much booty after massacring some ten thousand hapless villagers.

Then the predatory peoples of Iran, following the lure of loot, came to the Mongol camp to offer their services. Kurds from the highland valleys, who have

been raiders of the plainsman since Assyrian days, and Turkoman nomads, always the curse of the agriculturist on the desert edges until Russia took them in hand in the nineteenth century, poured into the camp.

The Mongol leaders, seeing the possibilities of such excellent professional free-booters, sent these new allies north into Georgia in February, 1221, under a Turk named Accoush, the Mongols themselves following in force in case of emergency.

Their forces rode up the valley of the Kura River, which divides Azerbaijan from Arran, to-day the Russian province of Caucasia, ravaging the valleys and driving any of the wretched inhabitants who managed to escape the torrent of massacre, into the snow-covered mountains. Near Tiflis the hastily formed Georgian army was encountered, and the Kurd and Turkoman allies, apparently acting as irregular horse, harassed the Georgians by incessant attacks, without coming to close quarters. When the Georgians were worn out with the constant manoeuvring which this form of threat imposes on less mobile troops, the Mongol force, which had hitherto kept out of the fighting, drew their swords and charged in. The Georgian army, weary and on tired horses, was destroyed.

In the spring of 1221, Chepe and Subutai moved south once more to keep in touch with events in western Persia, for Jenghiz Khan was moving in the east and the success of his operations would depend on the west being fully occupied with its own troubles.

Tabriz again saved itself by payment of a heavy ransom, and the Mongols rode on to Maragha.[1] This city manned its ramparts, whereupon the Mongols made breaches in the walls and following a common

[1] Afterwards the capital of Hulagu.

custom of theirs, sent their storming parties in behind Moslem captives. When the captives recoiled from the hail of arrows of the defence they were immediately killed, and others were sent to take their place. In spite of this inhuman trick, in which unarmed prisoners shielded with their bodies the soldiers behind, it was some days before the Mongols managed to capture the city. As usual, a general massacre followed, and the city was left in ashes. Before they finally abandoned the debris, they forced a few captives to go through the ruins shouting that the Mongols had gone; and when those who had lain concealed made their appearance, the Mongols immediately set on them and killed them all.

Across the mountains south-westwards from Maragha runs one of the passes to the plain where ancient Nineveh had stood. The valleys of the Great and Little Zab were used by the Assyrians for their punitive expeditions into the great plateau two thousand years before, and down these gorges the Medes had descended to make an end of the great Assyrian empire. The appearance of the Mongol horsemen in these narrow defiles sent a thrill of terror through Mesopotamia, so that even the Caliph was panic-stricken. The prince of Erbil, a town known to classical history as Arbela, gathered an army at Kirkuk and pleaded with the Caliph for reinforcements, with such effect that the parsimonious and pusillanimous monarch sent the prince eight hundred men with orders to attack the invaders immediately. Fortunately for him the Mongol commanders considered the passes too difficult, and, contemptuously ignoring the army from Erbil which they left in their rear, swung round for Persia again.

Riding for Hamadan, they pitched their camp beneath

the walls, and ordered the Mongol commandant to make a levy of gold and supplies. As the city had already paid a heavy indemnity the year before, the inhabitants went to the mayor and pleaded that this new burden was too heavy to be borne. They were told that they could have their choice, it was either pay or fight. They determined to fight and to show that they were in earnest they killed the Mongol commandant.

As soon as the Mongols outside the walls received the news, they commenced their attack and were met with desperate resistance. In the incessant fighting which ensued the Mongols sustained such heavy casualties that at last they decided to retire. Before the commanders issued their final orders, however, it was noticed that the defence was slackening, because, unknown to the Mongols, the commander of the garrison had fled.

The Mongols made one final effort, and after desperate fighting they entered the town. The massacre went on for days, and in the end the city was set on fire.

Done with Hamadan, the Mongols rode north and once again their hateful banners were seen before Tabriz. With the energy of despair, the inhabitants manned the walls, and the Mongols were told plainly that the city intended to fight if the exactions were too heavy. The two generals decided that their losses at Hamadan had been too severe to make a recurrence profitable, and so they took what they could get and left for the north once more. The land of Arran, swept with fire, torture and rape, was left a desert behind them. They had important operations in mind, and did not intend to leave any possible centre of resistance in their rear.

It is stated that the Mongols carried a cross at the head of their army to lull the inhabitants into a feeling

of security, so that they could be butchered the more easily.

Ganja (now Elisavetpol), the capital of the Province, was too strong and too well garrisoned and reluctantly they passed it by. Hearing of a strong Georgian army which had been organized in the west, they rode up the Kura towards Tiflis a second time.

Before contact was made, Chepe with 5,000 men rode into a valley that led off the plain, leaving Subutai to ride on with the main body possibly some 25,000 strong. The Georgians attacked when Subutai approached, and pursued him closely as he turned his army and fled down the road past Chepe's position. Once the Georgians had been led past Chepe's place of concealment, Subutai turned about. Chepe, issuing from the valley where he had been patiently watching events, struck home on the Georgian's rear, while Subutai charged their front, and the army of 30,000 Georgians ceased to exist.

Having thus effectively destroyed all remnants of possible danger, the Mongols crossed the Kura and rode back towards the Caspian along the plains beneath the mountains. At the entrance to the long narrow strip of shore between the Caucasus and the Caspian stands Shemakha and this town was stormed and gutted.

Confident that there was nothing behind them to take advantage of the precarious position in which they intended to place their army, the fearless commanders led their force north along the narrow strip of land which lies between the spurs of the Caucasus and the sea. At Derbent (Dar band—Stop Gate) they entered the defile " where the pass is so narrow that one hundred resolute soldiers could bar with their pikes the passage

of a million men."[1] But again their resolute daring and their speed overcame resistance. The heavily fortified pass was crossed without much difficulty, though the citadel of Derbent resisted all their efforts. They agreed to leave if they could have guides to take them through into the plains beyond; and when ten men were sent to them the Mongols decapitated one as an example to the remaining nine of what would happen to them if they played the Mongols false.

Once through the narrow passage, the guides led them north towards the plains, but in one of the defiles of Daghestan the Mongols found themselves in a trap. The hillmen of the Caucasus, Lesghs and Circassians, had heard of the coming storm and, banding together with Alans and Kipchaks, the nomadic peoples of the northern plains, had raised an army which now blocked the exits of the defile. Attempts to clear the way by force of arms proved unsuccessful, and the Mongols had recourse to treachery. "We are Turks," said they to the Kipchaks who were also a Turkish people and suggested that the Kipchaks should not fight their brethren. Eventually the Kipchaks deserted their allies, and in the subsequent battle the Mongols were completely victorious. Having disposed of the hillmen, they then turned on the Kipchaks and overwhelmed them (autumn A.D. 1221).

The Mongols next ravaged the northern slopes of the Caucasus, stormed Mosdok and Terki and waited for spring.

The terror of the Mongol name now spread north into the grassy ocean which lay between the Caspian

[1] Caterino Zeno, Venetian Ambassador to Persia in the fifteenth century, quoted by Sykes *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia*, p. 164. See also Sykes' *History of Persia*, Vol. I, p. 510.

and the Don. This immense stretch of pasture was inhabited by Kipchaks, or Polovtsi as the Russians called them, and the fear inspired by fugitives from the south ran like a fire through the grass-lands. So terrible was the panic caused by the presence of no more than two Mongol tumans with some Kurd and Turcoman allies, probably little more than 40,000 men in all, that a whole people of Turkish stock migrated a thousand miles, to the limits of their domain. Ten thousand families crossed the Danube into Byzantine territory, and some forty thousand crossed the Carpathians into Hungary. Others fled westwards into Russia, appealing to the very people they were wont to harass for assistance and refuge.

Their Khan, a Moslem, appealed to the Russian princes, and to show his sincerity, he embraced Christianity.

The Mongols were now on open plains similar to those on which they had first learnt the art of war, and their application of the military art had lost nothing by their experiences in China and Persia. Dividing into two bodies they scoured the country, one army burning the old city of Astrakhan on the Volga, the other riding through the basin of the Don. Crossing the Don the usual cloud of scouts was sent westwards.

In the meantime, the prayers for assistance made by the thoroughly terrified Kipchaks had been answered. Russia was then a mass of petty principalities ruled by Princes, of whom one of the most powerful was Mitislav of Kieff; and he, comprehending that something more serious than an average nomadic raid was afoot, convoked a meeting of various princelings and suggested that for once they should cease their internecine warfare to combine against this strange and savage foe.

The terror of the Kipchaks, who were themselves the

raiders of the Russian fields, proved to the princes that it was an uncommon and terrible enemy that was riding towards Kieff, so an army of no less than seventy to eighty thousand men was gathered and set in motion towards the Kipchak land. On the Dnieper the Russian princes were met by some Mongol envoys who stated that they did not intend to war against the Russian peoples, who were their brethren and their friends, but against the idolatrous Kipchaks. Apparently by this time the Mongol leaders had learned something of western religions and the hatred which different sects can feel towards those who profess other views.

The Russians, however, had probably heard of the Mongol faithlessness and treachery, and after listening to the fair promises, they incontinently killed the Mongol envoys. They crossed the Dnieper and on the other side the commander of a Mongol detachment was captured and killed by the Kipchaks. The Mongols, seeing that they were heavily outnumbered by the Russian host and their swarm of Kipchak allies, retreated slowly before them.

For days the Mongols kept just ahead of the advancing army, their rearward scouts keeping the leaders informed of the Russian movements.

Such a retreat could be kept up for weeks by the Mongols, but sooner or later something was bound to happen to their less disciplined and less mobile foes which would give the Mongols their opportunity. At the Kalka river it occurred. The prince of Galitsch, leading the foremost Russian troops, crossed the river in advance of the main body; and, believing the Mongols to be dispersed and disheartened, advanced swiftly to attack without waiting for assistance. After the long pursuit in which the enemy were always in

retreat, the impetuous prince who desired to reap the honour of victory, would have been justified in believing that his advance guard alone was capable of turning the pursuit into a rout had he had ordinary troops before him; but not with these experienced Mongols. They turned immediately they saw the situation, the ranks closed up, and almost before the Prince of Galitsch realized it, his flanks were turned and his centre hard pressed. The Kipchaks were dispersed before long, and then the Mongols closed. The rash prince sought safety in flight, and to save his precious skin he attempted to prevent the Mongols crossing the river by breaking in the boats which were on the shore, regardless of his men who were now utterly routed. About a tenth of the force managed to cross the Kalka to immediate safety, six princes lay dead on the field, and the remnants of terror-struck Kipchaks cut their way through the fugitives who remained between them and the far bank.

The Prince of Kieff on the western bank, realizing his peril, moved the main army to a hill near at hand, for he saw at once that it would be impossible for his army to retreat with such terrible warriors pressing it, without his whole command dissolving into a rabble. But he was too late. Before he could fortify the eminence, the Mongols were upon him. For three days the fighting continued, and at last the Russians, cut off from water and food, seeing that the end was near, surrendered on receiving a promise that their lives would be spared. It was given with the same freedom that the Mongols had ever given their promises, and broken as easily. They disarmed and massacred the soldiers, killed the princes by laying boards on their bound bodies and holding a feast on the floor so made.

With the Russian army destroyed, there next com-

menced a long ride through south-eastern Russia, and the flame and smoke of the burning towns and villages reddened the sky by night and darkened the sun by day, while fire and massacre swept the land. Detachments rode down to the Crimea and burnt Sondac, a Genoese trading station, and in one town the citizens, having no defensive organization, put their trust in God. They formed a procession and, carrying a cross before them, went out to meet the Mongols. They also went down the same road as those who had put their trust in their weapons.

From the Dnieper to the Sea of Azov the land was ravaged, and a wide band of desolation swept up to Greater Bulgaria, on the upper Volga, where the Bulgars of the Caspian region, who were a people akin to the Hungarians, dwelt in semi-barbarism. They were the fur-traders of Europe—this area has been referred to as the Hudson's Bay of Europe—and promptly gathered their forces together and showed fight on the approach of the Mongol army. All that is recorded of their destruction is that they fell into the usual Mongol ambush, were surrounded, and were wiped out. As a result of the Mongol ravages the fur trade of Europe was interrupted for some years.

In the winter of 1222, when the Volga was frozen over, the Mongols crossed on the ice not far from the spot where the tent city of Serai was afterwards built as the Headquarters of the Golden Horde, and then they commenced their long march homewards.

They crossed the desolate steppes between the Caspian and the Sea of Aral and joined Jenghiz Khan, then also bound for home, somewhere in the plains north of the Jaxartes in the summer of A.D. 1223.

Old Chepe Noyon had ridden his last and greatest

ride and Jenghiz Khan had to mourn the death of his ablest subordinate shortly afterwards, but in Subutai he found a lieutenant who had absorbed all Chepe's art, and who had risen in reputation until he was considered the outstanding soldier of his people and his time when Jenghiz Khan himself was dead.

However much we may view with abhorrence the simple code which gave no rights whatsoever to captives or to enemies, we cannot but stand amazed at the fearlessness, energy and indomitable character of these shepherds from High Asia.

To follow their trail on the contoured map is sufficient to bewilder anyone with the slightest conception of what war means. If it were not a matter of cold historical fact, this great ride of the shepherds of Mongolia should take its proper place in the dream of an amateur strategist from whose calculations such details as supplies, communications, remounts, care of the wounded and replacement of casualties are all absent.

All the details of communications, their methods of signalling, their scouting system are lacking in the narrative of their operations, yet we can be certain they troubled the grey hairs of Chepe Noyon, then nearly sixty years of age.

Unlike western histories written of the same period, there are no details of great deeds by individual prowess. No Coeur-de-Lion nor Chandos nor Bayard appears among them, and in the human torrents which swept through the passes between the snow-capped ridges of Asia, neither by dress nor stature nor inlaid armour can we distinguish such men as Jenghiz Khan or Chepe Noyon from the tattered shepherds on third-rate ponies surrounding them.

In place of the silken banners of medieval European commanders, we have the crossed sheeps' shoulder-blades[1] tied to a pole, with the nine yak tails dangling beneath as the standard which indicated that the Greatest Khan himself was present.

It is not in the printed pages of some Oriental Froissart that we discover any romance in Mongol wars, but in the more sober colouring of the contoured map. There is no Arrian to tell the story of his hero, and no Xenophon to write a Kyropaedia with Jenghiz Khan as his central figure, and therefore if we would fully appreciate the deeds of the men who obeyed the orders of the Great Conqueror, we require first of all a comprehension of the detailed geography of Asia. And, strange to relate, if we first study the geography of Alexander the Great's eastern campaign we can better appreciate this campaign of the greater Mongol soldier, for he strode in the footsteps of the Macedonian for hundreds if not thousands of miles.

[1] The Mongols attached a certain religious significance to the shoulder blades of animals. It is interesting to note that in the *Illustrated London News* of May 14th, 1932, Professor Flinders Petrie remarks that the Hyksos of Egypt attached a religious importance to the shoulder blades of horses. This point may be decisive in clearing up the origin of this people, who have been a mystery to Egyptologists. Armies from the steppes of Asia have reached Egypt's borders on more than one occasion and the direction of the Hyksos' retreat is further evidence that the home of the Hyksos was in the north.

CHAPTER VI

"Amdand u khandand u sokhtand u kushtand u burdand u raftand." (JUWAINI.)

(They came and they breached, they burned and they slew, trussed up the loot,—and were gone.)

IT is necessary now to return to the main Mongol army. In May, 1220, Jenghiz Khan had captured Samarkand, and had dispatched two tumans under Chepe and Subutai to pursue Mahommed. During the summer, when the heat of the plains of Transoxiana is that of a fiery furnace, he rested his army in the great oasis of Nakshab under the shadow of the mountains. Chepe and Subutai would be keeping western Persia under observation, and their detachments in Khorassan south of the Oxus were in a position to warn him of any dangerous developments in that rich province.

There remained still unsubdued the populous districts of Khwarazm proper, centring on the delta of the Oxus with Urgenj as the capital, and Badakshan, which consisted of the upper Oxus valley and the foothills[1] surrounding it. South of Badakshan and separated from it by the Hindu Kush were the mountainous districts of Afghanistan of which the chief city was Ghazni.

He had also left the valley of the Upper Jaxartes in his rear but by occupying Khojend he had effectively sealed its exit.

[1] Badakshan was a populous and important district before the Mongol invasion. Lying as it does in the curve of the great mountain ranges, the passes from India and from the Tarim basin meet the connecting roads in Badakshan. Talikhan lay at the foot of the pass which crosses the mountains to Yarkand, and much of the trade between China and India went by this route. Buddhism spread to China via Bamian and Talikhan.

MONGOL CAMPAIGNS
1220-24

KHWARAZM
URGENJ
Juji 1221
Juji, Jagatai, Ogdai 1221
DESERT OF KARA KUM (BLACK SAND)
Jelaluddin Feb. 1221
Amu Darya or Oxus R.
Syr Darya or Jaxartes R.
FERGHANA
NUR
KHEBET
NURATA
DJIZAK
KHOJEND
BOKHARA
SAMARKAND
SHAHR-SABZ
KARSHI
NAKSHAB
DARBAND
KARA TAGH MTS.
Atrek R.
KUCHAN
NISA
KHORASSAN
MERV
Togachar Nov 1220
KELIF
TERMEZ
SABZAWAR
TUS
NISHAPUR
SARAKHS
Tule 1221
ANDEKUH
BALKH
Murghab R.
KUNDUZ
TALIKHAN
BADAKSHAN
GREAT PAMIR
(SAMANGAR) HAIBAK
BAGLAN
TURBAT HAIDARI
HINDU KUSH
RANGE
PARWAN
KAFIRISTAN
CHARIKAR
ZUZAN
KHAF
Hari Rud R.
HERAT
KOH I BABA
BAMIAN
KABUL
Kunar R.
SWAT
HIMALAYA MTS
KHYBER
PESHAWAR
GHAZNI
KOHAT
Jenghiz
Ogdai
FARAH
BANNU
MIRPUR
KALABAGH
Tochi R.
Jhelum R.
Chenab R.
KANDAHAR
Bela
LAHORE
SEISTAN
AFGHAN
Helmand R.
LEIAH
Ravi
FEROZEPOR
Bela
MULTAN
Sutlej R.
PUNJAB
KERMAN
Jagatai
Jagatai
RIVER INDUS
NORTH
MAKRAN
BALUCHISTAN
INDUS
TEZ
Mouths of the Indus
INDIAN OCEAN

0 50 100 200 300 MILES

One of the chief characteristics of the Great Mongol, in war and in peace, was thoroughness in everything he did. Once started, he drove through to a logical and absolute conclusion.

The summer heat begins to abate in September, and his army was rested by the time the cool weather commenced, when he marched south to complete the work which had started so auspiciously for his arms. First, he sent a son-in-law named Togachar into Khorassan with two tumans, while he himself led the main body of his army across the Kara Tagh mountains and through the defile of Darband, a pass twenty yards wide with walls rising to 475 feet on either side.[1]

He debouched from the hills on Termez, the largest city on the banks of the Upper Oxus. In nine days the walls were breached and, following the storm, the inhabitants were massacred. Then he marched on Balkh, and in spite of its submission, he massacred the population and burnt the city, in order not to leave a possible centre of resistance on his flank.

The coming of winter found him across the river in the pastures south of the Oxus, with his detachments scouring the land over a wide area, and utterly destroying the population.

He took up his winter quarters in the valleys between the Hindu Kush and the Oxus and evolved a plan to clear his flanks and rear.

He dispatched strong raiding parties to deal with Ferghana and the Upper Jaxartes valleys. Then he ordered his three eldest sons, Juji, Jagatai and Ogdai, to subdue Urgenj and the Oxus delta.

[1] Darband or Derbent is one of the so-called Iron Gates of Asia. Alexander the Great passed through this one. See Olufssen, *The Emir of Bokhara and his Country*, p. 68.

But first it is necessary to follow Togachar into Khorassan.

Some of the cities of Khorassan which had submitted to Chepe and Subutai had rebelled when the pursuit had passed on. In these cities Mongol governors had been placed and now that the main army was operating in the east, and the two pursuing generals were far to the west, some cities attempted to rid themselves of the Mongol yoke. The city of Tus killed its governor in the hope of ending the Mongol rule, but when a detachment of three hundred Mongols, stationed at Kuchan, rode up to the city, the townspeople submitted instantly, and so terrible was the Mongol name even at this early date, that they tore down their walls at the order of the Mongol officer in charge of the detachment. Togachar's force crossed the Oxus, made a wide sweep through the steppe, and headed for Nisa, at the entrance to the pass which pierces the northern mountain rampart of Khorassan.

A Mongol detachment, riding up to reconnoitre, had its commander killed by an arrow from the walls. Togachar seeing that the city intended to put up a stout resistance, set up twenty catapults, and forced his wretched captives to serve them under fire. When the labourers recoiled before the vigorous counter-measures of the defence, the Mongols immediately killed them and sent in others to take their place. In spite of this complete disregard for casualties, it was fifteen days before a breach was made. A strong night attack carried the walls, whereupon the captured inhabitants were massacred in cold blood by the savage victor.

By November, 1220, Togachar, continuing his devastation of Khorassan, had reached Nishapur, the capital of the province. He attempted to besiege it, but on

the third day an arrow struck and killed him. The officer who succeeded to the command considered that his force was not strong enough to take the great city, so he raised the siege and loosed the cavalry in two bodies to ravage the district. One strong force rode westwards to Sabzawar and after a three days' siege stormed it and butchered its seventy thousand inhabitants. Another body rode through the hills beyond Tus, and carried fire and sword through the fertile valleys of the Kashaf and Atrek.

As soon as Jenghiz Khan realized that Khorassan was too strong to be completely subdued by the forces he had thrown into the province, he gave orders to Tule, his youngest son, to take four tumans and finish with Khorassan.

Tule, who had been in winter quarters south of the Oxus with Jenghiz Khan, marched along the desert edge by way of Andekuh, and swung north to Merv, the greatest cultural centre of Islam east of Bagdad. Like Bokhara, Merv was built before the first Aryans descended into Iran (about 2500 B.C.). It had been the capital of the successors of Haroun-al-Rashid—the Caliph of the Arabian Nights—and both Malik Shah and Sultan Sanjar, the latter one of the greatest, as he was the most tragic, of the great Seljuk line, had made it the seat of government. Yakut, the eminent geographer, was among the few who escaped from the city before the Mongols arrived. He refers to the rich libraries of the city and to the many men of science and the numerous authors residing there.

Merv stood in the oasis of the same name, and was the northern gateway of Khorassan and the Iranian plateau. Once Merv was taken, the most direct road between Transoxiana and Iran lay open; and it is on

account of the lack of physical barriers in the valleys of the Murghab and Tedjen rivers, that every conqueror of either Transoxiana or Iran has been forced to occupy Merv, and once in Merv to continue his conquests in order to protect it, for there is no real barrier either north or south. The northern half of the plateau of Iran contains the long trough formed by the valleys of the Atrek, Kashaf Rud, and the Hari Rud, from which the road runs without serious gradients to Kandahar and Kabul. On this account, every conqueror from east or west has always been forced to continue his marches to the other extremity of the plateau, because there is no natural dividing line which is also a military obstacle on which he can rest his conquests. Alexander (and many others, both after and before him), started from the west and ended on the Indus, and, centuries later, when the Afghans left their mountains, they halted only at the foot of the ranges that divide Iran from Mesopotamia. All of them have been forced to attend to the gap between the Tejend and the Murghab, and often it has led to Transoxiana being added to their domains, just as the conquerors of Transoxiana from the north have often been forced to conquer Iran also.

This is the reason that has caused Merv and Herat and Bokhara to be among the most frequently looted cities in the world. The accident of Western expansion may have suspended the constant march of armies down the Iranian valleys for the last hundred years; but the foundations of these cities were laid in the dawn of civilization four or five thousand years ago.

Situated as they are squarely in the middle of the only highways of commerce and of war that geography has afforded in this part of South Western Asia, they have seen old empires fall and new religions arise, and they

are outstanding examples of the truth that history passes, but geography remains. When archæology comes into its own in Central Asia and delves among the ruins that lie thickly in the vicinity of Balkh and Herat, and along the valleys of the Helmand and the Oxus, it will surely discover in brick, in coin and in ceramics, the record of every great Asiatic movement from long before the coming of the Aryan to the days of the Arab invasion, movements of which we now know little or nothing.

As Tule approached Merv, an advanced scouting detachment of his army was surprised by a force of some two thousand Turkomans and were nearly all killed in the action, while the prisoners taken were put to death in cold blood. The wild Turkomans, nomads of the Kara Kum desert-steppe, next pillaged the suburbs of Merv. Tule arrived two days afterwards, 25th February, 1221, and his first action was to round up and destroy the Turkoman force. He next made a personal reconnaissance of the great city before his train of siege-engines arrived. It took seven days to set up the siege-engines; but they were ready to commence battering the walls when a messenger from the city came to him, with offers of surrender. Dissension had set in within the city. A peace party argued with those who held for a strong resistance, and the pacifists won their point and a temporary advantage —and lost everything in the end.

Tule promised them all they asked, and the great gates were opened. Riding in with his troops, his first act was to order the citizens outside the walls. The procession took four days to pass the gates, and when the town was empty he turned his Mongols loose to kill. All the surrounding peasantry had fled to the

protection of the city on his approach, thus adding to the numbers within the walls. The number of those who died in the atrocious massacre is estimated from five to seven hundred thousand men, women and children, and Sykes, the historian of Persia, reviewing the evidence, considers that these appalling figures are not excessive.

Having disposed of the population, the army rode in to pillage and destroy. When they were done, they set on fire the great city which was also the cultural centre of eastern Islam. Some five thousand of the inhabitants escaped by hiding in cellars and secret places, but some time later a Mongol detachment rode by and found them, and completed the work of massacre that Tule had begun. The poignant lines of Yakut, the geographer, can be quoted to round off the terrible picture. " The palaces were effaced from off the earth as lines of writing are effaced from paper, and the abodes became a dwelling for the owl and raven; in these places the screech owls answer each other, and in the halls the winds now moan responsive to the simoon."[1]

From the reeking horror that had been Merv, Tule marched via Sarakhs to Nishapur. Compared with Merv or Bokhara, Nishapur was young, having been built by Shapur I (A.D. 240 to 270) of the Sassanian dynasty, who had named the city after himself.

Malik Shah had built his observatory there, and Omar Khayam had worked therein, for Khorassan was glowing with the light of culture and learning when the benighted west was sunk deep in the darkness that had followed the fall of Rome. Twice before within the century it had been destroyed, once by the Guzz Turks in 1153 " when the dead could not be seen for the blood wherein

[1] Sykes, *Hist. of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 155.

they lay " and once by an earthquake only twelve years before the Mongols came. Tule was now to finish it for ever, its historical associations meant nothing to the human lava-flow from Central Asia.

It had been prepared for a siege ever since the Mongol army under Chepe had swept by it on the trail of Mahommed, and it now mounted 3,000 balista, i.e., heavy javelin throwers, and 500 catapults on its walls.

First the Mongols laid waste the surrounding districts which had escaped the previous ravages of Chepe and Togachar. Then they forced their captives to work erecting their siege-engines under fire from the defence. 3,000 balista, 300 catapults, 700 fire-throwing implements and 4,000 ladders were placed in readiness, the enslaved peasantry bringing down from the mountains 2500 loads of rock. With unlimited labour at their disposal, and utterly indifferent to the casualties their wretched captives suffered, a siege by the Mongols could seldom be repelled by any garrison.

Prevented as he was by ordinary humanity from firing on the peasantry erecting the siege works, the sight of the preparations unnerved the Persian commander, and he sent a deputation offering submission. Tule for some unknown reason refused it, for if he intended to stamp the city with its citizens from off the face of the earth, he could have perpetrated the same foul act of treachery here that he effected at Merv. Instead, he gave orders for the place to be stormed, and the bombardment commenced. The moat was filled and seventy breaches were made in the walls. Then ten thousand picked troops were sent to the assault, with the widow of Togachar, herself a daughter of Jenghiz Khan, leading the stormers. The city was entered at several points, and the carnage commenced.

For four days the killing continued, and nothing, not even the cats and dogs, was spared. Tule had learnt that some men had escaped from Merv by lying among the dead, so he gave orders that every corpse was to be beheaded, and the heads piled in pyramids, with the heads of men, women, and children, separate and in pyramids by themselves. Then he gave orders that the buildings were to be pulled down, and this work of destruction went on for fifteen days. When he was done the capital of Khorassan had disappeared, and he sowed barley where the city had been. Says Sykes, "I have shot sand-grouse within the area surrounded by the broken-down walls of ancient Nishapur, and I saw barley growing in unconscious imitation of the Mongol's sowing."

With Nishapur eliminated as a possible threat to Jenghiz Khan, Tule turned eastwards once more. Before he left the district, however, he sent a detachment to treat Tus as he had treated Merv and Nishapur. It was this detachment which wrecked and looted the splendid mausoleum of Haroun-al-Rashid, for not even the dead were left in peace when the Mongol rode to war.

His next objective was Herat. On his way he ravaged the country by sending out his raiding parties in every direction, to burn, to ravish and to kill. He camped before Herat after a leisurely and destructive march, certain that all possible centres of resistance had been cleared away from behind him. The governor of Herat had determined to defend the city to the last, and for eight days after the siege commenced, the city offered a desperate resistance to the assaults which came in from all sides at once. But the iron-hearted governor was killed in repelling one of the storming parties, and the citizens wavered. They thereupon sent a deputa-

tion to Tule, offering to surrender; Tule consented and strange to relate, considering his frightful record, even kept his word so far as a Mongol could. He slaughtered the 12,000 men composing the garrison, but spared the inhabitants. Perhaps his mercy was born of the need for haste, because orders had been received requiring him to return with all speed, but Jenghiz Khan later bitterly reproached Tule for his clemency.

Tule placed a Mongol governor in the city and commenced his long return march.

It was during this period when Khorassan was being laid desolate that a small tribe of Kankali Turks in one of the oases near Merv, abandoned their pastures in terror and emigrated to Armenia. When the Mongols ravaged that country eight years later, this little tribe again rode westwards. Their chief, named Ertigroul, is unknown to fame, but his son Othman was the founder of that Ottoman dynasty before which Europe from Vienna eastwards was to live in fear and trembling for many a long year to come.

We left Jenghiz Khan encamped in the grassy valleys south of the Oxus. He had sent raiding parties through Ferghana and Badakshan, in order to ravage the head waters of the two rivers of Transoxiana. At the base of the hills of Badakshan stood the strong fortress of Talikhan, which repelled the attacks of his subordinates for six months. At last he took the operation in hand himself, causing a long ramp to be built up to the top of the wall, and he left it a ruin without a live inhabitant (Summer of 1221).

After Tule had been sent into Khorassan, in the winter of 1220-21, the Oxus delta commenced to show signs of being alive to its peril.

In the previous chapter it has been told how Jelaludin, son of Mahommed, had sailed north to Mangishlak on the death of his father, and had ridden to Urgenj. He found the city attempting to organize an army of defence; but the political factions soon showed him that its case was hopeless. Finding that he was unable to control the disputing elements, he left the city. The plan he adopted was as courageous as it was desperate.

He rode across the Kara Kum desert with only three hundred horsemen behind him, determined to make for Afghanistan. In his little bodyguard was Timur Melik, the stout-hearted defender of Khojend. But Chepe and Subutai had left detachments in Khorassan, and Jenghiz Khan had placed a line of scouts between Merv and Nisa to watch any movements from Urgenj. Just outside the ruins of Nisa, lately sacked by Togachar, a Mongol force of 700 horsemen blocked his way. Undaunted by the disparity of force, the gallant soldier charged and succeeded in cutting his way through.

Followed by merely a remnant of his bodyguard, Jelaludin reached Nishapur safely, where he was secure for the time being.

His brothers, younger sons of Mahommed, left Urgenj a short time after his departure, because they had received news of the approach of the army under Juji, Jagatai, and Ogdai. They also found their path blocked by a Mongol detachment, but they were not so fortunate as their greater brother. They fell victims to the Mongol arrows and their heads were stuck on lances to grace a Mongol victory (February, 1221).[1]

We must now return to the army under Juji, Jagatai and Ogdai which Jenghiz Khan had ordered to Urgenj.

[1] See Appendix I.

While Tule's army was marching for Khorassan, this army set out on its long march down the Oxus.

It must have commenced its march some time in January, 1221,[1] and marched via Bokhara, crossing the river on the ice above Urgenj. The river is wide and shallow, with many islands and mud-banks in the channel. Nearer its mouth the slow-moving waters of the Oxus spread out and form a large area of swamp, and the delta itself contains many water channels, all of them smaller than the main stream. By leading the water into ditches and canals, a large area is made fit for agriculture. Gardens and orchards abound, though the district is in the main unhealthy by reason of the clouds of mosquitoes which breed in the fens and swamps.

The first indication of the coming storm was the appearance of a Mongol reconnoitring detachment which captured some horses near the gates. Some of the stouter-hearted men of the garrison, which was 90,000 strong, seeing their opportunity, issued from the gates to engage them. The Mongols fled abruptly, and the Kankali Turks followed in pursuit. Suddenly the Mongols halted and turned about, and at the same time a strong Mongol force, concealed till then from the Turks, rode between the pursuers and the city. The whole affair was a Mongol ruse, simple and effective. The Turks were completely routed, and some of the Mongols actually entered the city with the fugitives, but they were too few in number to maintain themselves there.[2]

When the main army arrived, the princes summoned the city to surrender, and were met with defiance. A peculiarity of the soil assisted the defence and hampered

[1] See Appendix I.

[2] Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, p. 84.

the besiegers. The Oxus delta consists of fine silt brought down by the river which flows so slowly that all the coarser sediments are deposited in the higher reaches, and only silt as fine as flour is left when it reaches the delta.[1] There were, therefore, no rocks available for the catapults, and the bombardment of the mud walls was a problem for the besiegers. The ingenuity of the Chinese engineers attempted to make up the deficiency by cutting down mulberry trees and soaking lengths of their trunks in water to make them heavy enough for effective missiles, but this proved inadequate.

Past one side of the city flowed a branch of the river, and on the tenth day of the siege the Mongols, prevented from breaching the walls, attempted to take one of the bridges which crossed the stream, but were repulsed with the loss of 3,000 men. Unable to storm it, they fell back on the last weapon in their armoury, which was also the normal weapon in Europe, starvation.

The siege dragged on through spring to the unhealthy summer of the year. Juji and Jagatai quarrelled, and the discipline grew slack. The quarrel was due to the apparent reluctance of Juji to destroy the city, because it would be part of his dominion later. The same reason had caused him to refrain from destroying the cities of the Jaxartes.

When the summer heat had come in June the city was still untaken, and a great many Mongols became casualties—probably from diseases such as malaria, typhoid and dysentery, all of them prevalent in swampy country of this type. Jenghiz Khan, however, growing

[1] Olufssen, op. cit. Besides Olufssen's work, a good description of this area is contained in Burnaby's *Ride to Khiva*, and in Major Herbert Wood's *The Shores of Lake Aral*. (Smith Elder, 1876.)

impatient of the delay, because the events which had caused him to recall Tule from Herat were taking definite shape, at last intervened in the disputes between the two brothers. He relieved them both of their commands and placed Ogdai in charge.

By his genial manner for which he was noted, Ogdai temporarily reconciled the two brothers, and by firm action he re-established discipline in the army. He surveyed the situation and determined to finish the siege. Along the river bank strong defensive works had been built by the garrison, and a well-armed fleet of boats floated on the waters. A Chinese engineer made a number of fire arrows, and discharging them during a strong wind into the fleet of river-craft set the boats afire. Under cover of this attack on the boats and the smoke and confusion it caused, the Mongols stormed the river defences and entered the outskirt of the city.

Three thousand men were then set to work to divert the stream, but though a strong sortie by the garrison attacked the workmen and destroyed their laboriously made dam, Ogdai gradually reduced the garrison to its last extremities (July, 1221).

At last, deeming the time propitious, he ordered the assault, and the besiegers mounted the walls. When the governor sent an envoy requesting terms, declaring that they had submitted to the Mongol fury for six months and now wished to feel the Mongol clemency, Ogdai in stupefaction replied, " What ! You who have destroyed so large a number of our men by your stubborn resistance ! It is we who have felt your fury—and now you are going to feel ours."

He saved the craftsmen and artisans—for the time being—and then loosed his butchers. When the massacre

was complete, they set the captives to work breaking down the dykes, in order that the river waters might flow against the mud walls. Urgenj had been built across an old dry channel of the Oxus when the river had flowed to the Caspian Sea past the south shore of Lake Aral, and the Mongols diverted the waters back to their old bed. Those who had taken refuge in cellars were drowned like rats in their holes, and the river flowed again towards the Caspian.[1] The lesser cities dotting the oasis were then taken and the delta was swept clean of Khwarazmian troops. The last centre of opposition in Jenghiz Khan's flank and rear was disposed of, and the army, in response to urgent calls from the Commander-in-Chief marched up the river once more to join him.

The reason for the recall of the two armies must now be explained.

When Jelaludin reached Nishapur, sometime in February, he rested only three days. He probably saw the hopelessness of attempting to raise an army to take the field against the Mongols in Khorassan, because Chepe and Subutai had inspired a terror in the inhabitants which made them loath to leave the protection of their walls. Shortly after leaving the city his little party found itself being followed by Mongol scouts whose numbers were steadily being augmented as the journey continued.

[1] According to Herbert Wood (op. cit.), who quotes from Arab sources, the Arab name of the city the Mongols stormed was Al Djordaniyeh. Its walls were entirely of mud, and these were built across the old bed of the Oxus, whose course has wandered at times like all silt-depositing rivers. A great dam held the river to its new course into the Aral Sea, and the Mongols by breaking down this dam and permitting the water to wash against the mud walls, caused the ramparts to collapse so that the site became a swamp. The city now called Old Urgenj was built about sixty miles from the previous city. In the sixteenth century the Oxus still flowed into the Caspian. See also *Cathay and the Way Thither*, Hakluyt Society, Vol. III, p. 82.

The Mongol intelligence system must have been of a high order, for when we recall the circumstance of the detachment of seven hundred men which barred Jelaludin's path at Nisa, and this appearance of a detachment as soon as he left Nishapur, it is impossible to believe that each event was fortuitous. Throughout all the campaign, there is the feeling that the Mongol commanders knew exactly what was happening in the enemy's camp, and that the enemy knew very little indeed of what the Mongol movements would be. When it is realized that most of the men Jenghiz Khan commanded were Turks,[1] and that the soldiers of the enemy's armies were also Turks of identical stock and similar speech, it is obvious that Jenghiz Khan made full use of a wonderful intelligence system, and denied a similar advantage to his enemy. The military system and organization of the Mongols would render it difficult for a spy to mix too freely in their camps, while the lack of cohesion and discipline in the armies of their foes would probably simplify the work of a Mongol spy seeking information. It is also likely that much of the Mongol's intelligence system was due to the natural ability of the Mongol as a scout. The normal position of the scouting screen was two days' march, perhaps one hundred miles ahead and on the flanks of the main army.

[1] Probably three-quarters of the pastoral nomads of Mongolia were Turks. I have adhered to the word Mongol when discussing the armies led by Jenghiz Khan, because it is difficult to use any other term which is sufficiently distinctive. The Chinese historians were confronted with the same problem, and as the nearest tribe to China was the Tatar—a Manchu people—the Chinese used the word Tatar as a generic term for the peoples of the plateau of Mongolia. It is quite as erroneous to call the armies under Jenghiz Khan "Tatar," as it is to call them "Mongol," because neither Mongol nor Tatar were Turks. But because the leaders of these armies were undoubtedly Mongol, and because their home is now called Mongolia, I have used the term "Mongol" in a generic sense.

The later eruptions from Mongolia, in the days of Ogdai and Kublai, present an even greater problem, because by then Persians, Russians, Kankali, Turcoman and Chinese served in the armies, and no generic term can possibly suffice.

Strong supporting parties, in some instances hundreds strong each, operated well forward, and when the army traversed enemy territory it left small bodies of troops scattered over the area it had covered. Mongol scouts pushed far out into the desert, had undoubtedly watched Jelaludin from the day he left Urgenj to the day they lost him near Farah.[1] This scouting system was as much a part of Mongol operations as the tactics employed on the field of battle. When we read of European armies in 1914 with their advanced patrols ahead of the main body only ten or eleven miles at the most we may have an important clue why manœuvre and stratagem are lost arts in European warfare, and why modern warfare becomes stationary, because when armies merely blunder into one another, the soldier, in face of modern weapons, has no recourse but to dig. In European warfare also, with nothing approaching to the Mongol scouting force, the junction of two armies on the field of battle has been the most difficult of operations, whereas with the Mongols it was a very common manœuvre.

The key to real mobility probably rests on a highly-developed scouting system, because it is of no value to be able to move from one point to another at high speed if an undiscovered enemy lies between.

But if the scouting screen, one hundred miles or more in advance of a striking force capable of moving at fifty to seventy miles a day has located the enemy and become cognizant of his flanks and the extent of his front, and is also able to deny intelligence to the foe, manœuvre against flank and rear becomes possible.

[1] P. de la Croix states, p. 178, that spies had kept Jenghiz Khan informed of the state of affairs in Urgenj and that he had placed a screen of outposts across the desert from Merv to Scheherestan. Scheherestan was close to Nisa.


BALKH
TASHKURGAN
KUNDUZ
TALIKHAN
BAGLAN
HAIBAK
BADAKSHAN
KHAWAK PASS
VALIAN
HINDU KUSH
BAJGAN PASS
Panjshir R.
KAFIRISTAN
VALIAN PASS
PARWAN
AK ROBAT PASS
CHARIKAR
BAMIAN
River
PASSES OF THE HINDU KUSH
0 10 20 30 40 50
Hari Rud
HAJIGAK PASS
Ghorband R.
UNAI PASS
Helmand
KABUL

The fact that mobility to be employed to best advantage requires a most efficient scouting force, emerges very clearly from a study of Mongol operations.

When Jelaludin perceived that he was being followed, he set spurs to his horse, and he was of the same hard-riding stock as his pursuers. He rode one hundred and twenty miles that day, from Nishapur to Zuzan, south of Khaf. The gates were shut (perhaps because it was after dark, or possibly from fear of the Mongols), so he had no choice but to ride on with the Mongols still in pursuit. They lost him that night and eventually he reached Ghazni safely. He found the country in disorder, but the wild hillmen and the Turkish horsemen rallied to his standard. It was information regarding the mustering of this army eventually numbering fifty to sixty thousand men, which caused Jenghiz Khan to recall his subordinates. By the end of summer, Tule and Jagatai and Ogdai with their armies had all joined him, but Juji, incensed at being superseded, had taken part of the Mongol army operating against Urgenj into the steppes north of the Aral Sea and made his head-quarters at Signak. He took no further part in the campaign in spite of direct orders from Jenghiz Khan—the one deliberate breach of discipline in these early years of Mongol ascendancy. The armies concentrated somewhere in the neighbourhood of Kunduz, and Jenghiz Khan directed his march up the river valley that runs to Bamian. First he sent three tumans under the command of Siki Kutaku, a Buyar-Nor Tatar whom he had caught when a child in one of his early raids and had adopted, to watch the army of Jelaludin from the northern side of the Hindu Kush. One scouting detachment of this force, pushing ahead to the village of Valian, was caught and destroyed by

Jelaludin's forces.[1] After this initial success, Jelaludin retired to Parwan, where his baggage train was encamped, because he had now successfully discerned his opponent's intention.

Kutaku, most probably exceeding his instructions, crossed the Hindu Kush and descended into the plain of Parwan where Jelaludin was awaiting him. The plain itself is a stony valley cut up by ravines, with the Hindu Kush rising like a wall to the north—evidently an area quite unsuitable for cavalry operations. Jelaludin therefore dismounted his right wing composed of Kankali Turks under the Emir Melik, and awaited the Mongol onslaught in confidence.

On the first day, the action was indecisive, for there could not have been much room for manœuvre, and the armies separated at nightfall. The Mongols, 30,000 strong, were heavily out-numbered and though they excelled their foes in discipline and organization the unsuitable ground discounted the tactics of which the Mongols were masters.

The day following saw the two armies again in contact, and at first glance it appeared that the Mongols had been strongly reinforced.

The resourceful Mongol commander had given orders for clothing to be packed with straw and the dummy figures so made to be mounted on spare horses.

The ruse succeeded in disturbing the subordinate Turkish commanders, but Jelaludin himself was not to be moved by a mere increase in the numbers of his

[1] D'Ohsson states that Jenghiz Khan marched up to Bamian from the Oxus via Kerduan, crossing the great Balkh plains and passing through the terrific gates and gorges of the hills which lead to Haibak. Kerduan is not marked on modern maps but must have been close to Kunduz. No less than thirteen routes are available across the Hindu Kush. Valian is marked as a hamlet on the Survey of India sheet of this area. A description of the plain of Parwan is given in Wood's, *Journey to the Source of the Oxus*.

foes, when he held them in a trap. With the wall of mountains behind the Mongol army, with only the defiles of the Ghorband and Panjshir to right and left and a field of battle most unsuited to cavalry, it was obvious to the soldier prince that he had a good chance of annihilating the hated foe. He held firm to his intention to fight when his generals advised caution, and gave the order for the front ranks to dismount because the archer on foot is always the superior of the horse-bowman, and especially so when unsuitable terrain hampers the horseman.

The Mongols attacked the left wing and were received with such a storm of arrows from the dismounted cavalry that they retired in confusion. Kutaku next ordered a general advance along his whole line, and desperate fighting ensued. Jelaludin waited his opportunity and when the Mongol attacks were finally repulsed by the arrows of the dismounted troops, he gave orders to mount and charge.

The better horses and the bigger men of Jelaludin's army now made their weight felt on the attenuated Mongol ranks, and at last a Turkish army was able to win a complete victory over the hated enemy, less than half of Kutaku's army making its escape.

If Jelaludin could have kept his army together, he might have been able to block the further advance of Jenghiz Khan with a good chance of catching him also on unsuitable ground, where the savage hillmen would have been invaluable against the Mongol cavalry. But a quarrel over the spoils of victory ruined Jelaludin as completely as though he had suffered an overwhelming defeat. The Emir Melik, commander of the Kankali Turks, in an argument over a division of spoils with the Turkoman chief, struck the latter across the

face with his riding whip. The Turkoman appealed to Jelaludin, who, faced with the problem of losing the support of either the Kankali Turks or the Turkomans, did nothing, and the Turkoman chief led off his tribesmen. The mountaineers also deserted in disgust, leaving Jelaludin with only some 20,000 men to face the menace of 70,000 Mongols under Jenghiz Khan himself. He had no choice but retreat—he was too close to the great Mongol for safety.

Jenghiz Khan had found his advance southward barred by the city of Bamian, famous in an earlier day as a centre of Buddhism before Islam invaded the Afghan valleys in the eighth century, and renowned through the east for its immense statues of Buddha carved in the rock cliffs that flank the valley in which it stood. As he reconnoitred the city's walls, an arrow struck and killed his favourite grandson, Moatugin, Jagatai's twelve-year-old son.

"I forbid thee to mourn," said the grim old warrior to the bereaved father and such was the Mongol discipline that Jagatai suppressed his grief until he could withdraw from his father's presence to ease his aching sorrow in the solitude of his own tent. For seven days the walls were battered and when the breach was made it was the wife of Jagatai who led the assault. Orders were given that the city was to be utterly destroyed and neither booty nor captive to be taken. Even the dogs and cats were killed in the holocaust to his grandson's soul. It was the end of Bamian, erased from the face of the earth for ever, though the great idols remain as one of the wonders of Afghanistan.[1]

Now that the valley in which Bamian had stood was

[1] There are some excellent photographs of Bamian and also Herat in the *National Geographic Magazine*, October, 1931.

empty of life, he determined to finish with Jelaludin. Giving orders that the pursuit was to be pressed with all speed, he directed the army up the Ghorband where "on either side rose battlemented cliffs, with now and then a crumbling castle watching over the pass below. It was the scenery of Switzerland and of the Rhine combined,"[1] through which the fierce Mongols rode. At Parwan he turned aside to visit the scene of Kutaku's defeat. He rode over the battlefield and listened quietly while his adopted son described the disaster in detail. Jenghiz Khan pointed out where Kutaku had erred, "in order that he might profit by the instruction," but it is recorded that he indulged in no recriminations. He, the consummate artist, knew too much of war not to realize that, given a young commander with plenty of self-confidence, such things can happen. Rejoining his men, he urged on the pursuit of Jelaludin.

The army thereupon travelled at such speed that for the first two days the men were given no opportunity to halt for food. When Ghazni was reached, Jenghiz Khan learnt that Jelaludin had left fifteen days before, with the intention of retreating into India and placing the Indus between himself and the Mongol host. Prior to his departure, Jelaludin had sent out a general alarm through Afghanistan, but the swift advance of Jenghiz Khan prevented any reinforcements reaching the Sultan. As soon as Jenghiz Khan learnt of the route Jelaludin had taken, he pressed after him, hoping to make contact before the Sultan could cross the Indus.

Just before he issued on the plain, Jenghiz Khan fell in with the Sultan's rearguard, a thousand strong, and destroyed it, then learning that Jelaludin intended

[1] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland*, London, 1901, p. 164.

to cross the river next day, the tired Mongols rode on at break-neck speed, and that night the Mongol found his quarry, still on the west bank of the Indus.

Of all the Mongol campaigns, this is undoubtedly one of the most interesting. Jenghiz Khan probably left Bamian in late August or early September.[1] There is much rough country between Bamian and Kabul, but from there on to Ghazni the road is comparatively easy with the exception of one high pass, the Sherdahan, which lies at 9,000 feet. Ghazni itself lies at 7,500 feet. Two roads lead down to the Indus, via the Kurram and via the Tochi. D'Ohsson states that he has no definite information regarding the route taken or the locality of the subsequent battle, but taking everything into consideration, I offer the opinion that it was by way of the Tochi to Bannu, and thence down the Kurram.[2] Before he reached the mouth of that river, he probably branched off in a north-easterly direction, making for Kalabagh,[3] where the Indus is only some four hundred yards wide. Below this point the river meanders through sand bars and has many channels, which would make it difficult for an army to cross.

D'Ohsson states that the battle was a straight soldier's fight, with the immensely larger Mongol army formed in an arc round the force commanded by Jelaludin, and that the Mongol flanks rested on the river banks. But d'Ohsson admits, with characteristic honesty, that he has little information to draw on ; and therefore I consider that it would not be unfair to the historian if I

[1] See Appendix I.

[2] This is the route which Mahmud of Ghazni is said to have used when he swept down with his cavalry to lay waste the Indus Valley from Bannu to Multan in the 11th century (Holdich, *The Indian Borderland*).

[3] I have seen somewhere that the site of this battle was where Diankhot stands to-day (some seven miles up the river from Kalabagh) but cannot now remember the reference.

feel obliged to dissent from this view for military reasons. If we estimate that Jenghiz Khan left Bamian with 50,000 to 70,000 men, I think that we must make great deductions at the finish owing to the terrific speed of the pursuit, and the nature of the country he traversed. Part of the march would have been through narrow rocky defiles, and over bare ridges where even the best march discipline will fail to keep troops closed up. Remembering that Jelaludin could not have been loitering, it is inconceivable that Jenghiz Khan could have taken such an enormous force from Ghazni to the Indus, in fifteen less days than it took Jelaludin's army of 20,000, without over half his cavalry dropping out with foundered horses and exhausted men in the narrow passes and defiles of the route. In such a march, the greatest strain is always on the rearmost troops, and we can almost see the last regiments falling out as the distance grew greater. Again, both P. de la Croix and Barthold declare that some 4,000 men of Jelaludin's army escaped. If we grant the Mongols a superiority of three to one, it is difficult to see how any men of Jelaludin's army, fighting with its back to the river, could have got away, and this fact makes it highly probable that the Mongol force was barely equal to Jelaludin's. D'Ohsson states that the battle raged from dawn till noon, with the Sultan Jelaludin leading charge after charge against the Mongol centre. It is hardly likely that the great Mongol could have had such an enormous superiority as d'Ohsson suggests, and not ended the fight in an hour.

There is another account of this battle, which has an air of greater probability. Petis de la Croix in his life of the Great Mongol gives the following description of the fight :

Jelaludin took up a strong position with his left flank protected by a mountain ridge, and his right by a bend in the river. At dawn the Mongols attacked, Jenghiz Khan keeping a strong force under his own command in reserve behind his centre. The right wing of the Khwarazmian army was commanded by Emir Melik who drove back the Mongol left. The ridge on Jelaludin's left was strongly held, but he drew on the defending force for reserves as the battle progressed.

Jenghiz Khan, seeing the gradual diminution of the force holding the ridge, sent a detachment under Bela Noyon with orders to capture it, and when he had taken it to descend on Jelaludin's left flank. While Bela was ascending the ridge, Jelaludin, meanwhile, had charged home on the Mongol centre and had nearly broken it, when down on his left flank came the detachment under Bela. Jenghiz Khan himself led the horsemen of his reserve against Jelaludin's victorious right, and held it, while the flank attack under Bela got home and the Mongols closed in. Jelaludin stripped himself of his armour and, cutting his way through the ring of enemies, urged his horse over the bank of the river, while Jenghiz Khan, for once chivalrous towards a defeated foe, watched him with admiration as he gained the far bank, even forbidding his men to shoot their arrows at the fugitive.

Jelaludin rode to Delhi, but the reigning Sultan gave him no assistance, and the prince, after wandering about the Punjab for a year, eventually made his way back to western Persia, where, after some years of warfare in attempts to remove opponents to his rule, he was eventually defeated by the Mongols and later murdered by the Kurds.

After the battle on the Indus, the Mongol army moved

via Kohat to Peshawar. Near Kohat, the Emir Melik was caught and killed. Jenghiz Khan halted in the plain of the Bara River, in which Peshawar stands, for a while; but events in his rear caused him to turn up the Khyber, and he set up his camp in the vicinity of Kabul. Ogdai was dispatched with a force to eliminate Ghazni, because the Mongols had been unable to attend to it during the pursuit of Jelaludin. Ogdai massacred the inhabitants, thus leaving no hostile forces in eastern Afghanistan.

While Jenghiz Khan was encamped in the plain of Kabul, raiders from the mountains north of the Oxus destroyed the bridge which he had built over the river at Pendjab, near the mouth of the Wakhs. His own raiding parties ranged through Kafiristan and the valleys of the Bajaur and the Kunar[1] felt the edge of the Mongol sword.

The winter of 1221 must have been one of the most terrible periods that has ever afflicted the valleys of Afghanistan. The mountaineers, themselves raiders of no small ability, were raided by past-masters of the art, and encamped in the strategic centre of the country was the despoiler of half Asia.

During this period also, the last great surviving city of eastern Iran met its doom. When Herat had heard of the victory over Kutaku at Parwan, it had revolted against its Mongol governor, and had slain him out of

[1] These two areas are given as the canton of Buyer Ketwa by d'Ohsson. The reasons which caused the Mongols to raid through these valleys are well brought out by Holdich. "The Kunar valley is of special interest for many reasons. The ancient high road from Kabul to India through the Laghman valley ran across it to Bajaor. Consequently former conquerors of India (Alexander and Baber for instance) who advanced from Kabul and were always much concerned in reducing the hill tribes about the Kunar before they entered the plains of the Indus, knew it well. It was in fact a necessity of their advance that the powerful coalition of hill tribes who have ever dwelt between the Kunar and the Indus should be thoroughly well thrashed." (Holdich, *The Indian Borderland.*)

hand. Now that Jelaludin's army had been dispersed, a Mongol general by the name of Iltchi Kadai was given an army of 70,000 men and ordered by Jenghiz Khan to take and destroy Herat. The enormously thick ramparts of the city, built on an immense earthwork, which may be but the debris of older fortifications, remnants of long-forgotten sieges, enabled the defence to resist desperately, knowing well what the end would be if it failed. For six months and seventeen days the murderous siege went on, until the inevitable peace party grew strong enough to cause dissension in the ranks of the garrison and hamper the defence. On June 14th, 1222, the Mongols entered, but it was June 21st before they had finished with the inhabitants, stouter-hearted and pacifists alike. It took seven days to kill them, and when the Mongols left once more, all life was gone from the mighty city. To make certain that Herat was dead, a Mongol party two thousand strong rode through the ruins some weeks later. The streets were still blocked with bodies that had lain in the fierce Afghan sun all that time, and over the ashes hung the awful stench of concentrated putrefaction. The Mongols found two thousand miserable wretches who had managed to survive the storm, and their corpses also were added to the necropolis that had been Herat.

In the second week of May, A.D. 1222, one Chang Chun, a Taoist monk, who had left China a year previously, reached Jenghiz Khan's camp and records in his diary that shortly afterwards the Mongol headquarters were moved to Parwan.

The Chinese philosopher also records that Jenghiz Khan was encamped near the Hindu Kush until October 3rd.

It must have been during this year of 1222 that Jagatai was sent south to the Indian Ocean. Jelaludin was known to be attempting to reach Persia, and after his rebuff by the Sultan of Delhi, he had taken up his quarters at Lahore. Jenghiz Khan gave orders to Bela Noyon to take two tumans and ride through the Punjab: at the same time he ordered Jagatai to take another force of equal strength and ride through Baluchistan to the sea. It is the identical plan that was used so successfully against Gutchluk, but this time it failed in its object.

Bela Noyon took his force to Multan and then swung north in a great sweep through Ferozepore and Lahore.

The same fierce heat of summer, which long before had forced Alexander the Great to retreat, was too much for the Mongols; and reluctantly Bela Noyon led his army back to the hills.

Jagatai rode south through Baluchistan, and the memory of the havoc he wrought still lingers in those bleak sun-baked hills.[1]

He continued on to Tez on the coast, where he halted to recuperate his army. Riding north in the searing heat of summer, he lost numbers of his men from starvation and thirst in the desert of Makran, the same desert which Alexander the Great had known as Gedrosia, and where he also had nearly perished. Somewhere in Seistan, Jagatai divided his force, one half being directed to the Hindu Kush, where it joined with Bela Noyon, while Jagatai himself led the remainder to Farah and thence to Bokhara, where Ogdai had taken up his quarters.[2]

[1] A remnant of Jagatai's men may have settled in the Baluch hills, where a Mongol strain can still be seen in places (Holdich, *The Gates of India*, p. 156).

[2] Apparently, though it is not so stated in any of my authorities, Ogdai after

Ogdai, from the shambles of Ghazni, had sent a request to Jenghiz Khan for permission to move his force through Seistan, so as to finish anything that had escaped Jagatai; but Jenghiz Khan refused to expose his men to the heat of the deserts of southern Afghanistan. He himself kept to the hills south of the Hindu Kush.

In the first week of October, Jenghiz Khan resolved to return to Mongolia. First he ordered the immense number of his captives to husk grain for the journey, and when that work was done he butchered them out of hand. Then he led his army northwards, past dead Balkh, once the Mother of Cities, where Chang Chun had noted with surprise that dogs were still alive for he heard them barking. Crossing the Oxus again, the Mongol army marched to Samarkand, and thence to Khojend, where Ogdai and Jagatai joined him.

Wherever his men had trod, the dreadful signs of the Mongol storm were apparent. In parts of Afghanistan and Badakshan, the few who had escaped were reduced to living on cats and dogs.

Badakshan, an important province, has never recovered though seven centuries have passed. Balkh was a great centre of trade before the coming of Jenghiz Khan, to-day, it is but a petty town. Talikhan had been strong enough to hold his men at bay for six months, to-day, it is a cluster of forty miserable hovels. Bamian itself is but a memory kept green by the great statues in the cliffs—it is not marked as a town on modern maps.

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reducing Ghazni, marched to Kandahar, and then took the easy route to Farah, Herat and Kelif.

Jagatai may have ridden due north from Tez and joined Ogdai at Farah. It is interesting to note that though these marches were remarkable, so much of the chroniclers' attention is focused on Jenghiz Khan that only the barest mention is accorded the operations of his subordinates. P. de la Croix states, however, that Jagatai, after losing many men in Makran, divided his army, sending one part back to Jenghiz Khan, and leading the remainder to Balkh.

The irrigation system which kept fertile the upper valley of the Oxus was ruined, and with no one left to keep the irrigation canals free from silt the valley went back to the desert and swamp from which patient agriculturists had won it over a thousand years before. Khorassan had been depopulated, and Sykes states that it was only because south-western Persia escaped the storm and therefore could be drawn on for settlers when the Mongol flood had run its course, that Khorassan ever recovered.

Like a flow of molten lava the nomads had swept away human life and work so completely that those who escaped to the mountains must have perished from sheer inability to obtain shelter or food, and the southern portion of the Khwarazmian Empire had been turned into a nomad's paradise—almost empty of human life. Whether the extermination of an alien culture in a couple of years by the sharp swords and speeding arrows of the nomads is morally more culpable than the extermination of other cultures by more civilized methods such as the extirpation of the Bushmen by the Boers or the Tasmanians by the British, or even the partial eradication of the Red Indians of North America by modern civilization is something that can best be left to the moralists. Both cultures deemed it natural and necessary, and unfortunately too often the judgment of modern history depends on the moralizing aptitude of historians.

Jenghiz Khan encamped some months at Khojend, and it is recorded that he was thrown from his horse while hunting on March 11th, 1223. It probably shook him badly, as he was then over sixty years of age.

In the beginning of spring he moved northwards once more, and as the army was filing past the ruins

of Otrar, he bade the mother of Mahommed cry her farewells to her old home.

He camped in the vicinity of Lake Balkash for the summer and started for the north again when the cool weather set in and the first frosts froze the swamps. Chepe and Subutai, fresh from raiding Russia, rode into his camp north of Lake Balkash. Juji, his first-born, was away in the steppes north of the Aral Sea, dying there in 1224 or 1225.

In 1224 Jenghiz Khan reached the Emil River, where two young grandsons named Hulagu and Kublai, also destined to have their names written in letters of blood across the chronicles of Asia, met him on the banks. He set up his tents on the Tola in February, 1225, having earned, above all other men, his right to the fearful title given him by terrified Bokharans five years before, " The Scourge of God."

By then Juji was dead, and next he had to mourn the loss of Chepe Noyon. Another great subordinate, Muhuli, was dead in China, and there was much that required his attention. The sands of his own life were running out, and only two more years were to pass before the chroniclers could write " finis " to the life of the Great Khan.

The world was not to see either a desolation or an effusion of blood which could equal the effort of this simple shepherd chief until another seven centuries had passed, when civilization was to rise in its full genius and by enlisting the aid of all the sciences do by brute force and weight of numbers what he had done by guile and stratagem and sheer mastery of the art of war.


THE LAST CAMPAIGN
MONGOLIA
Jenghiz Khan
KARA KHOTO
Gol
May 1226
Etsin
YU-MEN
KIA-YU-KWAN
SU-CHOW-FU
ALA SHAN DESERT
KAN-CHOW-FU
July 1226
TANGUT
LIANG-CHOW-FU
KU-LANG
KOKO NOR
SI NING-FU
Hwang Ho
KWEI-TEH-CHING
SHUN-HWA-TING
HO-CHOW
LAN-CHOW-FU
HSIN-TIEN
TI-TA-CHOW
TAO-CHOW
NINGSIA
LING-CHOW
NING-LING-TING
ORDOS
Hwang Ho
TOKOTO
Muhuli 1217
TA-TUNG-FU
KALGAN
YENKING
1217
YI-CHOW
Si-Ling Pass
AN-SUH
1218
TAI-CHOW
PAO-TING-FU
CHILI
GULF of CHILI
TENG-CHOW-FU
LAI-CHOW
Nov 1221
PAO-TEH-CHOW
KO-LA-CHOW
HING-HSIEN
YU-LIN-FU
KIA-CHOW
SHUI TEH-CHOW
SHANSI
1218
TAI-YUAN-FU
PIN-TING-CHOW
FEN-CHOW
LIAO-CHOW
TSIN-CHOW
Fen Ho
PAO-AN-HSIEN
YEN-AN-FU
HWO-CHOW
KI-CHOW
PING-YANG-FU
LU-AN-FU
FU-CHOW
LO-CHWAN-HSIEN
CHANG-PU-HSIEN
I-CHUN-HSIEN
KING-YANG FU
1219
WEN-SIH
died 1223
CHIEH-CHOW
PU-CHOW-FU
TUNG-KWANG
HAN-CHENG
TSEH-CHOW
KWANG-PING-FU
TA-MING-FU
TUNG-CHANG-FU
TSIN-AN-FU
LIN-TSZE
1220
Present Course
SHANTUNG
TUNG-PING CHOW
1221
I-CHOW-FU
TSAO-CHOW FU
Hwang Ho
KAI-FENG-FU
HONAN
LIUPAN HILLS
KU-YUAN
HWEI-NING HSIEN
CHEN-YUAN-HSIEN
LUNG-TEH-HSIEN
PING-LIANG
May 1227
TSING NING CHOW
KING-CHOW
died Aug 1227
TSING-SHUI-HSIEN
TSIN-CHOW
Wei Ho
KIEN-CHOW
March 1223
FENG-SIANG-FU
SI-AN-FU
TSIN-LING SHAN MTS.
Ogdai 1227
Han R
Miles 0 20 40 60 80 100 200 300 400 Miles

CHAPTER VII

A great people and a strong, there hath not been ever the like, even to the years of many generations. A fire devoureth before them, and behind them a flame burneth. The land is as a garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness; yea, and nothing escapes them. (The Book of Joel II, 2.)

BEFORE Jenghiz Khan had marched against Khwarazm in 1219, he had appointed Muhuli as his regent in China. The subjugation of so densely populated an area as North China presented a difficult problem to the nomad conqueror. Under ordinary conditions, war between two nomadic or pastoral peoples led to either the extermination of the vanquished tribe or its absorption into the tribe of the conqueror. When the result was extermination, the women of the vanquished would become the property of the conquerors, so that intermingling and blending of blood and language were a continual process.

But both these solutions were impossible with the myriads of Chinese. Jenghiz Khan had looted their cities, and then stamped many of them flat, he had killed them by the million, and he had ravaged their fields; but as soon as he withdrew his war-worn troops, other millions of peasant farmers came back to till the fields again, to rebuild the walls and to erect more houses.

In Mongolia, when he had made war on the Merkits, the work was settled for ever when his warriors returned to their tents.[1]

The Merkit women were in the tents of the victors,

[1] See p. 37.

the tribesmen were scattered through the steppes of the Aral Sea, soon to lose their separate tribal identity, and the Mongol flocks and herds now occupied the Merkit pastures. In China, on the other hand, whole districts in the provinces of Shansi and Chili, which he had left desolate in 1214, were springing into new life by 1217.

Faced with this new experience, Jenghiz Khan gave Muhuli full powers and ordered him back to see if he could find a solution. The nomad had not then grasped the fact that in war with civilization, mere defeat of the enemy is not enough to ensure permanent conquest, but that the area won must be held. In truth, the Mongol social and military organization was most unsuited to the task. Their mode of life required space far greater than was necessary for an agricultural existence: their immense herds and flocks required a greater pasturage than could be found in a land which had been under the plough for more than one millennium. It is, in the main, the whole difference between the pastoral and the civilized; because civilization depends on agriculture, and where agriculture takes hold, the pastoral form of life cannot exist.

Until Muhuli grasped this essential fact his operations took on all the appearance of extensive raids, rather than attempts at consolidation. In 1217, the Mongols only retained the old capital of Yenking, and the western borders of the Province of Shansi. Muhuli used the thoroughly ravaged area between the Inner and Outer Walls as his base of operations, and in 1217 he rode into the Province of Chili and reduced the two cities of An-suh and Yi-chow, which guard important passes through the Inner Wall. Having stormed these cities, he marched back again to the intermural area. In 1218,

however, he discovered that the Kin were again re-occupying the districts which he had just ravaged, and that an army under a Kin general named Chang-ju was in the area. Muhuli marched at once, and after a stiff battle routed the Kin army and captured its commander. It is here that we see a new light dawning in the Mongol's brain. He had killed and ravaged and destroyed in the attempt to hold his conquests, and it had availed him nothing. Now he adopted a policy of conciliation. He offered the captured Kin general his life and his former rank and position if he would serve under the Mongol rule, and the captive grasped the opportunity. For the future he served his new master well, and in one action against Kin troops he was wounded in the hour of victory; but due to him, the Mongols retained a grip of Chili.

As the relentless war went on, Kin desertions grew more numerous; but if these men deserted their country in the days of its torment their action had one good effect, because owing to their expostulations and their entreaties, the grim old Mongol was constrained to curb the rapacity and cruelty of his troops, to whom he gave orders to deal less severely with the conquered.

But for every Kin who deserted to the enemy there were others who steadfastly and fearlessly preferred the worst the savage Mongol could do to them rather than dishonour themselves.

Some committed suicide rather than surrender, while others fought it out to the end. Next we find Muhuli in desperation placing Chinese officials in charge of conquered districts and cities, to administer them in the name of Jenghiz Khan. Once he adopted this policy the story alters, and from now on the districts he conquered remained in his hands, something which

was to have great importance later. Then he is found moving into the Province of Shansi, which had been swept by fire and sword in the first invasions; but which had also been re-occupied by the Kin. Muhuli's force numbered about sixty thousand men, and it took him two full years to re-conquer and consolidate the province. Tai-yuan-fu, the capital of the province, and the cities of Ping-yang-fu, Fen-chow, and Ko-lan-chow resisted desperately.[1] Their commanders died sword in hand or else committed suicide when the battered walls could no longer hold the Mongols out; but by the end of 1220 he had completely mastered Shansi, and then he found that his presence was urgently required far to the east in the Province of Shantung. The Kins had been acting with unusual energy, strengthening their defences and augmenting the city garrisons. He crossed Chili Province and was marching on Tsi-nan-fu, the capital of Shantung, when he learned of a Kin army which had crossed the Yellow River near Tsao-chow-fu, and had taken up a position with the river behind it.[2] Muhuli swung his force round to meet this strange Kin army that dared meet him in the field and found it drawn up in battle array not far from the banks of the Yellow River. He wasted no time in a fire fight; but gave the order to his men to draw their

[1] According to Douglas' *Life of Jenghiz Khan*, the cities which Muhuli stormed in the Province of Shansi were :—

Tai yuen (Tai-yuan-fu).
Ping yang (Ping-yang-fu).
Hin (Tsin-chow).
Tai (Tai-chow).
Tsih (Tseh-chow).
Lu (Lu-an-fu).
Fun (Fen-chow).
Ho (Hwo-chow).

[2] It would appear that the map illustrating this operation may have an error, as from the account given in Douglas' *Life of Jenghiz Khan*, Tsao-chow would seem to have been situate north of the old course of the River.

swords and close at once. The Kins broke at the first shock and were driven headlong into the river.

Turning towards the provincial capital once more, he was halted by the resistance offered by the city of Tung-ping-chow, one of the few which had successfully survived a siege by the army of Jenghiz Khan himself in his great raid of 1214. It again offered so stout a defence that Muhuli was forced to leave a blockading force around the city, while he moved on with the remainder of his army to reduce the rest of the province. Dividing his force into detachments, he steadily overran Shantung, and the neighbouring province of Chili was also included in his sphere of operations.[1] Tung-ping-chow[2] was the last city to surrender to the conquering Mongols, falling at last in June, 1221.

By November of that year Muhuli had accomplished his aim in so far as the two provinces east of the Inner Wall were concerned.

Shansi had already been in his hands two years, and now he determined to reduce the remainder of the Kin dominion. He therefore concentrated his forces at Tokoto, one of the starting points for the desert caravans outside the Wall.

Prior to this, in 1220, while Jenghiz Khan had been

[1] The cities stormed by Muhuli in the Provinces of Chili and Shantung were as follows :—

Douglas	*D'Ohsson*	*Modern Spelling*
Suyching	Suy-cheng	(An-suh)
Le cho	Li-chow	(Yi-chow)
Taming fu	Ta-ming-fu	(Ta-ming-fu)
Tung cho		(Tung-chang-fu)
Ting cho		(Pin-ting-chow)
E tu cho		(I-chow-fu ?)
Lin tsze hsien		(Lin tsze)
Tang cho		(Teng-chow-fu)
Lai cho		(Lai-chow)

[2] The two sieges of Tung-ping-chow are noteworthy. Douglas states that it finally surrendered without a blow, suggesting that there was no need for it to do so. Possibly its strength lay in its geographical position or in the choice of its site.

encamped in the oasis of Nakshab, the Kin ruler had sent an embassy to him asking for terms. Jenghiz Khan, however, refused to receive the Kin envoy, who returned to Kai-feng-fu, where the Kin ruler had taken refuge, without having accomplished anything.

So far as the Kin were concerned, the situation in North China was desperate. By the time Muhuli had reduced the provinces north of the Yellow River, wholesale desertions had occurred, and Chinese officials had been placed in authority to enforce the Mongol rule.

In spite of the fact that he had now consolidated the three provinces of Shansi, Chili, and Shantung, and held them firmly in his power, the Mongol was no nearer the ultimate objective of his operations, which was the Kin emperor, and the war could not be brought to a close. The Yellow River was an absolute barrier to any advance southward, and while Tungkwang, the great fortress guarding the pass into Honan Province, remained in Kin hands, the Kin emperor was secure. While he lived there would be no end to the war, and in addition no less than two hundred thousand men were stationed in the vicinity of the pass.

Muhuli, having tried every possible expedient to cross into Honan, determined to follow in Samukha's foosteps and try to turn the line of the Kin defences. He crossed the Yellow River at Tokoto and moved south into Shensi.

Again the Kin sent an embassy to Jenghiz Khan, reaching him in the summer of 1222, when he was encamped in the hills west of the Indus, asking for peace.

Jenghiz Khan received them this time, but he would not abate the severity of his terms. "Formerly," he said to the envoy, "I proposed that the Kin sovereign should cede to me all the country north of the Yellow

River. Now that country is mine by right of conquest, as is also the country to the west of the Tung-kwang Pass, with the exception of a few cities. If the Kin sovereign will now cede me the province of Shensi, I will undertake to keep him on the throne as king of the remainder of his territory south of the Yellow River." The envoy could not accept such terms, and the embassy started on its long journey back to Kai-feng-fu.

The appearance of Muhuli's army in the Ordos country so alarmed the king of Tangut that he sent an envoy to Muhuli asking him to declare his intentions. Muhuli promptly demanded assistance from the king as a vassal of Jenghiz Khan, and the terrified monarch sent him an army of 50,000 men. With this reinforcement, Muhuli marched south and set about reducing the province by his usual methods. City after city[1] fell to him, and by February, 1223, he had reached the southern boundary of the Province on the Wei-Ho, a tributary of the Yellow River. He had besieged the city of Feng-siang-fu for forty days without being able to take it, when suddenly there came the news that a Kin army had crossed the Yellow River at Tung-kwang and had taken Pu-chow-fu, an important city in the angle formed by the Yellow River when its course changes direction from south to east.

[1] Douglas gives the following list of cities in Shensi which were besieged by Muhuli.

Kea chow (Kia chow).
Suy tih chow (Shui-teh chow).
Paogan (Pao-an-hsien).
Foochow (Fu-chow).
Chung-oohhsien (Chung-pu-hsien).
E chuen hsien (I-chun-hsien).
Yengan (Yen-an-fu) this city repulsed Muhuli.
Lu cho (Lo-chwan-hsien).
Keen (Kien-chow).
King (King chow) in Kansuh Province.
Pin (Pin-chow).
Chin yuan (Chen-yuan-hsien) in Kansuh.

Muhuli at once raised the siege of Feng-siang-fu and moved with all speed to Pu-chow-fu. When the Kin received news of his approach, they did not wait, but hastily burning the captured city, they retired back to safety behind Tung-kwang.

It was while Muhuli was engaged in re-establishing his authority in the angle of the Yellow River that his last illness seized him. For nearly forty years he had carried his lance and worn armour in the service of Jenghiz Khan, and, he remarked proudly to his officers gathered around his death-bed, " not once have I been defeated." He died in April, 1223, at the age of fifty-four, at a little town called Wen-si on the Tung-shui River in Chieh-chow prefecture. His son, Borou, taking his father's title of prince, became commander-in-chief in China.

In November, 1223, the Kin sovereign died, worn out with the cares and troubles of his empire, and the same year saw the death of the ruler of the Sung. In this year also, the king of Tangut abdicated his throne in favour of his son.

The relentless pressure of the Mongol armies had now stripped the Kin of all their dominion except the Province of Honan, which is south of the Yellow River. Then to add to their troubles, a new enemy had appeared on the southern horizon.

Previously, during the short period of peace which had followed the reconnoitring raids of Samukha, the Kin had been foolish enough to believe that the Mongol danger had passed for ever. They thereupon took the opportunity to send an ultimatum to the Sung Kingdom.

This southern neighbour had owed the Kin a yearly tribute, probably a relic of the days when the Kin dynasty had ruled a united China.

The Sung ruler had been a tranquil observer of the wrecking of his northern neighbour's power by the Mongols, and he profited at their expense by refusing to pay tribute while the Kin were occupied with the Mongol invasions. The chronicle records that the Kin emperor was quite prepared to inform the Sung that he would overlook this breach of an ancient treaty if they would form an alliance with him against the Mongols. But his councillors, with truly Oriental shortsightedness turned him from his purpose by averring that such a step might be interpreted by the Sung as a sign of weakness, and that they might then add to the Kin difficulties by invading his territory. Then when Jenghiz Khan left the Kin in peace for a short period in 1216, the Kin emperor, having an army already mobilized as a result of the Mongol war, dispatched a force across the Hwai River to ravage the Sung territory, in the hope that they would pay the tribute money and that the loot obtained and territory conquered would make good the losses incurred at the hands of Jenghiz Khan. This expedition marched across the Sung frontier in 1217. It had captured many cities and ravaged a wide stretch of territory when to the consternation of all concerned Muhuli rode through the Inner Wall. . . .

Bitterly regretting his mistaken policy, the Kin emperor withdrew his troops and sent an embassy to the Sung, hoping that his southern neighbour would be prepared to come to terms after the heavy blows he had received, and would look favourably on the Kin suggestion to form an alliance against the Mongols.

The Sung, however, realized the Kin difficulties with the Mongols again on the war-path, and refused to entertain the suggestion. When Muhuli was ravaging

Shansi, and keeping the Kin forces fully occupied, the Sung invaded the Kin territory from the south.

But when Muhuli marched into the province of Shensi, and drove the Mongol power down to the Wei River, the Sung realized that the terrible nomads were now on their own borders, and that it might not be long before the Mongol armies might be operating in their own fields and cities. They took the opportunity, therefore, to send an embassy to Jenghiz Khan in 1225 as soon as he arrived in Mongolia from his invasion of Iran; but apparently nothing came of the mission.

The war languished after Muhuli's death, because not only did the conquered areas have to be held; but with the forces at his disposal, the Mongol commander could not conduct an invasion of Honan, and the Kin took what steps they could in the breathing space that was now afforded them to prepare for the storm which could be confidently expected as soon as Jenghiz Khan returned to Mongolia. They entirely abandoned the provinces of Chili, Shantung, Shansi, and Shensi, and massed every available man around Tung-kwang.

Guarding as it did the one pass by which the Mongols could enter Honan, the Kin realized that everything depended on their ability to hold it, and no doubt additional fortifications had been erected, because Jenghiz Khan himself considered the forcing of the passage too hazardous even for his veterans.

He had set up his tents on the Tola in February, 1225; and he remained quiescent for a year. He who had been a shepherd chieftain only twenty years before was now master of a domain greater than that of any other ruler in Asia. In addition, age was beginning to

place its limiting hand on his activities. He was sixty-four, he had travelled to the ends of the earth with tens of thousands of men at his back, and it is likely that he needed a breathing space after his exertions. But in the last months of 1225 the restless old nomad decided that there was a score to settle with his old enemy, Tangut. Apparently, the previous monarch of Tangut had received with honour some desert chief whose life had been declared forfeit by Jenghiz Khan, and the present king had also roused the ire of the Mongol by refusing to make the journey to his *ordo* on the Tola when summoned to do so, and in addition, had refused to send his son to Mongolia as a hostage. To the man who was able to set a hundred thousand men in motion by merely giving the order, such behaviour on the part of a mere civilized king was intolerable. A pastoral khan near the Aral Sea might be able to refuse an order from Jenghiz Khan provided his people were well mounted and were prepared to ride hard for two or three months; but for a ruler who was pinned to his cities and his fields, the only result of such action would be a fight to a finish.

The winter of 1225-26 was one of unusual bitter cold; but despite this, the screen of Mongol scouts was being stationed on the frontiers of Tangut in February. Before the scouts left Mongolia, they were given special sheep-skin coats, and even their horses were covered with felt.[1]

In the spring of 1226, Jenghiz Khan gave the order to his armies. Jagatai was left behind in Mongolia, but Tule accompanied him. From the Tola River, his

[1] P. de la Croix, p. 269. It is interesting to note that the scouting screen is placed in position months before the main army moved. Only by this means could information of the Mongol preparations and movements be prevented from reaching Tangut.

route probably took him across the easterly spurs of the Altai Mountains in a general southerly direction, for the first place he attacked and captured was Kara Khoto, also called Etsina, in the Etsin Gol oasis, a place of greater importance in those days than it is now, when dessication and the constant advance of the sands have caused it to be abandoned as a caravan depot. From Kara Khoto he descended on to the caravan route at the western end of Tangut. Ogdai's route is not mentioned by my authorities, but as he is first recorded as besieging Si-an-fu, it is likely that he led his force across the Yellow River somewhere near Tokoto, and then marched due south paralleling the Yellow River.

That part of Tangut lying west of the Yellow River is merely a thin strip of country, not more than twenty miles in breadth at the most, and usually not more than five, through which the Great West Road runs as a connecting thread. Undoubtedly, it was more densely populated in the thirteenth century than it is to-day; but even in those days the cultivated area could not have been much greater than it is now. The most westerly town was Sachu or Tun Hwang,[1] situated on the edge of a desert that took Marco Polo thirty days to cross. This town was the most westerly of a system of fortification which stretched westwards from the Yellow River. Every village along this strip is fortified, and most farming areas have their own towers of refuge—built of solidly packed mud on the top of some steep eminence, where a few courageous men could hold off an army as long as food and water lasted. The larger towns have thick walls with projecting bastions and towers to enable flanking fire to be directed on storming parties. Tun

[1] Not marked on map. It lies 130 miles west of Yu-men.

Hwang, for instance, had double walls, enclosing an area 1,000 yards by 800 yards.[1]

The walls were thirty feet high with towers every fifty yards, and the double gateways were closed by massive wooden gates clamped with iron. Between Tun Hwang and Kan-chow, the country is wild moorland, with the Nan Shan Range rising to fourteen thousand feet on one side and the desert on the other. This strip of moorland is covered with tussocks of grass and even to-day is eminently suitable for cattle-raising.

What this must have meant to the pastorals under Jenghiz Khan is obvious. The first time he came down along this road in 1209, it is recorded that the only fort he captured was Yu-men. Considered as a military work, the ruins of this fort are so insignificant that Bruce, travelling in the footsteps of Marco Polo, and therefore of Jenghiz Khan (though he was unaware of this fact), does not mention them. But he describes a more important work three days journey further east from Yu-men. Kia-yu-kuan is famous in Asiatic history as the gateway of Ancient China. There embassies were halted and entertained while permission of the government at Pekin to enter was being obtained by special couriers. "In Chinese eyes a certain halo of romance has always clung to this far-famed spot—chiefly because Kia-yu-kuan was the threshold of their country in all communications to the west."

"Before entering the massive gates of the fort, every embassy was forced to give a full description of each

[1] Major C. D. Bruce, *In the footsteps of Marco Polo*, p. 219. This officer must have had an intuition of the great things which were done in N.W. Kansuh in ancient days, because his military appreciation of many parts of this area are of the utmost value when attempting to analyse the campaign of Jenghiz Khan. Of all the marches of the Mongol, this campaign against Tangut is the only one where a soldier has studied the military and geographical problems with a practised eye, so far as I can find.

individual member of the cavalcade. Only then was the right vouchsafed to enter that wonderful country, miraculous tales of which had penetrated to their own distant lands."[1] Here then is one of the most noted of the forts along the thin strip of terrain that composed north-western Tangut, which Jenghiz Khan had failed to capture in his raids of the first decade of the thirteenth century.

"Let me now invite the reader to approach and enter the gates of Kia-yu-kuan. It is in reality a mud-brick fort of a kind far inferior to such as are to be seen at Lahore, or other Indian cantonments, where they have long served as mere quarters. The walls enclose an area some 120 to 150 yards square. On the north and south sides these are double. The outer walls are twenty feet high and from four to six feet thick. The inner wall is thirty-five to forty feet high all round. Inside the wall is to be found a collection of the most squalid hovels, with one official residence of an equally dilapidated kind."

Nothing shows more clearly the growth of the military power and capacity of Jenghiz Khan between 1208 and 1226 than this description of a fort that he could not take in the former year, and the fact that he swept through this part of Tangut in his stride in the latter period. Douglas, the translator of the Chinese chronicles, employs the same matter-of-fact phraseology in describing the taking of the powerful cities of Tangut in this last campaign, as that with which he records the capture of the most insignificant fort of Yu-men in the first.

By the summer of 1226 Jenghiz Khan had captured the city of Kan-chow-fu, and had moved into the foothills of the Nan Shan Range to escape the hottest weather,

[1] Bruce, op. cit., p. 243.

for old age was telling on him. In the autumn he moved eastwards again, first storming the strong city of Liang-chow-fu. Then he swung out across the Ala Shan Desert to the Yellow River, where he captured many small towns along the banks, and next, riding past Ningsia, the capital of Tangut, he stormed and gutted Lingchow, just south of it, after routing an army that attempted to relieve it. Winter was approaching, so he retired to the Liu-pan Hills where he spent some months.

In February, 1227, he sent a corps to maintain a blockade of Ningsia, while he started out again on one of his sweeps to ravage the country. Some of his detachments raided into the valleys that run down from the Koko Nor district in Tibet, others scoured the land through which the Yellow River flows, and others again ravaged the great and populous valley of the Wei Ho.

His armies were methodically laying waste all Tangut, starting from the west and driving east. While he was engaged on these operations, Ogdai was closing the gap between the Province of Shensi, which had been in Mongol hands since Muhuli's conquest of it, and Jenghiz Khan's forces. He had ravaged the district of Si-an-fu, and had destroyed most of the cities along the banks of the Wei Ho, then he had led his horsemen south-east across the Tsin-ling Mountains. By midsummer, Jenghiz Khan had returned to the Liu-pan Hills, a series of loess plateaux, bare of trees or undergrowth, having by then circled Tangut with a ring of desolation. Now that Ogdai had completed his task, the encirclement was complete, and the heart of the country had been ravaged by his detachments. He therefore halted his forces and sat down to wait for the over-ripe fruit to be delivered into his hands.

The commander of the corps blockading Ningsia was

Hivese, the son of his old vassal, Liuko, king of Manchuria. Liuko had died in the meantime, and while Jenghiz Khan was encamped in the hills, an embassy headed by the widow of Liuko came to him to ask that Hivese, her son, might be permitted to withdraw so that he could take charge of affairs in Manchuria. Jenghiz Khan agreed to let him go as soon as Ningsia fell, but not before.

The capital was now at its last gasp, and the king of Tangut sent envoys to Jenghiz Khan, asking that terms be granted. He offered to surrender in one month's time, provided that Jenghiz Khan would promise to accept him as his vassal. To this the Mongol agreed.

He moved his camp once more, this time to the hills near the town of Tsing-shui-hsien, some 30 miles northeast of the city of Tsin-chow. He knew that his own end could not be far off and the words that the chronicle puts into his mouth are those of an old and weary man. " Let us put an end to the slaughter, that the lives of our enemies be not needlessly sacrificed."

Strange words these from the old warrior who had strewn the fields around him with human remains, and who had drenched the land with the blood of men, women and children. The inhabitants had fled in vain to the mountain refuges to escape this same old Mongol, and the Chinese chronicle asserts that only one or two out of every hundred in some districts lived to tell the story. During this same campaign he had been incensed when his officers had reported that there was little forage or grain to be found in the newly conquered districts, and they had suggested that the farmers were worthless and that the whole human population should be exterminated, so that the land could go back to grass.

He was only too ready to agree, but Yeliu-Chutsai, the Chinese official who had excited his esteem when Yenking was taken in 1216, and had been his councillor and guide in his more peaceful dealings with civilization ever since, expostulated vigorously at such a proposal. He pointed out that once peace had been re-established a moderate tax would produce an immense revenue, and Jenghiz Khan, whose respect for the opinion of the sage had never altered, let his councillor have his way.

And now the old nomad chief, who was also conqueror of half Asia, was going on his last long ride. Ogdai, whom he had previously named as his successor, was across the Tsin-ling Mountains, but Tule was with him at the end. Illness struck him down as he was patiently waiting for the fall of Ningsia, and he felt that his time had come. While he lay dying in the circular-domed tent outside the ruins of the little Chinese town of Tsing-shui-hsien, his restless mind evolved a plan for the final subjugation of the Kin. Apparently Ogdai was meeting strong opposition; in any case the dying warrior proposed another plan of campaign. He pointed out that the strength of the pass of Tung kwang would make any attempt to try and force it far too expensive in men. The towering mountains on one side and the Yellow River on the other would not give his armies room for manœuvre, so he suggested that as the Sung were now enemies of the Kin, a request should be made to them for permission to march through Sung territory. Then if the army moved rapidly down the Han River valley, it would debouch on the plains of Honan before the Kin could move their troops from Tung kwang. As they would undoubtedly commence to move their army by forced marches as soon as they heard the Mongols were approaching from the south, the troops

would be tired by the time they got into action, and the Mongol commander should have no difficulty in destroying them.[1] Having outlined this plan, he gave orders that if he died before Ningsia fell, the news of his death should be suppressed lest the city gain heart by the news.[2]

On the 18th of August, 1227, after an illness that lasted only eight days, Jenghiz Khan died, at the age of 66. Born in a tent, he had lived all his life in a tent, and in a tent he died as a nomad should. The body was placed on a two-wheeled cart, and a long procession started out to take the Great Khan home.[3] Ningsia surrendered a few days later and its king was sent into Mongolia. Tule gave out the news, and he also gave permission to all and sundry, officials and officers, to come to Mongolia if they wished to pay their last respects to the remains of Jenghiz Khan, and it is said that some of them travelled for three months, so distant were their posts, before they accomplished their desires.

The cortege stopped at his various camps along the Tola River, and special mention is made of the fact that it was directed first to the tent of Burte Hushin, his chief wife. But whereas the common method of disposing of the bodies of the Mongol dead is to throw

[1] Ogdai followed this plan later.

[2] There is disagreement here among my authorities. D'Ohsson implies that the reason for suppressing the news of the death of Jenghiz Khan was in order that the king of Tangut might surrender to Tule without coming to terms with him personally, because the latter need not have considered himself bound by the pact made by his father. Then as soon as the king surrendered, he was to be executed and the population of Ningsia destroyed. Douglas, however, quoting Chinese sources, states that the king of Tangut was sent into Mongolia.

[3] Here again there is a discrepancy in the narratives. D'Ohsson states that the escort killed everyone it met on the way.

The Chinese sources of Douglas do not say so, the Mongol Senang Setzen does not mention it, and P. de la Croix denies it. As these massacres must have occurred in parts of what is now China, the silence of Chinese and Mongol authorities must bear greater weight than the assertion of d'Ohsson's Persian sources. It is known that these massacres occurred on the death of later Mongol Khans, and perhaps Persian chroniclers presumed it was normal procedure and that it also occurred on the death of Jenghiz Khan.

them to the dogs and the ravens—the raven is called "Mongol coffin" by the Chinese—the man who had solidified the tribes of Mongolia, and who had conquered half Asia, was deserving of better sepulture.

About a hundred miles to the north of where Urga now stands is a forest-covered range of hills called the Kentei Shan, rising to a height of five or six thousand feet above sea level. Many trails run through the dense growth of timber on its slopes, and in wooded valleys the three rivers of the ancient Mongol tribe have their sources. On one of the summits is a cairn so huge that it can be seen for miles, being some two hundred and fifty yards long by two hundred wide, one of the very greatest in all Asia.[1]

If a yellow-clad lama be asked the name of the man who lies buried beneath the towering pile, and why so many pilgrims go up to worship, he will probably reply that a great saint lies buried there, and if questioned further, he will reply that he does not know his name. About the sixteenth century Buddism spread over Mongolia, and placed a grip on the superstitious Mongol mind which has never been shaken off; so that the Mongol became the most priest-ridden of all mankind. If the peaceful doctrine of Buddism destroyed his blood-lust and his thirst for war—it was introduced into Mongolia with that end in view—it also took care to destroy the great memories of a tremendous past. Men who made the pilgrimage to bow down before the tomb of the terrible warrior were frowned upon by the official religion, and before long the officially fostered legend arose that a great saint was buried on the hill-top from whence flow the Onon, the Tola and the Kerulen, the rivers of the Mongols.

[1] Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, November, 1903.

But, it must be asked, if it is a saint, what saint? The great saints of Buddism are as well known as the great saints of Christianity, so who is this holy one who was given the greatest tomb in Mongolia, on the summit of the holiest mountain of the Mongols? Can it be any other than the greatest figure who ever rode across her plains? There is much evidence for the belief that this cairn is the last resting place of the great conqueror. Marco Polo and d'Ohsson both declare that he was buried on the top of a high mountain, and the latter explicitly states that it was the mountain from which the Tola, the Onon, and the Kerulen flow. In any case, it should not be long, now that civilization is forcing its way into Mongolia, before archæology gives us the final verdict on the subject. And until the point is finally settled, we can let it rest.[1]

We have now finished with the story of the Greatest Khan. Considered as a soldier, he towers head and shoulders over those other Great Captains whom Napoleon ordered military men to study; and it is noteworthy

[1] I must again note disagreement among the authorities before I take my final leave of them. The burial place of Jenghiz Khan is variously stated by Chinese authorities to have been (*a*) under a great tree which he had admired when out hunting, (*b*) in a valley near Karakorum, (*c*) in the Ordos country. After the burial ten thousand horses were galloped over the spot to eradicate all trace of the disrupted earth. See *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Dec. 1918. *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1925, Vol. LVI.

Against these we have d'Ohsson's statement that he was buried on the mountain from which the Onon, Tola, and Kerulen flow, and above all Marco Polo's statement that he was buried on the top of a high mountain. I have explained in the text that official Buddism would desire that the memory of the great warrior should be forgotten; and it must also be remembered that both d'Ohsson and Marco Polo could have had no reason to believe that such a mountain existed in the Mongolian plains, so that it is not likely they were merely repeating a local legend.

Douglas himself bears witness that the Chinese chronicles, though accurate regarding events in China itself, are of doubtful value when recording facts beyond the boundaries of China proper. Now Persian chroniclers were writing at Karakorum within a few years of the death of Jenghiz Khan, when his place of burial must have been as well known throughout Mongolia as Napoleon's is in France.

Therefore I have considered that Marco Polo and the Persian writers should carry more weight in this instance than Chinese historians.

that the only other soldier whose campaigns can be compared in extent with those of Jenghiz Khan was another Asiatic of his lineage, Timur, surnamed the Lame.

We may liken the Great Mongol to the paleolithic artist of the Old Stone Age, who by a few deft strokes with a broken flint on a splint of bone could produce a picture of stag or bison which still excites our admiration as a work of art. The Great Khan took the materials which lay ready to his hand; but the skill with which he used them proclaims the artist. Using the same simile, the art of war as practised in 1914-18, with all science at its disposal, which, after mere collisions of masses dignified by the name of "encounter battles," degenerated into stagnant massacres in mud solemnly termed "battles of attrition" may be likened to the work of some modern artists in colours. These latter, who have at their disposal more colours than the man of Altamira ever saw, invent such terms as "cubism" or "post-impressionism" to describe work which no pre-historic artist would have tolerated.

The factors which contributed to his success in war deserve to be studied in more detail than have been given in the narrative, because, now that his campaigns can be studied one with another, certain features are exposed which are not apparent in the meagre records available.[1]

First and foremost we must give much credit to the individual Mongol soldier. His hardihood, his discipline, and his self-reliance are contributory factors of importance. The Mongol pony also deserves its place. Together they made a simple and effective instrument; but the simpler the instrument, the more skilled must

[1] For a purely military analysis of his campaigns, see Appendix II.

be the artist who wields it, if the results are to be commensurate with the possibilities.

As a personality, his relentless energy when there was work to be done and his driving power, are unequalled by the Great Captains of the West. The pursuit of Jelaludin through the bleak Afghan highlands is only excelled by the pursuit of Mahommed undertaken by Chepe and Subutai.

In vision also, Jenghiz Khan is one of the great figures of history. Alexander and his phalanx cannot compare with this nomad chieftain whose horses wet their hoofs at the tip of the Shantung peninsula, on the surf-swept beaches of the Indian Ocean, and in the Dnieper. The brain becomes bewildered by the tremendous distances covered in his campaigns.

It may well be asked, what manner of man was this, who could look beyond the horizons which hem in the visions of ordinary men and who could lead armies of tens of thousands of warriors to what must have been the uttermost ends of their world, and in addition could make them pay for the privilege of enrolling under his banner. The galaxy of brilliant commanders who served the Great Khan can only be compared to Napoleon's marshals. Muhuli, Chepe, Tule, Ogdai, Juji, Jagatai, Bela Noyon and Subutai the greatest of them all, must individually occupy a high place among eminent soldiers.

So brilliant are these subordinates, that some historians, notably Gaubil, have fallen into the error of giving them the credit for the successes which followed the career of Jenghiz Khan. Nothing is more difficult than to allot the due proportion of credit to so brilliant a band of soldiers; but it is their commander who took the responsibility, who gave them their orders, and who

taught them the art of war. In the days of the Mongol cataclysm he stands out as the master craftsman. He co-ordinated their work and his was the directing hand. There is a sureness of stroke and a deftness in his method which does not stand out so clearly in the work of his subordinates. Long after he was dead the work of Subutai recalls the art of the master; but Subutai himself was a subordinate right to the end.

Chepe Noyon's stroke near Tiflis, when he fell on the rear of the Georgian army, or Subutai's decisive action at the Sajo in 1242 when he rode into the flank and rear of the Hungarian army, are samples of their art at its best; but masterly as they are, they must be compared with Jenghiz Khan's march to Bokhara.

Their strokes would end a battle, his ended a campaign without a battle. Where they thought in thousands of men on a square mile of ground, his mind pictured whole armies manœuvring in an empire.

And when we remember him on the field at Parwan, listening quietly to Siki Kutaku attempting to excuse himself, with thousands of his men strewn over the rocky valley, there is something in his reserve and his lack of incrimination which marks him as a man standing far above those about him. What, for instance, would Napoleon or Alexander have said and done under like circumstances?

With the power which had accrued to a united Mongolia ever before him, and with his empire spreading in all directions, it is not surprising that a remark is attributed to the Great Khan which indicates the widening of his ideas into the realm of political idealism. "There is but one sun in the sky, so there should be but one Khan over men." This idea has appealed to philosophers and idealists from long before his day; but unlike the

philosophers, Jenghiz Khan had the instrument and the practical ability to attain his ideal or a goodly portion of it.

Essentially a realist in his dealings with men, he did not attempt to justify his ideal by appeals to reason or morality, thoroughly understanding that great and deeply rooted prejudices require stern action if they are to be removed. He remarked on one occasion that he did not approve of drunkenness, a fault to which his pastorals were prone, and he declared roundly that it would be better for a man if he only got drunk once a month and better still if he even abstained altogether. "But," he added thoughtfully, "who can abstain altogether?"

If we turn our gaze to the darker side of the picture, and consider the devastation that he wrought, the countless numbers he killed in cold blood, and the misery he inflicted on civilization, I think we must make allowances. He was bound by a different code to that of civilization, and his mental and moral outlook were not the same as ours. The nomad's whole life revolves about an existence where scantiness of population and a life of movement are essentials, and such an environment must produce a different outlook to that formed amidst density of population and a stationary life. Civilization is based on agriculture and settlement, and the two social systems cannot exist together, in fact they are antagonistic to one another. It would be as natural for him to attempt to exterminate the agriculturist, as it is for the agriculturist to exterminate the nomad, and if civilization justifies its action on the grounds that necessity forces it, it cannot complain when the nomad has occasionally obtained the upper hand. Jenghiz Khan's code was to deal justly with his

friends and harshly with his foes, and rigidly he adhered to it. He knew no other.

In a wider sense, other considerations arise and other conclusions can be drawn from the impact of the pastoral on civilization. The question is sometimes asked, " What was the reason for this frightful cataclysm ? " Just as ancient theological philosophers demanded a sign from Heaven, so modern moralistic philosophy demands a reason for human activities. The outburst from Mongolia can be better understood if it is viewed as the resultant of certain conditions. Prior to the advent of Jenghiz Khan, Mongolia was a heterogeneous mixture of tribes, powerless against civilization by reason of disunity and inter-tribal conflict. While this condition existed, civilization was quite secure from tribal attack because of its fortifications.

Jenghiz Khan, by means of fire and the sword, rapine and murder, welded the tribesmen into a homogeneous unit. At once a new and terrible power was given to the pastorals, not due to natural genius but simply by reason of political unity, and the security of civilization was altered. The identical thing occurred when the nomadic tribes of Arabia were united by Mahommed. This does not imply that a conquering blood-lust was excited by unification ; but that a united people could over-ride the conditions which civilization had been in the habit of imposing on scattered tribal organizations.

Mahommed ordering the execution of Mongol merchants was simply civilization acting in its usual off-hand manner with a tribal chief : Jenghiz Khan destroying Bamian or Balkh was merely nomadism acting as it was accustomed to act with other nomads.

At the present day, also, it is commonly believed and

frequently so stated by emotional public speakers, that another war such as that of 1914-18 will mean the end of civilization. Apart from the fact that many people have a very vague idea of what is meant by civilization, let us cast our minds back seven centuries.

Civilization in the Far East was then divided politically as western civilization is at the present time. Khitan fought with Kin, and Kin with Sung, while Tangut on occasion fought them all impartially for liberty, national independence, political self-determination and all the other shibboleths we know so well to-day. Jenghiz Khan littered their fields with human corpses, his horses did not stumble when his armies rode where flourishing cities had been. The land between the Inner and Outer Walls was desert. It was war such as the West has never known. Civilization was at the mercy of the most ruthless and destructive armies the world has seen. But mark the sequel.

In fifty years, China, united politically, reached a grandeur it had never attained before or since. The Grand Canal, second only to the Great Wall as an engineering feat, had been built, Pekin was rising out of the debris of Yenking, rulers from Burma to the Baltic were paying tribute to a civilized emperor named Kublai Khan, who has appeared once before in this narrative as a little shepherd princeling welcoming his grandfather, Jenghiz Khan, on the banks of the Emil River. The isles of Java and Borneo felt his heavy hand. China's shipping explored the Indian Ocean, her sails were seen along the coasts of Africa as far as Madagascar. Rulers along the Indus and the Volga acknowledged themselves the vassals of the man who ruled China.

Traffic commenced between the Far East and the Far West, and one Marco Polo won the title of "Il

Milione" because he told a tale of millions of men and of wondrous wealth, but even then "he had not told one half of what he had really seen."

Can we not ascribe this wonderful re-birth to the human volcano which had erupted in Central Asia? Might it not be, perhaps, that the Mongol armies had swept away from the foundations of an ancient civilization, those prejudices, patriotisms, the national bias and preconceived ideas, with their political and philosophical rubbish, which had clogged men's minds and prevented the erection of a better and far greater social edifice? One of Jenghiz Khan's grandsons, with Subutai at his elbow, was shortly to do to Russia what the Great Khan had done to China.

Three centuries later we find a unified Russia rising from the wreckage of petty kingdoms and principalities, to work out its destinies as a united nation.

It has happened in other areas and at other times. It was not one of the many Leagues of Ancient Greece which brought peace to that squabbling civilization, nor philosophers like Thales of Miletus or Isocrates of Athens urging the cause of civilized unity as Briand urged it at Geneva—there were then quite as many political and social prejudices against such a scheme as there are now—but a soldier named Philip of Macedon; and if assassination removed him before his work was done, a lasting peace was finally imposed by Roman legions.

The long peace which has succeeded a millennium of strife in India was not brought into existence by moralizing visionaries, but by a succession of able soldiers, Clive, Wellesley, Napier, Nicholson, Havelock.

The wars which were incessant in Western Asia in Babylonian times were not stilled by priests of Ishtar or Bel calling on their gods, but by a prince of Anshan,

Cyrus, called the Great, one of the world's great soldiers.

Now that the geographical barriers on which sovereign nations relied for their security have been nullified by air-power, does the Western world await the coming of a soldier who will unite the struggling peoples and impose a lasting peace? If so, civilization will be fortunate if he is a Cyrus, as Xenophon described him in the Cyropædia, rather than a Jenghiz Khan.

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

IN my account of the invasion of Khwarazm and the events leading up to it, I have made use of the researches of d'Ohsson, Howorth, Barthold, P. de la Croix, and the diary of Chang Chun. It is now necessary to explain certain differences between d'Ohsson's narrative and those of Howorth and Barthold, especially regarding the chronology.

The first event of major importance in the war between Jenghiz Khan and Mahommed was Juji's expedition against the Merkits, which culminated in the battle of Karaku. Barthold, quoting his authority, gives the date as 1216, d'Ohsson, on the other hand, gives it as 1218. In spite of Barthold's assertion that he was able to use more reliable sources than d'Ohsson, there is a grave objection on purely military grounds to the date 1216.

It is highly improbable that Juji could have moved into the Talas river area as long as Gutchluk was in power in Kara Khitay. Gutchluk was not attacked by the Mongols until 1218, and, therefore, for Juji to have left so implacable a foe across the line of his retreat seems quite unlikely. Again, it is not probable that Jenghiz Khan would have attempted to punish the Merkits for their defection, without attempting to punish the author of that defection.

Barthold is next faced with the problem of the relief of Almalyk. He states that Chepe relieved it in 1218.

If so, the question must at once be asked, how did Chepe reach Kashgar in the same year? Remembering that the bridges across the torrents running down from Sairam Nor to Almalyk were not built until Jagatai moved down in 1219, and remembering also that the Muzart Pass, according to Owen Lattimore's description, can hardly be considered feasible, then Chepe, if we adhere to Barthold, must have ridden from Almalyk to the Sungarian Gate, thence to Urumchi (Bishbalik), and then to Kashgar, a most unlikely military proceeding. But Barthold's peculiar tenacity for a date, however improbable, leads him into more than one error, because being committed to 1216 for the Battle of Karaku, he is forced to suggest that it was Chepe that relieved Almalyk in 1218, and not Juji. I consider it likely, that Juji, who had been operating in 1217 against the Merkits of the Tannu Ola, had remained in Western Mongolia, and was the obvious commander to undertake the expedition against Almalyk and the remainder of the Merkits. (See Chapter IV.)

Again, Howorth, d'Ohsson, and Barthold all differ in their chronology for the capture of Bokhara and Samarkand. Howorth gives the date 1219, and then makes Jenghiz Khan encamp for a year at Samarkand in order to explain the subsequent chronology. Barthold gives the date as 1220, but states that the capture of Bokhara occurred in February, and the arrival of the Mongols before Samarkand in March. D'Ohsson gives the dates for these two events as March and April respectively, 1220, and Howorth when he states that Mahommed in his flight reached Nishapur on April 18th gives a date which fits in well with d'Ohsson's chronology, for Mahommed fled from Samarkand when he heard of the fall of Bokhara.

D'Ohsson's dates also fit in well with certain climatic conditions of this area.

Olufssen, in his work *The Emir of Bokhara and his Country*, a veritable mine of scientific detail, gives facts of the greatest importance regarding the country. Olufssen states (p. 150) that the melting of the snow in early March brings up the grass, but that it is withered and unfit for fodder by June. He also states that the spring rains at the end of March turn the desert clay into a veritable quagmire of slime (p. 160). These are items of the utmost importance to a commander with grass-fed and unshod ponies, because he would have to cross the steppe after the first appearance of the grass after the melting of the snow in the beginning of March, and before the coming of the rains at the end of the same month, when the passage of so large a number of ponies would churn up the slimy clay into an impassable morass. He would also be forced to find a well-watered area by June, when the steppe grass would be withered. If Barthold's dates are correct, on what did the ponies feed when crossing the steppe between Benaket and Bokhara ? D'Ohsson's dates, on the other hand, fit in so well with the scientific data recorded by Olufssen, that I have felt no hesitation in following them. I shall record another objection to Barthold's date in a later paragraph.

Again in Jenghiz Khan's oft-quoted order to his troops from the steps of the mosque in Bokhara, " Give your horses fodder," I feel that he was issuing a warning to his troops that the ponies were in poor condition owing to the grass being not yet long enough, and that an attack from Samarkand would be dangerous.

In so far as the preliminary operations undertaken by the Mongols against Khwarazm are concerned, Bart-

hold and d'Ohsson are practically in agreement. But there is another account of this campaign which is so obviously impossible that I have ignored it entirely in my text, and only refer to it here because it is contained in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and has been adopted by the well-known military critic and historian, Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart.

Howorth and P. de la Croix state that Jenghiz Khan detached two tumans under Juji before the main army passed through the Sungarian Gate, and sent them south to Kashgar. A study of the map reveals the fact that the route to be followed, via Urumchi (Bishbalik) seems somewhat roundabout and the Muzart passage must be ruled out at that time of year. From Kashgar, Juji's two tumans cross the mountains into Ferghana in the depths of winter where Juji meets Mahommed at the head of an army of 400,000 men and inflicts losses of 160,000. Incidentally, the passes from Kashgar into Ferghana were blocked by snow in winter. Liddell Hart, however, asserts that it was Chepe who crossed from Kashgar into Ferghana; it is to be noted that he does not quote his authority. After the battle Juji moves on Jand. Therefore Juji, according to his account, not only routs an army of fighting Turks nearly ten times his own numbers, but as commander of the left wing is given an objective beyond the flank of the right wing, and makes his march across the front of the advancing armies. Captain Liddell Hart deserves credit for being the first military writer to appreciate Jenghiz Khan as a great soldier; but it is a pity that he did not refer to the long notes at the end of Volume I of Howorth's history where he would have found a corrected version of the text, and the explanation that Chepe's march to Kashgar in 1218 and Juji's expedition of the same

year had very obviously become interwoven with the narrative of the invasion of Khwarazm in 1220.

I have previously referred to Barthold's dating of the fall of Samarkand. In his account of the pursuit of Mahommed by Chepe and Subutai, he states that their force crossed the Oxus in May and reached Nishapur in the beginning of June. This chronology agrees with d'Ohsson's ; but again it brings in a problem if we adhere to Barthold's date for the fall of Samarkand, i.e., March. If Samarkand fell in March, why did Jenghiz Khan wait one whole month before sending Chepe and Subutai in pursuit of Mahommed ? If, however, we adhere to d'Ohsson's date, i.e., April, no such objection arises. We can readily believe that the commander-in-chief, as soon as he realized that Mahommed was in flight, immediately ordered his two great subordinates in pursuit ; but it is difficult to find a reason for a delay of one whole month if we adhere to Barthold's chronology.

My chronology of the operations south of the Oxus must now be explained.

I have followed d'Ohsson for the expeditions of Togachar and Tule into Khorassan because his chronology fits the military aspects of the situation. Then when he states that Tule received urgent calls from the commander-in-chief owing to Jelaludin's activities south of the Hindu Kush, it is necessary to fix the date of the battle of Parwan and the siege of Bamian.

The Urgenj operation must be fitted into this scheme of things, because the Mongol army besieging Urgenj was also summoned to take part in the operations against Jelaludin, and it is clear that Jagatai was present at Bamian where his son was killed. Therefore the siege of Urgenj must be dated between the flight of Jelaludin in February, 1221, and the fall of Bamian. As a

clue to the date of the commencement of the siege of Urgenj we must consider the crossing of the Oxus by the army advancing towards the city. Vambery has recorded the difficulties which he encountered in crossing the Oxus when it was free from ice, whereas Burnaby, in his *Ride to Khiva* has shown that he had no difficulty when the river was frozen. Therefore it is justifiable to believe that the Mongol army crossed on the ice above Urgenj in January or February. Also the great losses incurred by the Mongols can be in part attributed to disease, which breaks out in summer. Barthold, however, states that the army under Ogdai and Jagatai moved on Urgenj from Bokhara, but that Juji, whom he believes to have stayed at Signak after his capture of the city in 1220, rode down from the north, possibly along the same route followed by Burnaby centuries later. The military objection to this is obvious. There was an army of 90,000 men in Urgenj, and it is hard to believe that it would have failed to take advantage of such wide separation between the forces of its enemy. Barthold also states that Urgenj fell in April, 1221. With all authorities agreeing that Mahommed died the previous December, that Jelaludin left Urgenj in February, after a short stay, on account of the approach of the Mongol army, there is the additional fact that the siege must have been a long one, due both to the strength of the defending forces and the fact that stones for the siege-engines were unobtainable. I am at a loss to discover Barthold's reason for making April the date of the fall of Urgenj, other than an uncritical adherence to a doubtful authority. Jelaludin would hardly have had time to raise his army, certainly he could not have caused Jenghiz Khan much anxiety by April. With most other accounts giving the duration of the siege as six months,

I have felt, taking all things into consideration, that the fall of Urgenj must be dated June or July, with the probability on the latter month. This date also fits in with the operations further east. If Tule arrived at Merv in the end of February, the sack of the city must have occurred in the second or third week of March. Then followed the siege of Nishapur and the devastation of Khorassan, for which two months can be allowed, bringing the operations into the second or third week of May. His march to Herat, with his train of siege-engines and plunder detracting from the normal mobility of a Mongol army, possibly took another month, and the setting up of the siege-engines and the submission of the city would therefore bring us to the end of June or the beginning of July.

Further to the east, Talikhan held out for six months. It may be presumed with confidence that its siege commenced at the beginning of the year when Jenghiz Khan sent out raiding parties into Ferghana and Badakshan, and it was probably the news of Jelaludin's activity which forced Jenghiz Khan to take the conduct of the siege into his own hands. A six months' siege must again bring us to June or July. Confirmation is given from another source.

In Chang Chun's diary, the philosopher mentions meeting a Tangut envoy on October 27th, 1221, who declared that he had left Jenghiz Khan on August 1st, and that the Mongol was now (i.e., in October) pursuing Jelaludin into India. It seems quite likely that this envoy, who had been sent from Tangut on a mission to Jenghiz Khan and was returning home when he met Chang Chun, left the Mongol headquarters because Jenghiz Khan was about to commence his operations towards Bamian. This gives us therefore a date on which the

march to Bamian can be based with a fair degree of certainty.

When we remember the urgent demands which Jenghiz Khan had sent to the other armies which had been operating in the west, it must be considered that he would not have moved south towards Bamian until he had received reinforcements. Tule, being nearer, most likely reached him first, and the forces from Urgenj could have joined him after the march to Bamian commenced. The next important event was the battle on the Indus. Bamian must have fallen, then, in August or September, and if we take into account the speed with which the pursuit was pressed after its fall and destruction, we have no choice but to date the battle on the Indus in September or the beginning of October, 1221. The pursuit of Jelaludin could not have occurred much later than this for the passes between Ghazni and the Indus are blocked by snow in winter, say from the middle of November to March. Also the passes over the Hindu Kush become clogged with snow in October with the exception of the Khawak Pass, which Jagatai could have used in February, when he moved north from Parwan and repaired the bridge over the Oxus. At this stage the Chinese authority comes into the picture and provides a fixed date from which there can be no departure.

Chang Chun had seen a total eclipse of the sun on May 23rd, 1221, and if we plot his position we will place him approximately in lat. 48° N., long. 114° E. His journeying can be plotted easily on the 1:4,000,000 War Office map, and astronomy has verified the date. According to Chang Chun, Jagatai was back on the Oxus repairing a damaged bridge at Pendjab in February, 1222. Now Jenghiz Khan did not hurry back to the

Hindu Kush after his victory on the Indus. He encamped for a while at Peshawar, and marched leisurely back through the Khyber Pass to the vicinity of Kabul. As it can be presumed that Jagatai was with him, then we are committed to five months from the date of his departure from Bamian to the date when Jagatai rode north from Kabul to repair the bridge, a length of time that seems reasonable, remembering that it was winter and that there were no active enemy forces in the field.

The subsequent operations consisting of the expeditions of Bela Noyon into the Punjab, Jagatai's march through Baluchistan to Tez, and the final destruction of Herat, must therefore be placed in 1222. It is true that Chang Chun's chronology is at variance with that of Mongol, Chinese and Persian authorities, but the date of the eclipse of the sun that he records is final.

According to d'Ohsson, for instance, Bela Noyon was sent in pursuit of Jelaludin the day following the battle on the Indus which d'Ohsson thinks occurred in December; yet he records that it was the heat which forced Bela to return. If we take this last fact as a most probable one we are forced to date Bela's raid during the hot weather, between the middle of April and the middle of September, and not in the spring as would be necessary if we adhere to d'Ohsson's date for the battle on the Indus, and Jagatai's unfortunate experience in the desert of Makran must be similarly dated. If Jagatai started on his march through Baluchistan after repairing the bridge on the Oxus, then he would have been encamped near Tez in the summer of 1222.

The only other alternative is to believe that Jagatai may have started for Baluchistan after the battle on the Indus, but if that be so then he would have been in Makran in winter instead of the summer. Against this

there is Chang Chun's notice of him on the Oxus in February which cannot be dismissed, and we know that he lost many men in the burning heat of summer. Again, Jelaludin fled to the vicinity of Delhi after the battle on the Indus, and there would be no point in sending a force into Baluchistan to prevent him reaching Persia when it is unlikely that Jenghiz Khan would have received any intimation of Jelaludin's intentions until much later.

The final capture of Herat is given the highly probable date of June 14th, 1222, by Howorth. As the siege lasted six months, it must have commenced in January, and if we allow the army four to six weeks to reach Herat from Kabul, we arrive at the month of December, 1221, for the start of the besieging army. If the battle on the Indus occurred at the end of September, Jenghiz Khan would hardly have risked dispatching so large an army before he had taken stock of probable eventualities. When Chang Chun visited him in Afghanistan in May the forces which Jenghiz Khan was keeping under his own hand must have been small. There were 70,000 men before Herat, Bela had 20,000 in the Punjab, Jagatai had another 20,000 in Baluchistan and 20,000 were with Chepe and Subutai. Undoubtedly, the number given for the Herat army includes labourers and captives, so that the actual strength of the soldiers was probably not more than thirty to forty thousand. The fighting men of the garrison had been already destroyed by Tule. Then another deduction which must be made is that of Juji's following, which may have amounted to 15,000 or 20,000. Making deductions for casualities, the heaviest losses occurred at the siege of Urgenj, the defeat of Kutaku at Parwan, and at the battle on the Indus, apart from the normal wastage which can be expected

in campaigns undertaken in enemy countries. If we place his losses at Urgenj at 10,000, at Parwan 12,000, and at the Indus 5,000, we reach a figure of 27,000 battle casualties. Then for the rest, a thousand a month could be considered normal wastage, say 24,000 to the end of 1221. This gives a figure of total casualties, little more than a guess, it is true, of 51,000 men. There is no record of reinforcements from Mongolia; but it is highly probable that Turkomans had joined his armies, just as they had flocked into the camps of Chepe and Subutai. Again, it must be considered that although Jagatai and Bela had each two tumans, their tumans could not possibly have been at full strength owing to casualties, unless Turkomans had been recruited.

APPENDIX II

HAVING given the bald facts of the campaigns of Jenghiz Khan in the text, it is now necessary to study this amazing chapter in the history of Asia from a military standpoint.

In doing so, we must endeavour to guard ourselves from the trap in which the historian is always liable to be caught, and that is we must not allow the actual success which attended the Mongol's strategy to overwhelm our critical faculties. The critic who becomes merely the obsequious historian does no service to history or to the military art, because when dealing with human efforts and aspirations, success need not necessarily be the result of sound or careful planning, and disaster likewise may be due to circumstances over which no control was possible and against which foresight could not have guarded.

Too often, the sole criterion by which a soldier is judged is the final success which followed his method of making war, and it is the hall-mark of the obsequious to point to the actual result as an indication of the measure of the man. " His plan succeeded," says the historian, " therefore behold a genius." In the military art, as in other arts, the work of the artist stands or falls on its own merits, but in warfare it is seldom possible to make hard and fast comparisons because determining factors such as conditions, materials, geography, and times are never exactly the same, and it is true to say that the better soldier may leave the field of battle the defeated man. Zama and Waterloo are two examples

where the defeated commanders remained the greatest soldiers of their day and age.

When analysing the campaigns of Jenghiz Khan, caution becomes doubly necessary, because the critic is confronted with a man who commenced his career as a fugitive and died the greatest conqueror the world has ever seen.

The Campaigns in North China, 1211-14.

In Jenghiz Khan's campaigns in North China, there are two factors of prime importance which must be kept firmly in mind. First, the poor fighting capacity of the Chinese forces permitted the Mongol commanders to take risks which should have resulted in disaster had they been opposed by first-rate troops, and secondly, the absence of any fixed line for the Mongol communications, because there was no vulnerable base of operations, must also have lifted an enormous burden from the mind of the commander-in-chief. The line of the Great Wall was, to the Mongols, what an enemy sea-coast with numerous harbours would be to a sea-power in complete control of the seas. The Mongol armies could strike anywhere and at any time, and had they been defeated in the field, they only need to have retreated in a general northerly direction to have reached complete security. The weight which was lifted from the minds of the Mongol generals is obvious and made possible that wide dispersion of armies which is unique in military history.

The unexcelled mobility of the Mongols, a result, be it noted, not of special military training but of their normal habits of life adapted to war, and the poor fighting quality of the Chinese soon resulted in the elimination of the Chinese field armies, which then took

refuge behind the walls of their cities. Next we find the Mongols, when confronted with this problem of fixed defences with which they had no previous experience, attempting to storm strong defences without adequate siege weapons, just as the embattled armies in the Great War of 1914-18 attempted to do, and it was probably the arrow which wounded Jenghiz Khan himself that caused him to seek another solution. His next move was to disperse his forces through the countryside, ignoring the centres of enemy resistance. These raiding detachments of Mongols brought a pressure to bear on the Kin behind their walls very similar to the pressure of the British navy in European wars.

The Mongol khan had no vulnerable base to guard and no line of communications to watch so he was able to ravage all China north of the Yellow River with an abandon which no commander of a civilized army could have permitted himself. But even this pressure was no solution to the military problem presented by the strong walls of the cities. That could only be solved by siege methods, and with these the Mongols were totally unacquainted. The conquests of these defences depended on artillery, and it was the massed desertion of Chinese acquainted with siege-engines that placed an adequate supply of the proper weapons at the Mongols' disposal. Therefore it can be said that the Mongol cavalry provided the political, economic and moral pressure, but the siege-engines and starvation were the weapons that brought the war to a successful conclusion.

The Campaign against Khwarazm.

This campaign in the year A.D. 1220 is undoubtedly a most amazing example of the successful use of mobility against impregnability. The long march to the area of

operations, the complete disregard of the lines of communication, and the mobility of the Mongol armies have an aspect far more akin to the sailing of a fleet to an enemy's coasts than to anything in land warfare.

But this time, the opponents of the Great Khan were Turks, men of a fighting race, and yet we find that they were eliminated from the scene even more easily than the unwarlike Chinese had been. Superficially, the boldness of the Mongol's stroke against Bokhara appears to contrast with Mahommed's inactivity, thereby apparently stamping the hall-mark of genius on the character of Jenghiz Khan. But there are other considerations which must be considered if we would reach a correct appreciation of this campaign.

A point of prime importance was the strategic disadvantages which geography had imposed on Mahommed. From the very first, Mahommed was in a very unfavourable position. He had already discovered for himself the prowess of the Mongols on the field of battle. Had he marched north through the Arys pass in order to meet the approaching Mongol armies on the steppes, he would have been risking everything on a single throw, and he knew that the chances of victory were against him. Had he been defeated, he had only one line of retreat, the Arys pass, and even if he could have accomplished that passage safely, he still would have had the wide river Jaxartes behind him. He would have risked annihilation—without compensating factors.

On the other hand, by placing strong garrisons in the cities, and keeping his main army concentrated at Samarkand, the losses caused his foes by having to storm the city walls should have eventually given him an opportunity for a successful counterstroke.

In any case, the ordinary claims of political necessity

would have prevented him from withdrawing all his forces from the north bank of the Jaxartes in order to strengthen his main striking force, and it must have been with keen satisfaction that he watched the desperate resistance offered by Otrar and Khojend. Had he concentrated at Otrar, he would have had the ice of the frozen river to facilitate his retreat during the months of January and February; but if the Mongols then withheld their attack until spring Mahommed would have been faced with the problem of retreating before the ice broke up or else staking everything on a battle at Otrar, with no possibility of retreat if defeated.

He decided to concentrate at Samarkand and trust to the efforts of the northern cities to weaken the Mongol numbers.

But it is obvious that he realised the danger of a Mongol stroke against the Zarafshan valley, the heart and kernel of his domain and his defensive plan. When we remember that he was an experienced soldier who had added Afghanistan and Persia to his domain, it seems likely that he must have given consideration to a concentration in the vicinity of Zernuc. But here again, he was faced with the problem of holding a large army of restless and undisciplined Turks inactive in the field, merely watching and waiting, because inaction is always dangerous even with the best disciplined troops.

The initiative lay always with the Mongols, and taking the special features of the climate into consideration, Mahommed might easily have believed that the Mongol armies would not cross the Jaxartes until the March rains had given place to the April sunshine, and certainly not until Otrar had fallen. Had he guessed rightly, he could have moved his army, over one hundred

thousand strong, to Zernuc in April, and there awaited the Mongol onslaught.

Jenghiz Khan forestalled any such move, if such had been in Mahommed's mind. But if we give the Mongol commander-in-chief full credit for a wonderful appreciation of Mahommed's intentions, we are nevertheless forced to consider the step he took as the height of audacity. Even if we realize that Jenghiz Khan was well served by a remarkable intelligence system, it is most unlikely he believed that his march on Bokhara would turn into the decisive stroke that it became. Why, for instance, did he only take one third of his army with him? If we give him credit for a wonderful intelligence system, then he must have been fully cognizant of the powerful force that was concentrated in Samarkand, and he must also have known of that other force that included twenty thousand Turkish cavalry in Bokhara.

No commander of his experience would advance across a broad river and broader deserts to face three times his numbers in the middle of his enemy's country, when by waiting a month or two until Otrar had fallen he could have concentrated his full force and brought his numbers up to those of his opponents.

Is it not very probable that his march to Bokhara was intended as a diversion or a great raid instead of the decisive stroke? Let us consider for a moment the situation in which the Mongol khan and his fifty thousand men might have found themselves had Bokhara been commanded by a man like Timur Melik, the hero of Khojend, or Inaljuk who had commanded at Otrar. The Mongols would have found themselves investing the strong fortress of Bokhara whose garrison alone was nearly equal to their own numbers,

and four or five days' march away in Samarkand was the main army under Mahommed, but what is more important, the rainy season which turns the desert clay into an impassable slime was due in two or three weeks.

Returning to Mahommed in Samarkand. He must have been gravely disturbed when he heard of the loss of Zernuc and Nur ; but these disasters had by no means ruined him, in fact they should have increased his hopes of victory. So far as he could discover, somewhere out in the desert was a Mongol army, and the rains were not far off. The strong walls of Bokhara should hold the Mongols just as Otrar had done.

Then when the rains broke in two or three weeks' time, the Mongol ponies should be slithering about on the greasy clay surface of the steppe. That was the time for Mahommed to move, for he should then find the Mongol cavalry reduced almost to immobility. He had infantry, and the Mongols had none, and the infantry bow has always been more powerful than the bow of the horseman. " Let Bokhara hold Jenghiz Khan for a couple of weeks," so Mahommed could argue with justification, " and then we have him."

The rainy season which turns the Kizil Kum clay into a quagmire is as certain as the rains which fall in Belgium and Northern France in late summer, yet the Mongol dared to risk everything at such a time and won, whereas the British armies in 1917 attacked in the mud of Flanders and lost. Such is the uncertainty of war.

Mahommed had no reason to believe, any more than had Jenghiz Khan, that Bokhara would submit tamely without more than the veriest show of resistance : in proof of this is the large train of siege-engines which the Mongol took with him. But when the news of the

capitulation of Bokhara was brought to Mahommed, he was obviously right in considering that the war was lost.

There were now fifty thousand Mongols in Bokhara, and one hundred thousand in the north, and it was very obvious that his own troops were not to be depended on.

Whatever we may think of the daring march of the Mongol khan round the Nurata hills from Zernuc to Nur, it is impossible to reach any other conclusion but that the tame surrender of Bokhara was a turn of fortune's wheel which Mahommed had no reason to expect and Jenghiz Khan had no right to deserve. It raised the Mongol to the pinnacle which he holds among the great warriors of Asia, it abased Mahommed to the lowest depths of the moralists' scorn. Had the Bokhara garrison fought as Otrar or Khojend had fought, all the genius which is now attributed to Jenghiz Khan by historians might not have saved him from irretrievable disaster, and those historians who have so glibly poured their scorn on the head of Mahommed would now be hailing him as the equal of Timur the Great. Had the wheel of fortune turned the other way it is probable that the name of Jenghiz Khan would be as obscure as those of the other nomadic chiefs who have ravaged China through the centuries, while Ala-ud-din Mahommed might have been the forerunner of Baber and Timur.

If we are correct in our assumption that Jenghiz Khan did not expect to capture Bokhara without having to fight for it, what was in his mind when he set out from Benaket ?

With his methods in China before us, I consider that he had formed some plan whereby two or more Mongol armies would have swung through Khwarazm distracting the defence and harrying the land. It is likely that

Jenghiz Khan expected that the appearance of his army before Bokhara should have caused Mahommed to march out from Samarkand to engage him. Then would have ensued a series of manœuvres in which he with his superior mobility would have fenced with Mahommed while his other forces north of the Jaxartes would have swept down to Djizak, and from there descended into the Zarafshan valley to ravage the land in the dreadful Mongol manner. Mahommed would have been forced back towards Samarkand to save himself from being surrounded by a ring of his foes. There would next have commenced the same sort of operation which had proved so successful in China. Mongol detachments would have swept through Khwarazm while a blockading force stationed itself outside the gates of the capital, and eventually Samarkand would have fallen.

Some such plan seems reasonable, whereas a deliberate march to Bokhara with only fifty thousand men on the considered assumption that the city would fall like Jericho before Joshua, is entirely beyond the bounds of possibilities.

But when Bokhara capitulated, the Mongol took full advantage of his stroke of good luck, and at once put the second half of his plan into execution, bringing the northern armies down to meet him outside Samarkand, and thus the war was ended without a battle, because it is only when opponents are of equal courage, ability, and fighting capacity that war becomes a long drawn-out and bloody affair. It is then that the commanders of the opposing armies are held as examples of military ineptitude by the unprincipled and the ignorant. When the ability and capacity of the opponents is unequal, the victorious commander is hailed as a genius, despite the fact that genius faced by a stubborn foe is apt to

go the way of the mediocrity. Napoleon at Waterloo is an example. When analysing this campaign, it is well to remember the dictum of the great Moltke who once remarked that if he could see three courses open to the enemy, his opponent would probably choose a fourth. If anyone cares to turn to Liddell Hart's analysis of this campaign he will see this truth very clearly. That military critic makes Jenghiz Khan do things very different from what the Mongol actually did. He also acclaims these purely imaginary moves as perfect examples of the correct application of the principles of war, which no doubt they would have been—had the Mongol made them.

There is another lesson in this campaign to which it would be timely to draw attention. There is a type of intellectual who sincerely believes that war is useless and unnecessary, and that fighting in war cannot possibly have any good result. Mahommed and the commander of the Bokhara garrison behaved in a manner which must win the approval of this type of modern pacifist, because they did nothing of any consequence when faced with an invading host.

A hard-fought battle at Zernuc or Bokhara, even had it ended in the defeat of Mahommed, should have caused the Mongol sufficient loss to have made him pause. Mahommed might have lost fifty thousand men in a single engagement, but had he fought as desperately as Turks normally do, he should have given the Mongol khan his bellyful of war. Then there would have been no ravaging of Badakshan, no massacres of whole populations at Balkh, and Merv and Herat, no depopulation of Khorassan, no sack of the great cities of Persia, and the Tatar conquest of Russia and the horror that came of it would never have eventuated.

Timur was faced by a similar invasion, but he never evaded battle. Instead he charged headlong into the Tatar ranks wherever he found them, with the result that the nomads under their great chief Toktamish never became the destroyers of civilization that their forefathers under the Mongol khans had been.

But it was only the savage fighting spirit of Timur which prevented another catastrophe that might easily have equalled the Mongol cataclysm.

Campaign against Tangut, 1226-27.

In this campaign Jenghiz Khan's strategy again consisted in making the best use of the mobility of the Mongol armies.

Slow-moving infantry forces may be forced to attack the centre of the enemy's strength as the quickest method of ending the war; but possession of superior mobility and the lack of vulnerable lines of communication permitted the Mongols to adopt a much less costly means to ultimate victory.

When faced with the impregnable walls of Ningsia, Jenghiz Khan simply turned his forces into the surrounding country. He had done the same when the Kins had taken refuge behind their city fortifications. Fortifications must be defended by infantry and because no infantry could ever hope to overtake the Mongol cavalry, this dispersal of forces was a feasible operation. The Mongols therefore simply ignored the great walls that held their prey and ravaged the country districts. The constant harassing of the weaker portions of the enemy's defensive system is undoubtedly the cheapest method of prosecuting a war; but it depends on three factors, viz., impregnability of base, secure lines of communication, and superior mobility. Therefore it has

been the method of sea-power since the earliest days. A power in command of the sea has always directed its attentions to outlying areas and avoided attacks on the centres of the enemy's strength. Thus England's wars have always been based on these same foundations of impregnability of base and security of the lines of communication, with mobility provided by her ships.

It is likely to be the method adopted by air forces in the future. By harassing the enemy's country with bombs, air power should obtain results commensurate with the risks. To limit itself to the attack of fortified or defended areas is to take on work that should be left to the army.

It is these factors which give the Mongol warfare a similar aspect to naval warfare in the days of sail. Their armies could keep the field as long as the country in which they operated had supplies, just as Nelson could keep the sea as long as he could feed his seamen.

General.

A most interesting point in the military career of Jenghiz Khan was the development of his methods. In his first invasions of Tangut he was baffled at every turn. The instrument which he understood so well in a mobile war on Mongolian plains brought him very little success when used against the defences of civilization.

I have referred to the miserable fort of Yu-men which was the only fortified work he captured on his first raid on Tangut, and it was no less than four years later before he solved the problem. That he, the greatest conqueror in history, had to revise his ideas of war after bitter experience, is a fact worth remembering. Critics of the conduct of the war of 1914-18, especially those with no practical knowledge of the subject, but possessed of

facile pens and an easy style, have been prone to hold the trained soldier up to popular contumely because those placed in command of armies had not appreciated either the stopping-power of machine guns or the necessity for heavy guns or tanks. Jenghiz Khan in his raids on civilization first attempted to take strong walls with cavalry; and it took four years of war to teach him that he would have to find other means.

If the Mongol armies possessed mobility to a degree attained by no other armies before or since, we must ascribe the successful employment of this quality in part to the intelligence system inaugurated by the Great Khan, and especially to the scouting system he developed. I have previously referred to the scouting screen; but it is worth further study.

When Rei was being sacked by Chepe and Subutai, Mahommed, with a start of one hundred miles, fled towards Karind, and after leaving Rei, Chepe moved to Kum. Now if we make full allowances for relative speeds, it is impossible that Chepe could have moved much beyond Kum at the time when a scouting detachment of his army was already chasing Mahommed beyond Karind, and the distance between Kum and Karind is 300 miles. It is to be noted that this detachment was operating in enemy territory. Compare this with modern practise, which was content in 1914 to have its advanced patrols some five to ten miles ahead of the main army. The lack of this scouting screen explains much that happened in 1914, characterised by ignorance of the enemy's position, direction of march, flanks and numbers.

Another instance which can be cited was the occasion when the Mongol officer in charge of a scouting party captured the governor of Mukden, and then gained entrance into that city by display of the governor's

credentials. It is recorded that this officer was three days in advance of Muhuli—say 100 to 150 miles. It has been well said that the commander of an army is not everything ; but that every junior officer is an important link in the chain. The action of this junior officer, first in attacking and capturing the governor, and then in taking advantage of the opportunity which fate had so unexpectedly placed before him, is an example of how the action of a subordinate, possessed of fine courage and splendid self-reliance, can have a decisive effect on a campaign. The delegation of responsibility in a Mongol army, with the employment of small scouting groups operating two or three days' journey from superior control, must have developed a very high type of subordinate officer.

Now let us examine the two defeats the Mongols suffered, i.e., Juji's defeat near Karaku in 1218, and Kutaku's defeat by Jelaludin at Parwan in 1221.

Juji had overtaken and annihilated a Merkit force, and had afterwards turned for home. He was proceeding slowly when Mahommed came up from behind. It must be obvious that as soon as Juji turned his army homewards after his victory over the Merkits, he would have had no scouting forces behind him, firstly because the advanced screen would have been stopped by the Merkits, and secondly when the Mongol had accomplished their defeat and turned for home, the position of his scouts would have been in advance of his retiring army. Mahommed managed to obtain a surprise because Juji had no reason to believe that there were any hostile forces behind him, and consequently would have had no scouts in that direction.

Again, when Siki Kutaku was ordered to watch Jelaludin in 1221, it can readily be believed that he

exceeded his instructions when he crossed the Hindu Kush, because the mere presence of his army north of the range would have prevented Jelaludin from moving down the Ghorband to relieve Bamian. But we also know that Jelaludin caught and destroyed Kutaku's scouting party at Valian, which is north of the Hindu Kush. In the mountains also, scouts would be forced to keep to the defiles where it is easy for an enemy to halt them, and therefore the young commander must have pushed on over the range without his scouting screen which explains why he was forced to give battle on most unsuitable ground. We thus have the remarkable fact that on the two occasions during the campaigns of Jenghiz Khan when we know the Mongols were unprotected by scouts, they suffered defeat.

A fact which we must always remember when studying these Mongol campaigns is that in the thirteenth century, as in the twentieth, the defensive had conquered the offensive, and siege warfare had replaced manœuvre in the field. Armies of infantry could make little headway until the advent of gunpowder, and armies of civilized cavalry, without the special characteristics of the Mongols, which consisted in the ability to subsist on a minimum of supplies, were at a worse disadvantage than infantry.

Civilized cavalry horses could not have subsisted on the dead grass beneath the snow in winter, and the cavalrymen would not have relished the fare of horse and camel meat which the Mongol enjoyed.

Civilized cavalry could not have been content with the simple felt tents and the fuel of horse and camel dung.

But let it be remarked that the ignoring of the centres of enemy resistance and consequent harassing of outlying districts depends on the time factor to a great extent.

In most of these Mongol campaigns the speed with which the Mongol conquered an area was of comparative unimportance. But in Tule's campaign into Khorassan, the time factor was of great importance, because of the threat imposed by Jelaludin's activities in Afghanistan. Therefore we find that Tule was forced to make a frontal assault on such fortifications as stood in the way of the complete subjugation of Khorassan. He adopted the methods of the western armies in 1914-18, that is, he first prepared breaches in the hostile defences and then sent his men to the attack. Time was too important to permit him to indulge in the slow, if cheaper, method of reducing the country by widespread ravages.

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